NATURAL HISTORY

OF THE

PASSIONS.

From the French of M. Des Cartes

Mihi crede, qui nihil agere videntur, Majora agunt; humana divinaq; simul tractant. Seneca Epist. 8.

by Henry Carey Earl of Monmouth

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EPISTLE PREFATORY,

To a Perſon of Honor,

Friend to the Author.

Ειράζεται ἐις ἀρετὴν ἐν ἐρημία ψυχή, *exercetur ad virtutem in ſolitudine anima*; was the the ſaying of a *Bragman* or Indian Philoſopher to *Alexander* the the *Great*: and how memorable it is, you may perhaps collect from this diverſion. For, the imperfect *Diſcourſe* I herewith ſend to you, my dear *Friend*, concerning the PASSIONS, is the product of my late ten weeks *ſolitude* in the Country. Where being remote from my Library, and wanting converſation with Learned Men; I knew not how more innocently to ſhorten the winter evenings, than by ſpending them in reviſing

ſome Philoſophical papers of my own, wherein among other things, I had formerly, out of the beſt Authors, made certain *Collections* concerning the divine art of acquiring conſtant *Tranquillity* of Mind, by *Wiſedom* or the right uſe of Reaſon. And of this ſerious Diverſion I then made choice, both becauſe I well underſtood the beſt part of Human Science to be that which teacheth us how to moderate our *Affections* to the deceiptfull and tranſitory things of this life, and ſo to regulate our *Actions*, as to reap from them, whatever their Events may be, the happy fruit of internal *Acquieſcence* and Satisfaction: and becauſe my accumulated Misfortunes had at that time reduced me to a neceſſity of conſulting that part of Philoſophy, about the moſt effectual *Remedies* againſt *Diſcontent*.

In this ſtate and reſolution then, firſt I remembred, that Nature hath made

made Man ſubject to no other *real* Evil, but only *pain* of the *Body*; all *Grief* or pain of the *Mind*, though many times more ſharp and intollerable, being created by our own falſe *Opinion*, that we ſtand in want of things that are in truth without the circle of ourſelves, and therefore not abſolutely neceſſary to our wel-being.

Then I conſidered, that moſt commonly *falſe Opinions* are occaſioned, and ſo exorbitant *Deſires* ſuggeſted to us by our *Paſſions*; upon which all the *Good* and *Evil* incident to us in this life, ſeem's to depend: as *Joy* and *Grief* are the two points in which all Human actions end. For, though it be undoubtedly true, that the *Reaſonable* Soul hath her *intellectual Delights* and *Diſquiets* apart, ſuch as are proper to her ſimple and ſpiritual nature: yet is it no leſs true, that thoſe other Delights and Diſquiets that are common to her with the *Body*,

dy, depend intirely upon the *Affections*. Which when *regular*, that is, moderated and directed by *reaſon*, are indeed of good uſe to the Soul, in that they ſerve to incite her to deſire ſuch objects which ſhe well know's to be pleaſant and beneficial to her, and to perſiſt in that deſire: but when *irregular*, by repreſenting as realy good, things that are ſo only in apparence, provoke her to erroneous *Deſires*, and in perſuit of them, to *Actions* alſo repugnant to the dictates of right *Reaſon*, and conſequently to peace and *tranquility* of Mind.

From theſe Cogitations it was not difficult for me to infer, that the whole art of attaining unto that internal ſerenity after which I was ſeeking, conſiſteth principaly in *Directing our Deſires aright*, that is, to things which we clearly and diſtinctly know to be realy Good: and that the only way ſo to direct our Deſires, is to imploy our Underſtanding or Faculty of Diſcerning

cerning, which God hath to that end given us, ſtrictly and attentively to *examine* and *conſider* the *goodneſs* of things recommended to us by our *Paſſions*, before we determin our *Will* to affect and perſue them. For, moſt certain it is, that as our faculty of *Diſcerning*, that is our *Intellect*, cannot naturaly tend to *falſity*: ſo neither can our faculty of *Aſſenting*, that is our *Will*, be deceived, when it is determined only upon objects which we clearly and diſtinctly underſtand; and where our Will is not miſplaced, there can be no juſt cauſe of *Perturbation* of mind.

Being ſoon convinced of this no leſs evident than important verity, in the next place I conſidered, that if our inordinate *Affections* be the bitter fountain from whence the greateſt part of, if not all our *practical Errors*, and by conſequence moſt of the *Evils* we ſuffer, flow; and if as the diſeaſes of the *Body*, ſo likewiſe

thoſe of the *Mind* may be more eaſily cured, when their nature and cauſes are underſtood: then would it be requiſite for me firſt to inquire as far as I ſhould be able, into the *nature*, *cauſes*, *motions*, *&c.* of the *Paſſions*, before I proceeded further in my reſearch after the moſt powerfull *Remedies* againſt their *Exceſſes*.

To this inquiry therefore I diligently applied myſelf, both by reading and meditation; by *Reading*, that I might recall into my memory what I had long before tranſcribed out of the books of ſuch Authors who had writen judiciouſly and laudably of the Paſſions: by *Meditation*, that I might examin the weight of what I read, by comparing it with what I daily obſerved within the theatre of my own breaſt; every Man living being naturaly ſo ſenſible of the various Commotions hapning in various Paſſions, eſpecialy more violent ones, that ſome have held, the knowledge

of

of their nature and cauſes may be without much of difficulty derived from thence alone, without any help from foreign obſervations. And while I proceeded in this courſe, I digeſted my Collections and private Sentiments into ſuch an order or *Method* which ſeem'd to me moſt convenient, aſwell to ſhow their genuin ſucceſſion, and mutual dependence, as to make the Antecedents ſupport the Conſequents, and both to illuſtrate each other reciprocaly. I put them alſo into a dreſs of *Language* ſo plain and familiar, as may alone evince, my deſign was to write of this Argument, neither as an Orator, nor as a Moral Philoſopher, but only as a *Natural* one converſant in *Pathology*, and that too more for his own private ſatiſfaction, than the inſtruction of others. And thus have I ſuccinctly acquainted you with the *Occaſion*, *Subject*, *Scope* and *Stile* of the Treatiſe that accompanieth this Epiſtle. ¶

But

But this, *Noble* Sir is not all whereof I ought to advertiſe you, before you come to open the Treatiſe itſelf. There remain yet *two* or *three* things more, which it imports me to offer to your notice, as Preparatives againſt prejudice.

ONE is, that if in the preliminary part of the Diſcourſe, where it was neceſſary for me to inveſtigate the *Subjectum Primarium* of the Paſſions, I have declared my aſſent to their opinion, who hold that in every individual Man, there are *two* diſtinct *Souls*, coexiſtent, conjoined, and cooperating; one, only *Rational*, by which he is made a Reaſonable creature; the other, *Senſitive*, by virtue whereof he participateth alſo of Life and Senſe: I did ſo chiefly for theſe *two* reaſons.

Firſt, it ſeem'd to me unintelligible, how an Agent incorporeal, but not infinite, ſuch as the *Rational* Soul by her excellent faculties and proper

acts

acts appear's to be, can act phyſically in and upon a groſs and ponderous body, ſuch as ours are, immediately or without the mediation of a *third* thing; which though corporeal too, may yet be of a ſubſtance ſo refined and ſubtil, as to approach ſomwhat neerer to the nature of a pure Spirit, than the body itſelf doth: and therefore for the more probable explication of the *Phenomena* of the Paſſions which are not raiſed in the Rational Soul, I found myſelf obliged to admit her to have a *Senſitive* one conjoyned with her, to receive her immediate ſuggeſtions, and to actuate the body according to her ſoveraign will and pleaſure; there being leſs of diſparity betwixt the moſt thin and ſubtil bodies of Light and *Flame* (whereof many eminent Philoſophers have conceived a *Senſitive* Soul to conſiſt) and a ſubſtance purely Spiritual, than between a pure ſpirit and a groſs, heavy body, as ours is.

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Secondly it ſeem'd to me no leſs unconceivable, whence that diſmal ψυχομαχία or *inteſtin war* which every Man too frequently feels within himſelf, and whereof even *St. Paul* himſelf ſo ſadly complained, when (*in Epiſt. ad Roman. cap.* 3.) he cries out, *video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meæ*; ſhould ariſe, if not from a *Duumvirate* as it were of *Rulers* contending for ſuperiority within us, and inclining us two contrary ways at once. For, to conceive that one and the ſame *Simple* thing, ſuch as the *Reaſonable* Soul is rightly preſumed to be, can be repugnant to itſelf, or at one and the ſame time be poſſeſſed with oppoſite affections; is manifeſtly abſurd. There are indeed, who to evade this abſurdity, imagine it poſſible, that of one and the ſame Rational, ſimple Soul, there may be *two* diſtinct *Faculties* or powers oppoſite each to other, from whoſe

claſh-

claſhings and contrary inclinations this civil war may proceed. But to oblige us to ſwallow this palpable contradiction, theſe Men ought to have reconciled thoſe two repugnant notions of *Simple* and *Compound*; and to have told us, why in the ſame ſimple ſubſtance of *fire* there cannot likewiſe be two mutualy repugnant faculties, *heat* and *cold*. In a *Mixed* body there may be, I confeſs, oppoſite faculties; and therefore the like may be imagined alſo in the Rational Soul, if ſhe be conceived to be of a mixed or compound nature: but this is againſt their own *ſuppoſition*, and deſtructive to the natural *immortality* of the Soul. What then can remain to cauſe this dire war daily obſerved within us, betwixt the allurements of our *Senſe*, on one ſide, and the grave dictates of our *Mind*, on the other; but two diſtinct Agents, the *Rational* Soul and the *Senſitive*, coexiſtent within us, and hotly contending

ding about the conduct of our Will?

But You, *Sir*, will perhaps tell me, there may *another*, and that a more probable cauſe be given of this hoſtility; and that the ſearching wit of *Monſieur des Cartes* hath been ſo happy to diſcover what it is, *in libr. de Paſſion. part.* 1. *art.* 47. where he thus reaſoneth. "In no other thing "*(ſaith he)* but in the repugnancy "that is between the motions which "the Body by its ſpirits, and thoſe "which the Soul by her will, do at "the ſame time endeavour to excite "in the *Glandula Pinealis* in the "brain, conſiſt all the *Conflicts* "which Men commonly imagin be-"twixt the *inferior* part of the Soul, "which is named the *Senſitive*, and "the *Superior*, which is called the "*Rational*, or betwixt the *appetites* "*natural* and the *will*. For, in us "there is only one Soul, which hath "in her no variety of parts: the ſame "that is Senſitive, is alſo Rational,

"and

"and all the appetites thereof are
"volitions. The *Error* by which divers
"perſons as it were, that are for the
"moſt part mutualy contrary, come
"to be impoſed upon her; hath pro-
"ceeded only from hence, that hi-
"therto *her* functions have not been
"ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from the
"functions of the *Body*; to which
"alone is to be aſcribed all that can
"be obſerved in us to be repugnant
"to our *reaſon*. So that here is no
"other *Contraſt*, but that when the
"*Glandule* ſeated in the middle of the
"brain, is impell'd on one part by
"the *Soul*, and on the other by the
"*Spirits Animal*, which are nothing
"but bodies, as I have before decla-
"red: it often happens, that thoſe two
"impulſes or impreſſions are contra-
"ry each to other, and that the ſtrong-
"ger hindereth the effect of the wea-
"ker. Now there may be diſtin-
"guiſhed two kinds of motions exci-
"ted in the Glandule by the ſpirits:

"*ſome*

"*ſome* repreſent to the Soul objects
"that move the Senſes, or impreſſi-
"ons found in the brain, and uſe
"no force upon the *will*; *others* uſe
"force, namely thoſe that make
"the *Paſsions*, or the motions of the
"body that accompany them. And
"as for the *firſt*; though they often
"hinder the actions of the Soul, or
"be hindered by them; yet becauſe
"they are not directly contrary,
"there is no ſtrife or contention ob-
"ſerved in them: but only betwixt
"the *laſt* and the *Wills* that are re-
"pugnant to them; for *Example*,
"betwixt the endeavour by which
"the ſpirits impell the Glandule to
"induce upon the Soul a *deſire* of
"ſome one thing, and that by which
"the Soul repells the ſame Glandule
"by her *will* to avoid it. And this
"chiefly demonſtrateth this ſtrife,
"that ſince the will hath not power
"(as hath been already ſhown) to
"excite Paſſions *directly*, the Soul

" is therefore compell'd to uſe art, and
" to apply herſelf to the conſidera-
" tion of various things ſucceſſively.
" Whence if it happen that any one
" of thoſe various things hath the
" force of changing for a moment the
" cours of the ſpirits; it may ſo fall
" out, that the next thing that oc-
" curs to be conſidered, may want
" the like force, and the ſpirits may
" reſume their former cours, becauſe
" the precedent diſpoſition in the
" nerves, in the heart, and in the
" blood, hath not been changed:
" whereby it comes to paſs, that the
" Soul almoſt in the ſame moment
" feels herſelf impell'd to *deſire* and
" *decline* the ſame thing. And this
" hath given Men occaſion of ima-
" gining in the Soul two powers mu-
" tualy repugnant. But yet there
" may be conceived a certain *Conflict*
" in this, that oftentimes the ſame
" cauſe that exciteth ſome Paſſion in
" the Soul, exciteth alſo in the Body

" ſome certain motions, whereunto
" the Soul contributeth nothing at
" all, and which ſhe ſtops, or en-
" devours to ſtop, ſo ſoon as ſhe
" obſerves them: as is manifeſt from
" experience, when that which ex-
" citeth *Fear*, cauſeth alſo the ſpi-
" rits to flow into the Muſcles that
" ſerve to move the leggs to flight;
" and occaſioneth the will of exerci-
" ſing *Courage* to ſtop them.

To this Objection therefore I *anſwer* (1.) that had this excellent Man, *Monſieur des Cartes* been but half as converſant in Anatomy, as he ſeems to have been in Geometry, doubtles he would never have lodged ſo noble a gueſt as the Rational Soul, in ſo incommodious a cloſet of the brain, as the *Glandula Pinealis* is; tht *uſe* whereof hath been demonſtrated to be no other but to receive into its ſpongy cavities, from two little nerves, a certain ſerous Excrement, and to exonerate the ſame a-

gain

again into its vein, which nature hath therefore made much larger than the artery that accompanieth it; and which having no Communication with the external organs of the Senſes, cannot with any colour of reaſon be thought the part of the brain, wherein the Soul exerciſeth her principal faculties of *judging* and *commanding*. (2.) This *Glandule* which he ſuppoſeth to be ſo eaſily flexible and yielding to contrary impulſes, is not looſely ſuſpended, but *fixed*: ſo that whoever hath once beheld the ſolid baſis, ſtrong conſiſtence, and firm connexion thereof, will hardly ever be brought to allow it capable of any impulſe to either ſide, though by the greateſt Hurricano of ſpirits imaginable; much leſs by every light motion of them excited by external objects affecting the ſenſes. (3.) Though we ſhould grant this Gland to be both the Throne of the Soul, and moſt eaſily flexible every way:

yet hath *Des Cartes* left it ſtill unconceivable, how an Immaterial Agent, not infinite, comes to move by impuls a ſolid body, without the mediation of a third thing that is leſs diſparil or diſproportionate to both. Now theſe things duely conſidered, you will (I preſume) no longer imagine the Conflicts or Combats that frequently happen within us betwixt the *Rational* and *Senſitive* Appetites, to conſiſt only in the repugnancy of the impulſes of this little Glandule by the Spirits on one ſide, to thoſe of the ſame Glandule by the Soul on the other. Beſides, that the Soul hath power to excite Corporeal Paſſions *directly*, that is, without conſidering ſucceſſively various things; is manifeſt from her ſoveraignity over the body, which in all voluntary actions is abſolute and uncontrollable; and in the very inſtance of *Fear* alleadged by our Author, where ſhe determineth her *Will* to *Courage* to oppoſe

oppoſe the danger ſuggeſted, *inſtantly* and without running through a long ſeries of various conſiderations, for which ſhe then hath not time ſufficient. However, evident enough it is, that this conceipt of repugnant impulſes of this *Gland* in the brain, is ſo far from giving light to the reaſon of the Conflict here conſidered, that it rather augmenteth the obſcurity thereof, by implying two contrary Appetites or Wills in one and the ſame Soul, at one and the ſame time: Whereas the ſuppoſition of two Souls mutualy oppoſing each others Appetites, doth render the ſame intelligible.

Againſt this opinion of a *Duality of* Souls in one Man, ſome have (I well know) with not a little confidence urged the Sentence of ſome of the *Fathers*, yea and of whole *Councils* condemning all who ſhould aſſert it; and more particularly *Concil.* 8. *act.* 10. *Vienn. in Clem.* VII. & *Lateran.* 3. *ſeſs.* 8. But

But this, Sir, is *Brutum fulmen*, dangerous to none, terrible only to the Unlearned. For, to any underſtanding reader of thoſe *decrees*, it is clearly manifeſt, that the edge of them is turned againſt firſt the doctrin of the *Maniches* holding two human Souls in every individual Man; one polluted with the ſtain of vices, and derived from an evil principle; the other incontaminate, and proceeding immediately from God, yea more, a particle of the Divine Eſſence itſelf; then the *Platonics* alſo, and *Averrhoiſts*, teaching that the Rational Soul is not man's *forma informans*, but part of the *Anima Mundi* or Univerſal Soul: but not againſt the aſſerters of two Souls coexiſtent, one ſimply Reaſonable, the other merely Senſitive, in every ſingle perſon, in that innocent ſenſe I deliver it. And thus have the ſame Decrees been judiciouſly interpreted by the religious Philoſophers of the College

Collegue of *Conimbra*; who as of all Men they have diſcourſed moſt acutely and profoundly of this Argument; ſo have they with greateſt moderation treated the Defendents of this opinion by me here embraced. For (*in* 1. *de Generat. cap.* 4. *quæſt.* 21. *art.* 2.) though they expreſly avow their adherence rather to the common belief of the ſingularity of the Human Soul, as moſt conſentaneous to the ſenſe of the Church: yet they declare alſo, that the contrary opinion ought not to be cenſured as heretical or erroneous.

Why therefore ſhould I fear to eſpouſe it? eſpecialy if to the reaſons here urged, and others no leſs conſiderable alledged by me in the third Section of the Treatiſe to which this Epiſtle invites you, be added for confirmation, that ſo celebrated text of St. *Paul* (*ad Theſſal.* 1. *cap.* 5. *vers.* 23.) τὸ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα; *integer veſter*

ſpiritus, & anima, & corpus, &c. Where our moſt learned *Dr. Hammond* of pious memory (in his *Annotations* on the place) conceives the Apoſtle to divide the whole Man into three conſtituent parts, viz. the *Body*, which comprehendeth the fleſh and members; the *Vital Soul*, which being alſo Animal or Senſitive, is common likewiſe to Brutes; and the *Spirit*, by which is denoted the Reaſonable Soul originally created by God, infuſed into the body, and from thence after death to return to God; and this genuin expoſition of his he confirms by agreeing teſtimonies both of Ethnic *Philoſophers*, and ſome ancient *Fathers*.

To theſe give me leave to ſuperadd (*ex abundanti*) the concordant ſuffrages of three eminent Philoſophers of our own age; namely the *Lord Chancellor Bacon*, who (in his 4 *Book of the Advancement of Learning*, *chap.* 3.) gravely diſcourſing

ſing of the parts of Knowledge concerning the Mind or Soul of Man, divideth it into that which declares the nature of the Reaſonable Soul, which is a thing Divine; and that which treateth of the Unreaſonable Soul, which is common to us with Beaſts: and then proceeds to affirm at large, that the former hath its original from the inſpiration or breath of God; the later, from the matrices of the Elements: the *immortal Gaſſendus*, *de Phyſiologia Epicuri*, *cap. de Animæ ſede*, *Paſſionibms Animi*, *&c.* and the now flouriſhing *Dr. Willis*, *in libr. de Anima Brutorum cap.* 7. whoſe words I forbear to tranſcribe, out of deſign to increaſe your ſatisfaction, by obliging you to read them at your leiſure in the places cited. Now if ſolid Reaſons, Authority Divine, and the judgment of many ſublime Wits and profound Philoſophers, aſwell Ancient as Modern, be of any weight to recommend this neither heretical,

retical, nor improbable opinion to me; certainly I need not bluſh to incline thereunto. Notwithſtanding this, I recount the ſame *tanquam in Hypotheſi*, only as a *ſuppoſition* convenient to ſolve the *Phenomena* of the Paſſions; not as an article of my faith: nor had I ſo importunely inſiſted thus long upon arguments to juſtify my approbation thereof, in this Letter; had I not, through want of Books, omitted to doe it where I ought, in the III. *Section* of the Diſcourſe itſelf. ¶

The SECOND advertiſement I owe you, *Friend*, is this, that the greateſt part of what is delivered in the ſame Diſcourſe, concerning the nature, ſubſtance, faculties, Knowledge, &c. of a Senſitive Soul, hath been borrowed from that elaborate work of our Learned *Dr. Willis de Anima Brutorum*, lately publiſhed. Which I hold my ſelf bound here ingeniouſly to acknowledge

ledge, leſt otherwiſe you might juſtly condemn me as a *Plagiary*, and that I may invite you alſo to the pleaſure of attentively reading that uſeful Book. Wherein I found great part of what I had formerly read of that ſubject in various Authors, ſo well collected, digeſted and explained; that I choſe from thence to copy an image of the Senſitive Soul of Man, whereupon I was often to reflect my thoughts, while I ſate to deſcribe the moſt remarkable of the Paſſions to which it is liable: and this I did the rather, becauſe at that time I had by me no other Book of the ſame ſubject.

You are not therefore to look upon the Deſcription of the nature and affections of a Senſitive Soul therein delivered, as a ſuppoſition newly excogitated, and unheard of by former ages. For to Men converſant in the Theories of Phyſiologiſts concerning

cerning that Subject, it is well known, that all the Ancients were ſo far from holding the Soul of a Brute to be other than *Corporeal*, that they for the moſt part taught their Diſciples, that the Soul of *Man* was ſo too: except a few of them, namely *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and in ſome favourable ſenſe *Ariſtotle* (when he defined the Soul by that enigmatical term ἐντελέχεια) and his Sectators, *Ariſtoxenus* and *Dicæarchus*, when they called it a *Harmony*. True it is indeed, they were much divided in their opinions about the *Subſtance* or *Matter* of a Soul; ſome imagining it to be of Fire, as *Heraclitus*, *Democritus*, *Hipparchus*, and the *Stoicks*; ſome conceiving it to be on the contrary, of a Watery nature, as *Hippon*, and *Thales*; others fancying it to be compoſed of Water and Earth, as *Xenophanes*; others, of Earth and Fire, as *Parmenides*; others again, of all the four Elements, as *Empedocles*:

and

and yet notwithſtanding they unanimouſly conſented in theſe points, that this Corporeal Soul is diviſible; compoſed of particles extremely ſmall, ſubtil and active; diffuſed through or coextens to the whole body wherein it is contained; produced at firſt by generation out of the ſeed of the parents; perpetualy recruited or regenerated out of the pureſt and moſt ſpirituous part of the nouriſhment; ſubject to Contraction and Expanſion in paſſions; and finally diſſolved or extinguiſhed by death. If you doubt of the truth of what I here ſay, I know not how more eaſily to convince you, than by referring you to the incomparable *Gaſſendus in Lib.* 10. *Diogen. Laert. cap. de natura, contexturàque Animæ ad mentem Epicuri:* where you find the ſame more amply delivered.

Meanwhile ſuffer me to recite a pertinent and memorable text of the

Lord

Lord Verulam's (of the Advancement of Learning *Book* 4. *Chap.* 3.) that now comes into my head. "The "Senſible Soul (ſaith he) muſt needs "be granted to be a Corporeal ſub- "ſtance, attenuated by heat and "made inviſible. I ſay, a thin, gen- "tle gale of wind ſwell'd and "blown up from ſome flamy and "and airy nature; indued with the "ſoftneſs of aire to receive impreſſi- "on, and with the vigour of fire to "embrace action; nouriſhed partly "by an oyly, partly by a watery "ſubſtance; ſpread over the body; "reſiding (in perfect creatures) "chiefly in the head; running through "the nerves; refreſhed and repaired "by the ſpirituous part of the blood "of the arteries: as *Bernardinus* "*Teleſius* (*de rerum natura lib.* 5.) "and his Scholar *Auguſtinus Donius* "have delivered it.

And as for the Bipartition of this Senſitive Soul into two principle mem-

members as it were, or active sources; viz. the *Fiery* part, upon which *Life* depends; and the *Lucid*, from whence all the faculties *Animal* are, like so many distinct rayes of light, derived: I will not affirm it to be very *ancient*: but yet methinks, I discern more than a shadow thereof in some lines of the same most acute *Lord Bacon* (*de vita & morte, explicatione canonis quartæ*) which are these.

Spiritus vitalis *omnis sibi continuatur, per quosdam canales, per quos permeat, nec totaliter intercipitur. Atque hic Spiritus etiam duplex est*: alter ramosus *tantum, permeans per parvos* ductus, *& tanquam lineas*; alter *habet etiam* cellam, *ut non tantum sibi continuetur, sed etiam congregetur in spatio aliquo cavo, in bene magna quantitate, pro analogia corporis; atque in illa* cella *est fons rivulorum, qui inde deducantur. Ea cella præcipue est in ventriculis cerebri,*

qui

qui in animalibus magis ignobilioribus anguſti ſunt; adeo ut videantur ſpiritus per univerſum corpus fuſi, *potius quam* cellulati: *ut cernere eſt in* Serpentibus, *Anguillis, Muſcis, quorum ſingulæ portiones abſciſſæ moventur diu: etiam* Aves *diutius, capitibus avulſis, ſubſultant; quoniam parva habeant capita, & parvas cellas. At animalia nobiliora ventriculos eos habent ampliores; & maximè omnium* Homo. Alterum *diſcrimen inter ſpiritus eſt, quod ſpiritus* Vitalis *nonnullam habeat* incenſionem, *atque ſit tanquam aura compoſita ex flamma, & aere; quemadmodum ſucci animalium habeant & oleum, & aquam. At illa* incenſio *peculiares præbet* motus, & facultates. *Etenim & fumus inflammabilis, etiam ante flammam conceptam, calidus eſt, tenuis, mobilis: & tamen alia res eſt, poſtquam facta ſit flamma: at* incenſio ſpirituum vitalium, *multis partibus lenior eſt, quàm molliſſima flamma ex ſpiritu vini,*

ni, aut alias; atque insuper mixta est magna ex parte, cum substantia aerea; ut sit & flammeæ, & aereæ naturæ mysterium.

This place of that Prince of Modern Philosophers, the *Lord St. Albans*, conjoyned to that other of his immediately precedent, seems to me to contain a pourtraiture of the Sensitive Soul, drawn indeed as in perspective, in colours somwhat faint, and not accurately ground; yet with good judgment, and bold strokes of the pencill, such as give it no obscure resemblance of the original. And if you (Sir) please to compare it with the more ample description of the same Sensitive Soul, lately set forth by *Dr. Willis*: it will not be difficult to you, to observe, in how many things they agree. ¶

The THIRD and last thing whereof I am here to advertise you, is, that in the description of many of the *Passions* likewise, I have in-

terwoven ſome threds taken from the webbs of thoſe three excellent Men, *Gaſſendus*, *Des Cartes*, and our *Mr. Hobbes*; who have all written moſt judiciouſly of that obſtruſe theme. Nor will I otherwiſe excuſe myſelf for being ſo liberal to you, of what I owe to the bounty of thoſe richer Wits; than by reciting what your beloved *Seneca* ſaid to his dear *Lucilius*, in defenſe of his adopting for his own ſo many wiſe and memorable ſentences of his, and our *Oracle*, *Epicurus*: *adhuc de alieno liberalis ſum. Quare autem alienum dixi? quicquid benè dictum eſt ab ullo, meum eſt. Epiſt.* 16. I will only add, as a reaſon of my ſo frank communication of theſe unpoliſhed papers to you, who are my *Lucilius*, what the ſame *Latin Stoic* moſt affectionately profeſſed to his, on the like occaſion: *Ego vero cupio iſta omnia in te transfundere, & in hoc gaudeo aliquid diſcere,*

re, ut doceam. Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia ſit & ſalutaris, quam mihi uni ſciturus ſim. Si cum hac exceptione detur Sapientia, ut illam incluſam teneam, nec enunciem, rejiciam. Epiſt. 6. ¶

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ERRA-

Errors of this Impreſſion to be by the Reader thus Corrected.

PAg. 1. l. 5. read ἑαυτὸν. pag. 15. lin. 18. read *vivi-parous*. pag. 69. l. 6. read *inveſting*. pag. 76. lin. 16. read *deteſts*. pag. 180. lin. 8. read *undetermined*. pag. 185. lin. 2. read *thoughts*.

SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS.

Marcus Antoninus Philoſophus Libr. εἰς ἑαυτὸν 2. Sect. 2.

Ὁ, τί ποτε τοῦτο εἰμι, σαρκία ἐστὶ καὶ πνευμάτιον, καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, &c. *Quicquid ſum, conſtat id omne caruncula, animula, & parte principante. Proinde mitte libros. Nec diſtrahere amplius: (nihil obſtat, quo minus hoc facias) ſed tanquam qui jam ſtatim moriturus ſis, carnes iſtas contemnas. Cruor eſt, & oſſicula, & reticulum ex nervis, venulis arteriiſque contextum. Quin & Animam conſidera, qualis ſit. Spiritus eſt, ſive aer, nec is ſemper idem, ſed qui jugiter efflatus denuò reſorbetur. Tertium reſtat, pars illa principatum gerens. Tu ergo ſic tecum: Senex es: partem tui principem ſervire ulterius ne ſiveris; ſed nec motibus à communione humana alienis raptari. Nec quicquam quod fato deſtinatum tibi fuerit, vel jam aſcitum averſari, vel futurum pavere.*

NATURAL HISTORY Of the Passions.

SECTION I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Reasonable Soul of Man seems to be of a Nature so *Divine* and *Excellent*, that it is capable of Understanding all things that are in this life intelligible: but yet so *reserved* and *abstruse* withall, that it cannot understand *itself*; as many most sublime Wits, who had long exercised and perplex'd themselves in enquiries into the hidden

hidden and myſterious Eſſence thereof, have at length ingenuouſly confeſs'd.

Well therefore may we without bluſhing, own our ignorance of this nobleſt part of our ſelves, from which we derive all our *Knowledge*. Well may we without regret content our Curioſity with thoſe faint glimmerings of light, which ſhine through the *Operations* of this Celeſtial gueſt in our frail and darkſom Tabernacles of Fleſh; and which are reflected upon our Underſtanding, only from the illuſtrious *Effects* of its proper Powers and Acts.

What theſe *Powers* and *Acts* are, and how vaſtly they tranſcend the energie of a *Senſitive* Soul, how perfect ſoever in its kind; as alſo in what exerciſes of the Mind they are chiefly obſervable; hath been by Sir *Kenelm Digby* in his Book of the *Rational Soul*, copiouſly declared. So that here they need not to be repeated. Nor indeed would ſuch a prolix reſearch be conſiſtent with my preſent deſign; which principally aim's at a recollection of ſome notions, that have partly in reading, partly in meditation, occurred to me, concerning the various *Paſſions* of the Mind, their *Genealogy*, their firſt *ſourſes* and reſorts, their moſt remarkable *Differences*, *Motions*, and *Forces*, and in

ſine, by what kind of *Connexion* and intercourſe betwixt two ſo diſparate Natures, the one Incorporeal, the other Corporeal, it is, that the *Rational* Soul is reſpectively coaffected by them. And this with as much brevity, as the amplitude of the Subject can admit; with as much perſpicuity, as my weak reaſon can attain unto, in an argument ſo ſublime and difficult.

That I may then effect this my Deſign, if not ſo happily, as in the end to arrive at the certain and demonſtrative Knowledge of the truth I ſeek; yet ſo plauſibly at leaſt, as to form an *Hypotheſis* by which the Nature and Reaſons of the principal, and moſt predominant of our Paſſions, may be congruouſly and with probability explained: it is requiſite I begin with theſe few *Preliminaries*.

1. What kind of thing I ſuppoſe the *Senſitive* Soul to be, as well in Man, as in Brutes.
2. What ſeem's to me moſt conſentaneous concerning the Original, Nature, and royal Seat of the *Rational* Soul.
3. How, and after what manner I conceive *both* Souls to be connexed in *Man*, during this ſhadow of life.
4. How the *Rational* Soul may come to be affected by the motions of the *Senſitive*, in ſome Paſſions; and *this*, by predo-

predominion of *that*, in others; and whence their mutual conſent, and diſſent.

For, my preſent Conceptions concerning theſe things, though I foreſee, I ſhall not be able to eſtabliſh them all upon Reaſons irrefutable and cogent: are yet nevertheleſs to be here premiſed, as *Poſtulates* or Fundamentals, for introduction and ſupport of the following Theory about the Paſſions. Theſe therefore I ſhall in their order, and conciſely, and in a plain familiar Style, (ſuch with which I am always beſt pleas'd, eſpecially in Diſcourſes Philoſophical) ſet down, *tanquam præcognoſcenda.* ¶

SECT II.

What kind of Subſtance the Senſitive *Soul may be conceived to be.*

AS for the FIRST *Poſtulatum*; the *Senſitive* Soul of a Brute Animal, I conceive to be *Corporeal*, and conſequently *Diviſible*, *Coextenſe* to the whole Body; of a *Subſtance* either Fiery, or meerly reſembling Fire; of a *conſiſtence* moſt *thin*

Article 1. Firſt *Suppoſition*, that a *Senſitive* Soul is *Corporeal*.

and *ſubtile*, not much unlike the flame of of pure ſpirit of Wine, burning in a paper Lantern, or other the like cloſe place.

Art. 2. Two *reaſons* of that ſuppoſition.

Firſt, I think it to be *Corporeal*, *Diviſible*, and *Coextenſe* to the whole Body; and that for *two reaſons*, among many others not the leaſt conſiderable.

One is this; that many, and divers Animal actions are daily obſerved to be, at one and the ſame time, performed by divers Parts and Members of the Body: for inſtance, the Eye ſees, the Ear hears, the Noſtrils ſmell, the Tongue taſteth, and all exteriour Members exerciſe their Senſe and Motion, all at once. For as much then as betwixt the Body and Soul of a Brute, there is no *Medium* (both being intimately connexed) but the Members and Parts of the Body are Inſtruments fram'd for the uſe of the Soul: what elſe can be imagined, but that many and diſtinct portions of the Soul ſo extended, do inform and actuate the diſtinct Organs and Members of the Body; each in a peculiar manner, reſpective to the peculiar Conſtitution, Fabrique, and Office thereof?

The *Other* this; it is obſerved alſo, that Vipers, Eels, Earthworms, and moſt other *Reptils* being cut into many pieces; all pieces for a good while after retain a manifeſt

manifeſt Motion, and no obſcure ſenſe; for, being prick'd, they contract and ſhrink up themſelves, as ſenſible of the Hurt, and ſtriving to avoid it. And this probably from hence, that theſe leſs perfect Animals having their liquors, both Vital and Animal, of a conſiſtence viſcous, and not eaſily diſſoluble or diſſipable; and having their Soul, if not equally, yet univerſally diffuſed, and all its parts ſubſiſting immediately in thoſe liquors: cannot ſuffer a diviſion of their Body, without diviſion of their Soul alſo; the parts whereof reſiding for ſome time after, in the ſegments of the Body, may perhaps for that time continue to actuate them to Motion and Senſe. It hath been more then once unhappily Experimented, that the Head of a Viper hath bitten a Mans Finger, and Poyſoned him too, above an hour after it had been cut off. Not by involuntary convulſion of the Nerves and Muſcles of the Vipers Jaws, ſuch as not rarely happen to Animals, in the torments of Death; for thoſe probably could neither laſt ſo long, nor ſo regularly open and ſhut the mouth, and extend the two fang teeth, by contraction of their erecting Muſcles: but certainly by an action voluntary, regular and ſuggeſted by ſenſe, and perhaps revenge too. Whence I am

apt to ſuſpect, that not only part of the Vipers Soul, but *Anger* and *Revenge* alſo ſurvived in the divided head. For, it is well known, the bite of a Viper is never Venomous, but when he is enraged: the Chryſtalline liquor contained in the two little Glandules at the roots of his fang teeth, being then by a copious afflux of Spirits from the Brain, and other brisk motions thereupon impreſs'd, in anger (of all paſſions the moſt violent and impetuous) ſo altered, and exalted, as to become highly active and venenate; whereas at other times, when a Viper is not offended and provok'd, the ſame Liquor is found to be as harmleſs as the ſpittle of a Man in perfect health. But whether from the dangerous effects of this biting, the dire Symptoms that thereupon enſued, it be inferrible, or not, that in the abſcinded head of the beaſt there remained any thing of Anger and Revenge: in my poor judgment 'tis very evident from the very act of biting, there ſtill remained ſomwhat of *life*, *ſenſe*, and *voluntary motion*. Which is ſufficient to verify my preſent ſuppoſition, that a Senſitive Soul is diviſible and coextenſe to the whole body it animates.

Secondly

Secondly, I think the ſame Senſitive Soul to conſiſt of *Fire*, or ſome matter analogous to Fire: and the *Reaſons* inducing me to be of this opinion, are many. Some I have formerly alleadged, where I diſcourſe of the *Flame of life* perpetually ariſing from accenſion of the Sulphureous and inflammable parts of the blood, while circulated through the heart and lungs: which therefore I abſtain from reciting in this place. Others, that have ſince occurr'd to my conſideration, I am obliged here to expoſe to yours.

Art. 3. Second *Suppoſition*, that the *ſubſtance* of a ſenſitive Soul is *fiery*.

That the *Life*, or *Soul* of Brute Animals, is ſeated principally in their *Blood*; we are plainly taught even by the Oracle of truth it ſelf, the dictates of the Divine Wiſdom that created them: and that *Blood*, and *Fire* ſubſiſt by the ſame principles, viz. *Aliment* and *Ventilation*; is evident from hence, that a defect of either of theſe, doth equally deſtroy both the one and the other.

Art. 4. Becauſe *life* is ſeated principaly in the *blood*; and can no more than fire ſubſiſt without perpetual *aliment* and *ventilation*.

Should you here exact from me ſome deſcription of the *Eſſence* of *Fire*, I ſhould adventure to tell you, that it ſeems to be only a multitude of moſt minute and ſubtile particles, mutually touching each other, put into a moſt rapid motion, and by continual ſucceſſion of ſome parts, and deceſſion of others, renewed: which

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conſerves its motion, and ſubſiſtence, by preying upon, and conſuming the *Sulphureous* parts of its ſubject matter, or fewel, and the *Nitrous* parts of the ambient aer. For, even our ſenſe bears witneſs, that from the particles of this twofold aliment, *Sulphureous* and *Nitrous*, reſolved to the laſt degree of ſmalneſs, and by a moſt violent and rapid motion agitated, the forms of *Fire* and *Flame* (which differ only in degrees of denſity, and velocity of motion) do wholy reſult.

Nor doth the image I find drawn in my brain of the *Soul* of a *Brute*, much differ from this deſcription of the nature of Fire. I conceive it to be no other than a certain congregation of moſt minute, ſubtil and agile particles, corpuſcles or atoms (call them what you pleaſe) crowded together; which being, in the very firſt moment of life, put into brisk and moſt rapid motion, like that of the particles of Fire when firſt kindled; do ſo long conſerve that motion, and their own ſubſiſtence, as they have a continued ſupply of convenient nutriment; ſulphureous from the blood within, Nitrous from the aer without; and no longer. For we cannot but obſerve, that the Souls of all Brute Animals, of what kind ſoever, ſtand perpetually in need of a freſh ſupply of thoſe two

two ſorts of aliment; inſomuch that ſo ſoon as the recruit fails, they languiſh and dye: no otherwiſe than the flame of a lamp grows weak and dim, and is extinguiſhed, for want of oyl or air. But (what is very remarkable) beſides *fire* and *life*, there is not to be fouud in all nature any other thing whatſoever, to whoſe act and ſubſiſtence ſuch a ſupply of Sulphureous and Nitrous matter is neceſſary. Nor is any other motion in the World, whether it be of fermentation, ebullition, vegetation, or other whatever, beſides that of *Fire* and *Life*, ſubject to be arreſted and ſuppreſſed immediately from defect of aer. It was not then without very great reaſon, that our Maſter *Hippocrates* affirmed, ψυχὴν ἀιεὶ φύεσθαι, *that the Soul is perpetually generated, or made anew:* and that *Ariſtotle* held, τὸ ζῆν ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν, *life it ſelf to ſubſiſt by reſpiration.*

This you perhaps may judge to be but a faint and imperfect repreſentation of the nature of a Senſitive Soul. And therefore it is requiſite I endevour to render it more lively, by adding a few touches more concerning the *Hypoſtaſis* or *Subſiſtence* of ſuch a Soul; the *Life*, or *Act*; and the principal *Functions*, or *Operations* of it.

For

Art. 5. Becauſe it ſeems to be firſt formed of the moſt *ſpiritual* particles of the ſame *ſeminal* matter, of which the *Body* it ſelf is made.

For the *Firſt* of theſe three conſiderables, viz. the *Subſiſtence* of a Senſitive Soul; it ſeems not unreaſonable to conceive, that the Soul of a Brute doth conſiſt of the very ſame Matter, of which the organical Body is formed: but of ſuch particles of it as are ſelect, moſt ſubtile, and active in the higheſt degree. Which, as the flower of the whole matter, in the formation of the *Embrion*, emerging out of the groſſer maſs, and mutually uniting; firſt force paſſages convenient for themſelves through the whole compage of the Body, and then conſtitute one continued, thin, and as it were ſpirituous Hypoſtaſis, adequate and coextenſe to the ſame. For, ſo ſoon as any matter is diſpoſed towards animation; by the law of the *Creation* (not by *Epicurus*'s fortuitous concurſe of Atoms) the Soul at the ſame time, which is called the *Form*, and the Body, which is called the *Matter*, begin to be formed together, under a certain ſpecies, acccording to the modell or Character impreſſed upon them. When the more agile, and ſpirituous particles of the ſeminal matter, having freed themſelves from the other parts of it, quickly aſſemble together; and by little and little raiſing a commotion, ſtir up, and agitate the groſſer particles, and by degrees diſpoſe

poſe them into fit poſtures and places, where they ought to remain and cohere; and ſo form the body according to the figure or ſhape preordained by the Creator. Mean while this congregation of ſubtile and active Particles, or the Soul, which by expanſion enlargeth it ſelf, and inſinuating her particles among others more groſs, and as it were interweaving them, frames the body, is it ſelf exactly conformed to the figure and dimenſions of the ſame body, coextended and adapted to it, as to a caſe or ſheath, doth actuate, enliven, and inſpire all and all parts thereof. While on the other ſide, the ſame Soul, apt and prone of it ſelf to be diſſolved, and vaniſh into aer, is by the Body containing it, conſerved in its act and ſubſiſtence.

Art. 6. A *Senſitive* Soul imagined to be of the ſame *Figure* alſo with the *Body* wherein it is contained.

Now according to this notion, a Senſitive Soul may be conceived to be a moſt *ſubtle body contained in a groſs one, and in all points, of the ſame Figure with it*; or as it were a Spectre made up of exhalations, ſuch as ſome vain, or ſuperſtitious heads have ſomtimes imagined to aſcend from, and hover over the graves of the dead, and called them Ghoſts. For, ariſing together with the body, out of the material principles of Generation rightly diſpoſed; it doth, as well as the body, receive

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its determinate ſubſiſtence, conform to the idea or Type conſigned to it by the Law of Nature. But though the ſame be intimately united to the body, and every where cloſely intertexd with all parts of it; as the warp and woof are interwoven in cloth: yet ſo fine and ſubtle are the threads of which it doth conſiſt, that it cannot poſſibly by our ſenſes be diſcerned, nor indeed be known, otherwiſe than by its own Effects and Operations. Moreover, when by any violence done either to itſelf, or its Copartner, the Body, the life of this Soul is deſtroyed; inſtantly the particles of which it was compoſed, their mutual coheſion being diſſolved, diſperſe themſelves, and fly away, not leaving any the leaſt print or mark of their late ſubſiſtence: and the Body now deſtitute of its conſerving inmate, the Soul, ſpeedily tends to corruption; which ſooner or later, according to the leſs or greater compactneſs of the parts of the body, diſſolves that likewiſe into its firſt Principles, or Elements.

Art. 7. That the *Exiſtence* of a *Senſitive* Soul doth, as that of *Flame*, depend intirely upon *Motion*.

For the *Second*; it is not obſcure, that the Exiſtence of this Corporeal Soul depends intirely upon the *Act*, or *Life* of it: and in this very reſpect, ſeems exactly like to common *Flame*, and to that alone; inaſmuch as the ſubſtance of both ceaſes to be,

be, in the very inſtant it ceaſeth from Motion, wherein the very life of both doth conſiſt; nor can either of the two be, by any means whatever, redintegrated, ſo as to be numerically the ſame thing it was. From whence it ſeems a genuine conſequence, that the Eſſence, or Being of a Senſitive Soul, hath its beginning wholly from life, as from the accenſion or kindling of a certain ſubtile and inflammable matter. To render this yet more plain; when in the Genital matter, ſwarms of active, and ſpirituous, chiefly Sulphureous particles, prediſpoſed to animation, have met with a leſs number of Saline particles, in a convenient *focus*; being as it were kindled, ſometimes by another Soul (as in all *Vivaparous* Animals) viz. of the *Generant*, ſomtimes by their own rapid motion (as it happens in *Oviparous*) they conceive life, or break forth into a kind of flame, which thenceforth continues to burn ſo long as it is conſtantly fed with ſulphureous fewel from within, and nitrous from without; but inſtantly periſheth, when either through defect of ſuch aliment, or violence from external agents, it comes once to be extinct. This Act of the Corporeal Soul, or enkindling of the vital matter, is in more perfect Animals, ſuch as are furniſhed with hot blood, ſo mani-

manifeſtly accompanied with great heat, fuliginous exhalations, and other effects of fire, or flame; that it is difficult for even the moſt Sceptical perſon in the World to doubt, that the blood is really in a continual burning, and that life is rather Flame it ſelf, than only like it. But in other Animals leſs perfect, and endowed with blood leſs hot; though we cannot ſay their Soul is properly Flame: yet we may ſay, it is ſomwhat very like it, namely a ſwarm of moſt ſubtile, active and as it were fiery particles, or a ſpirituous *Halitus*: which included in the body, doth move and agitate the denſer maſs thereof, and inſpire the whole, and actuate all the members, and in ſome with admirable agility, even beyond that of more perfect Animals; as may be obſerved in ſome Reptils and Inſects. And that even in theſe there is a *fiery vigor* or force conſtantly acting, may naturaly be inferred from hence; that while they remain not unactive and drowſy (as in winter uſually they do) they can no more want the aliments of life, a perpetual ſupply of blood and aer, than Animals of a hotter conſtitution; as we ſhall ſoon declare. *

Art. 8. That the firſt *operation* of a Senſitive

As for the *Third* and laſt conſiderable, viz. the *Faculties* and *Operations* of a Corporeal or Senſitive Soul; I ſhall only in

in the general obſerve, that ſo ſoon as ſhe begin's actually to exiſt, ſhe firſt frames for herſelf a convenient ſeat wherein to reſide, the body; and then organizeth the ſame body, making it (according to the platform or model preordained, and intimated by ſecret inſtinct) in all parts fit and commodious for all uſes neceſſary, as well to the propagation of the *ſpecies* (for ſtill Nature doth, though the Soul it ſelf may not, aim at Eternity) as to the conſervation of the *individual*. For which uſes ſhe is furniſhed with many and various *Faculties* or Powers; all which ſhe duly exerciſeth, according to the various inſtincts, and intimate ſuggeſtions of her Governeſs, Nature, in acts of ſeveral ſorts; though all performed in almoſt one and the ſame manner, and as it were by the conduct of Fate, or eternal decree of Divinity congenial to her very Eſſence. To enumerate, and particularly recount all the natural *Faculties* with which the Souls of Brutes are endowed; all the various *Habits* reſulting from practiſe and long exerciſe of thoſe Faculties; is neither pertinent to my preſent inſtitute, nor eaſy to be done: becauſe of their almoſt infinite diverſity, reſpective to the immenſe diverſity of kinds of ſenſitive creatures. For, as ſome Animals

Soul, is the *Formation* of the Body, according to the model preordained by Nature.

are of a more, others of a leſs perfect order; and as they are diverſly configurated, according to the ſeveral places in this great Theatre of the World, in which they are conſigned to live and act their ſeveral parts: ſo we ſee their Souls are, by the wiſe bounty of the Creator, inſtructed with diverſe inclinations, faculties, and appeties, directive to the ends to which they were predeſtined. In a word; ſince there ought to be an exact proportion and congruity betwixt every organical Body, and the Soul that informs and animates it; and that for that reaſon, Nature ſeems to have diverſified and diſtinguiſhed the various Kinds of Brute Animals, by an equal diverſity of their bodily ſtructures and configurations, eaſily diſcernable by the ſight: we may even from thence alone conclude, that their Corporeal Souls likewiſe are no leſs various, and endowed with Faculties and Proprieties anſwerably different.

Whoever then ſhall attempt to enrich *Philoſophy* with a perfect Catalogue of theſe ſo different *Faculties* and Proprieties obſervable among Brutal Souls; will find himſelf obliged, firſt to compoſe a better *Natural Hiſtory* of all ſorts of Animals, than any we yet have, and then

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to deliver alſo a true and full account of the various Structures of their Bodies, from a *Comparative Anatome* of them. A work indeed moſt deſirable and highly delightful, but equally difficult, and laborious; nor to be performed, I fear, by any ſingle hand. But were it much leſs difficult; ſure I am, you know my incapacity too well, ever to expect it from mine: and what hath been already ſaid by me here, in the general, touching the nature of a Senſitive Soul; is enough to render my *Firſt Preliminary* probable.

Art. 9. A *recapitulation* of the premiſes.

For, from thence it may, without contradiction to either reaſon, or obſervations Anatomical, be conceived (1) in what manner the Soul of a Brute may be at firſt *produced* by *accenſion* of the moſt ſpirituous particles of the *Seminal humor*, in the womb of the Parent, as one flame is kindled by another: (2) how the ſame Soul then *form's* the *Organical Body* out of the groſſer parts of the ſame ſeed, after the figure or type predeſign'd by the Divine Protoplaſt at the Creation, whoſe wiſdom directs and regulates it in that admirable work: (3) How it afterwards comes to *conſerve*, *expand* and *augment* itſelf, as the dimenſions of the body are by degrees enlarged, until it arrive at its perfection or ſtandard of growth; by ac-

cenſion of more and more of the inflammable parts of the *Nouriſhment* dayly renewed, and converted into laudable blood; as the flame of a lamp is kept alive by a perpetual accenſion of freſh parts of oyl; (4) How the *Duration* of the *Body* depends intirely upon the ſubſiſtence, or perpetual renovation or regeneration of the Soul; and how immediately upon the Souls Extinction, the body ſubmits to *corruption*; no otherwiſe than as Wine dyes, and degenerates into a *Vappa*, ſo ſoon as the ſpirit that preſerv'd it in vigour and generoſity, is evaporated, or ſuppreſs'd.

Art. 10. The *Faculties* and *Organs* of a *Senſitive* Soul, reciprocaly inſervient each to other.

Now to the end this Corporeal Soul, or inviſible Flame, may the better thus animate the Body, and actuate it to ſenſe and voluntary motion; Nature hath moſt wiſely inſtituted, that her *Organs*, and *Faculties* ſhould all of them be *reciprocaly inſervient* or official each to other, in their acts and operations. For, as out of the groſſer parts of the Nutritive juice, prepared and elaborate in the Stomach and other inſtruments of concoction, the decays of the ſolid parts of the Body are daily repaired: ſo are the decays of the Soul itſelf likewiſe repaired out of the more ſubtile and ſpirituous partic'es of the ſame juice: which continu-

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aly brought afreſh to the blood, as oyl to a Lamp, and kindled therein, reſtore both the *Flame* and *Light* of the Soul, which would otherwiſe quickly be conſumed, and periſh. More expreſly; while the purer part of the Nutritive liquor feeds and renews the Lamp of life, or flame of the blood; the moſt active, and moſt ſpirituous particles diſcharged from that flame, are carried up, and inſinuated into the Brain: and there recruite or regenerate the other part of the Soul, viz. the *Senſitive*. And ſo the converſion of Chyle into blood, is an operation not only conſequent to, but in ſome ſort alſo dependent upon the converſion of meat and drink into Chyle: and on the other ſide, the *Animal* faculty gratefully requites the good offices of the *Vital*, and both as amply recompenſe the ſervices of the faculty of Chylification; in that the Animal ſpirit confers the pulſific power, by which the heart and arteries drive the current of the blood in a perpetual round, for the reaccenſion of its inflammable parts; and the Bowels ordaind for concoction of the aliment, at the ſame time borrow, as their enlivening heat from the flame of the blood, ſo their virtue both *motive* and *ſenſitive*, from the conſtant afflux of Animal ſpirits, with-

out which they cannot duely do their offices. Thus you ſee the brain is beholden to the heart, both to the ſtomach; and reciprocally the ſtomach is aſſiſted by them: and all parts conſpire, by contributary helps, to continue the Soul in its ſubſiſtence, as that again acts perpetualy to the converſation of herſelf and them.

Art. 11. A two fold *deſire* or inclination congenial to a Senſitive Soul; viz. of *ſelf preſervation*, and *Propagation* of her kind.

To this, the *Senſitive Soul*, or πῦρ νοερὸν (as *Ariſtotle* not improperly calls it) is ſtrictly obliged by a *twofold inclination* or deſire, innate or congenial to her. *One* is that of *ſelf-preſervation*, which ſhe endeavours conſtantly to effect by being ſollicitous for convenient food, out of whoſe inflammable parts actually incenſed, ſhe may every minute redintegrate her own flame. The *other*, that of *Propagating* her *Species*, or producing, by the ſame way of accenſion, other Senſitive Souls of the ſame kind; that ſo by an uninterrupted ſucceſſion of her like, ſhe may attain to that perpetuity, which is denied to her ſingle or individual ſelf. And to this end, ſhe carefully ſelects out of her ſtock of aliment, matter fit for generation, ſtores it up in the Genital parts, and is poſſeſs'd with an earneſt longing to tranſmit the ſame into a place moſt commodious for its accenſion into new Souls.

For,

For, as it is by natural inſtinct, that every living creature is from its very birth, directed to chooſe food moſt agreeable to its nature, and daily to feed thereupon; aſwell that the groſſer web of the body may from thence, by inſenſible addition and aſſimilation of new parts, be augmented more and more, until it attain to due magnitude, or perfection of ſtature: as that the finer intertexture of the Soul may be, by continualy repeted ſupplies of Spirits, rendred equal and coextenſe to the body, and inabled to execute all her functions vigorouſly and effectualy: So it is alſo from the ſame natural inſtinct, that when by that gradual amplification of all lineaments of both body and Soul, the living creature hath at length arrived at its full ſtrength and growth, the Animal Spirits then begin to abound, and ſwarm in greater multitudes than is neceſſary to the uſes of th' individual; and the luxuriant or ſuperfluous troops of them, together with a certain refined and generous Humor derived from the whole body, are daily transferr'd into the *Genitals* (natures both Laboratory, and Magazin for propagation of the *Species*) there to be further prepared, and formed into the *Idea* of an Animal exactly like to the firſt Generant,

which afterwards is in the amorous congreſs of male and femal, tranſmitted into the womb, therein to receive its accompliſhment.

Having thus lightly deſcribed the principal Faculties, and innate Diſpoſitions of a Senſitive Soul, as alſo the fundamental laws of her Oeconomy; it remains only, that we conſider the various *Mutations*, and irregular *Commotions* to which ſhe is liable.

Art. 12. To what various *Mutations* and irregular *Commotions* a *Senſitive* Soul is ſubject from her own *Paſſions*.

That the Corporeal Soul, while as a *Flame* burning within her organical body, ſhe on every ſide diffuſeth *heat* and *light*, is herſelf ſubject to various *Tremblings*, *noddings*, *Eclipſes*, *inequalities*, and diſorderly *Commotions*, as all Flame is obſerved to be; this (I ſay) is not obſcurely diſcernable, in the Effects of thoſe alterations, which happen chiefly in her more violent *Paſſions*: though indeed not ſo clearly and diſtinctly diſcernable in Brutes, as in Men; in reſpect they are ſubject to fewer paſſions than Man is, and want the faculty of ſpeech to expreſs any one of thoſe few they feel in themſelves. Wherefore that we may in ſome order briefly recount the moſt remarkable at leaſt of theſe turbulent Affections incident to the Senſitive Soul; we ſhall ſhew what Alterations ſhe may ſuffer (1) from her

her own proper *Paſſions*; (2) from the temperament and diſeaſes of the *Body*: (3) from various impreſſions of ſenſible *Objects*; and (4) from exorbitant motions of the *Animal Spirits*.

Moſt certain it is, that the Flame of the Soul doth not always burn equaly, or at one conſtant rate; but now more, now leſs; ſometimes briskly and clearly, ſometimes dully and dimly. For, it is not only enlarged, or contracted, according as the fewel brought to feed it, is more or leſs in quantity, and more or leſs ſulphureous in quality: but the very accenſion of it in the heart, though of itſelf moderate and equal, is yet ſometimes ſo varied by the fannings as it were of the Paſſions; that one while it blazeth up to a dangerous exceſs, as it uſualy happens in great *Anger* and *Indignation*; another while it is in danger of being blown out, by ſuddain and ſurprizing *Joy*; or almoſt ſuffocated, by unexpected *Terror*, or aſtoniſhing *Grief*. The like may be ſaid of the reſt of the Paſſions, or ſtrong Affects, by whoſe various motions the Flame of life, like the flame of a candle expoſed to the winds, is variouſly agitated and changed: as will more clearly appear from our enſuing diſcourſe of the Paſſions in particular.

Nor

Art. 13. From the *temperament* and *diſeaſes* of the *Body*.

Nor is it from the ſuddain puffs, or impulſes of Paſſions alone, that ſuch immutations and inequalities as theſe proceed. Sometimes it comes to paſs, that the Vital Flame by ſlow degrees, and as it were *Hectically* diminiſhed, becomes little, pale, faint and half-extinct; as may be obſerved in colder temperaments, in *Leucophlegmatic* bodies, in *Hydropic* perſons, in Virgins troubled with the *Green-ſickneſs*, and other the like chronic diſeaſes. In which the blood being more ſerous or watery than it ought to be, yields but little flame, and that too inconſtant, and beclouded with fume and vapour; like that which ariſeth from wet and green wood. On the contrary, it ſomtimes happens, that the blood being immoderately ſulphureous, is almoſt wholly put into a conflagration; as is frequently obſerved in *Choleric* conſtitutions, and *feveriſh* diſtempers, and great *debauches* with Wine. And as by theſe and ſuch like diſorders of the blood, the accenſion of the Vital Flame is with reſpective variety altered: ſo likewiſe do the *Lucid* particles that ariſe to the brain from thence, and conſtitute the beamy web of *Animal Spirits*, become more, or leſs luminous, and regular, or irregular in their motions. For inſtance; From the

dimi-

diminiſhed or reſtrained accenſion of the blood, the ſphere of the *Senſitive Soul* is contracted into leſs compaſs than that of the body, and reduced to ſuch narrowneſs, that it cannot re-expand itſelf ſo as to illuſtrate all the brain, and actuate the whole contexture of the nerves, with requiſite brightneſs and vigour. And on the other ſide, when the flame of life is much *intended* or increaſed (provided it blaze not to the hight of a fever) then the whole ſyſtem of Animal ſpirits thence deradiated, being proportionably augmented, *ſwells* to an expanſion beyond the limits of the body; inſomuch that a Man tranſported and exulting for great *Joy*, or puffed up with *Pride*, ſeems to be inflated above meaſure, and hardly able to contain himſelf within the modeſt bounds of his own dimenſions.

Art. 14. From various impreſſions of *ſenſible objects*, and exorbitant motions of the *Animal* ſpirits.

Beſides theſe Alterations which the *Senſitive* or *Lucid* part of the Soul ſuffers from the various changes of the Vital; there are others, and thoſe very many, which it receives immediately both from affections of the *Brain*, and *Nerves*, and from *External* objects making impreſſions thereupon: which perturb the conſiſtence, and uſual order of its parts. For example; at night, the Brain itſelf, from

from a too plentifull infuſion of the Nutrive liquor, as from a gloomy cloud overcaſt, ſeems replete with vapours; ſo that in ſleep, the *Lucid* part of the Soul is wholly obſcured, and envellopped as it were with darkneſs. Nor is it rare to have *Eclipſes* of one, or more of the Faculties Animal, meerly from ſome *morbific* matter, or groſs humor fixed ſomwhere in the brain, and obſtructing the ways of the Animal ſpirits. Somtimes theſe Animal ſpirits are not *themſelves* ſufficieiently pure, clear and bright; but infected and beclouded with incongruous ſteams, ſaline, vitriolic, nitrous, and other the like darkſom exhalations; which deform the images of things drawn in the brain, change them into falſe and chimerical repreſentations, and raiſe exorbitant motions of the ſpirits. Whence it ſomtimes comes to paſs, that the whole Soul undergoes various metamorphoſes, and is inveſted in ſtrange apparitions, and confuſed with deluſory whimzies: as it too frequently happens to Men in *Hypochondriacal Melancholy*, and *madneſs*; and likewiſe in *drunken* fits.

Art. 15. The various *Geſtures* of a *Senſitive* Soul, re-

And as for the various *Geſtures* of the Soul, by which reſpectively to the various impreſſions of *ſenſible objects*, ſhe expreſſeth one while *Gladneſs* and *Pleaſure*;

ſure; another, *Averſion* and *Offence*: it is worthy our obſervation, that ſometimes ſhe is allured *outwardly* into the organ of ſome one of the ſenſes, and that ſhe occaſionaly crowds herſelf into the Eye, Ear, Palate, or other inſtrument of ſenſe, there more neerly to approach and entertain the pleaſing object; ſomtimes on the contrary, to avoid an Evil ſhe apprehends, and decline an encontre with an ingratefull object, ſhe retreats *inwardly*, and leaving her watches, ſhrinks up herſelf, as if ſhe labourd to hide her head from the danger threatned. So that we can ſcarcely perceive, or imagine any thing without diſquiet and commotion: and at the apprehenſion of almoſt any object whatſoever, the whole Soul is moved, and put into a trembling, and the ſubſtance of it variouſly agitated, as a field of corn is waved to and fro by contrary guſts of winds.

ſpective to the impreſſions of external objects variouſly affecting her.

Nor do theſe agitations, eſpecially if they be any whit violent, ſtop at the *Senſitive* part of the Soul, or ſpirits Animal (which I imagine to make a kind of *lucid Fluidum*, ſubject to Undulations or waving motions throughout, upon either external, or internal impulſes) but, as waves rowl on till they arrive at the ſhore, are carried on, by an Undulating motion

motion, even to the *Vital* part glowing in the blood; and impelling the flame thereof hither and thither, make it to burn unequaly. For, ſo ſoon as an object is either by the ſenſe, or by the Memory, repreſented to the Imagination, under th' apparence of Good, or Evil; in the very ſame inſtant it affects, and commoves the *Animal Spirits* deſtined to maintain the Pulſe of the heart: and by their influx, cauſing the heart to be variouſly contracted, or dilated; conſequently renders the motion, and accenſion of the blood variouſly irregular and unequal. And thus you ſee in what manner the two parts of the Senſitive Soul, the *Vital* flame, and the *Animal* ſpirits reciprocally affect each other with their accidental alterations. But this you may underſtand more clearly and fully from the following Theory of the Paſſions, where we ſhall enquire into the reaſons and motions of them more particularly.

Art. 16. An Enquiry concerning the *Knowledge* whereby Brutes are directed in actions *voluntary*.

Mean while I find my ſelf in this place arreſted by a certain mighty *Difficulty*, which though perhaps I ſhall not be able to overcome, ought nevertheleſs to be attempted; not only for its own grand importance, but becauſe without ſome plauſible Explication of it at leaſt, all our pre-

precedent ſpeculations concerning the nature and proprieties of a Senſitive Soul, will fall to the ground; as an arch that wants a key, or middle-ſtone to ſupport all the reſt.

It is concerning the *Knowledge* of Brutes, by which they are directed in actions *voluntary*.

For, ſuppoſing all we have hitherto been diſcourſing of the *Origin*, *Subſtance*, *Subſiſtence*, *Parts*, *Faculties*, *Inclinations*, *Paſſions* and *Alterations* of a Corporeal Soul, to be true and evident (which is more than I dare aſſume) yet doth it not from thence appear, what ſuch a Soul can by her own proper virtue do more than a *Machine* artificialy fram'd and put into motion. To ſpeak more plainly; tho it be granted; that firſt th' impreſſion made by an external object upon the inſtrument of ſenſe, doth by impelling the Animal Spirits inwards, and by diſpoſing them into a certain peculiar figure, or mode (as the *Carteſians* ſpeak) cauſe the act of *Senſation*, or ſimple *Perception*; and that then the ſame ſpirits rebounding, as it were by a reflex undulation, outward from the brain into the nerves and muſcles, produce *local motions*: granting this, I ſay, yet ſtill we are to ſeek, How this Soul, or any one part of it, comes

comes to be *conſcious* of Senſation, or how it can, by a *reflex* act (as the Schools phraſe it) *perceive that it doth perceive*, and according to that perception, is impell'd to diverſe acts, directed to an *appetite* of this, or that good, and ſomtimes in proſecution of the good deſired, to perform *actions* that ſeem to be the reſults of *counſel* and *deliberation*, ſuch as are daily obſerved to be done by ſeveral ſorts of Beaſts, as well wild as domeſtic. In *Man* indeed, it ſeems not difficult to conceive, that the *Rational* Soul, as preſident of all th'inferiour faculties, and conſtantly ſpeculating the impreſſions, or images repreſented to her by the Senſitive, as by a mirrour; doth firſt form to herſelf conceptions and notions correſpondent to their nature, and then proceed to acts of *reaſon, judgement* and *will*. But as for Brutes that are irrational; in what manner the perception, diſtinction, appetite, memory of objects, and other acts reſulting from an inferior kind of reaſon, are in them performd: this, I confeſs, is more than I can yet underſtand. Some there are, I know, who rather then acknowledge their inſufficiency to ſolve this Problem; have attributed to *Brutes* alſo Souls *immaterial*, and *ſubſiſtent* after ſeparation from

from their bodies. But these considered not, that the Soul of a Brute, however docil and apprehensive, and using organs in their structure very little (if at all) different from those in the head of Man, can yet have no capacity of Arts and Sciences, nor raise it self up to any objects, or acts, but what are *Material*: and that by consequence, the same is different from, and inferiour to the *Rational* Soul of Man, and *material*. So that instead of solving the Doubt, by teaching us, how from a certain Modification of subtil *matter*, there may result such *Power*, which residing in the brain of a Brute, may there receive without confusion all impressions or images brought in by the Senses, distinctly speculate, judge and know them, and then raise appetites, and imploy the other faculties in acts respective to that knowledge, and to those appetites: instead of this, I say, they have entangled themselves in an absurd Error, ascribing to a thing meerly *material*, a capacity of knowing *objects immaterial*, and performing *actions* proper only to *immaterial* Beings.

We are therefore to search for this *Power* of a Sensitive Soul, by which she is *conscious* of her own perception, only in *Matter* in a peculiar manner so, or

ſo diſpoſed or modified. But in what matter? this of the *Soul*, or that of the *Body*? Truely, if you ſhall diſtinctly examine either the Soul or the Body of a Brute, as not conjoyned and united into one *Compoſitum*; you will have a hard task of it, to find in either of them, or indeed in any other material ſubject whatever, any thing to which you may reaſonably attribute ſuch an *Energetic* and *ſelf-moving Power*. But if you conſider the *whole* Brute, as a *Body animated*, and by divine art of an infinite wiſdom deſigned, framed and qualified for certain ends and uſes: then you may ſafely conclude, that a Brute is, by the law of the Creation, or inſtitute of Almighty God, ſo comparated, as that from Soul and body united, ſuch a confluence of Faculties ſhould reſult, as are neceſſary to the ends and uſes for which it was made. Do but convert your thoughts awhile upon *Mechanic Engines*, and ſeriouſly contemplate the motions, powers and effects of them. They are all compoſed indeed of groſs, ſolid and ponderous Materials: and yet ſuch is the deſign, contrivance and artifice of their various parts, as that from the figures and motions of them, there reſult certain and conſtant operations, anſwerable to the intent of the Artiſt,

Artiſt, and far tranſcending the forces of their divided ingredients. Before the invention of *Clocks* and *Watches*, who could expect, that of iron and braſs, dull and heavy metalls, a machine ſhould be framed; which conſiſting of a few wheels endented, and a ſpring regularly diſpoſed, ſhould in its motions rival the celeſtial orbs, and without the help or direction of any external Mover, by repeted revolutions meaſure the ſucceſſive ſpaces of time even to minutes and ſeconds, as exactly almoſt as the diurnal revolutions of the Terreſtrial globe itſelf? and yet now ſuch Machins are commonly made even by ſome Blackſmiths, and mens admiration of their pretty artifice long ſince ceaſed. If then in vulgar Mechanics, the contrivance and advantagious diſpoſition of matter, be more noble and efficacious than matter itſelf: certainly in a *Living Creature*, in a *Body animate*, the Powers emergent from a conſpiracy and cooperation of ſo many, ſo various organs, and all ſo admirably formed, ought to be acknowledged incomparably more noble, and more Energetic. If the art of *Man*, weak and ignorant Man, can give to bodies, of themſelves weighty, ſluggiſh and unactive, figure, connexion and motion fit to pro-

duce effects beyond the capacity of their ſingle natures: what ought we to think of the divine art of the *Creator*, whoſe *Power* is infinite, becauſe his *wiſedom* is ſo? Could not *He*, think you, who by the voice of his Will call'd the World out of Chaos, and made ſo many myriads of different Beings out of one and the ſame univerſal matter; could not He, when He created *Brutes*, ſo faſhion and organize the various parts and members of their Bodies, thereto ſo adjuſt the finer and more active contexture of their ſpirituous Souls, and impreſs ſuch motions upon them, as that from the union and cooperation of both, a *Syndrome* or conſpiracy of Faculties or Powers ſhould ariſe, by which they might be qualified and inabled to live, move and act reſpectively to the proper uſes and ends of their Creation? Undoubtedly He could; and tis part of my belief, that He did. Nor do I more wonder at the *Knowledge* of Beaſts, by which they are directed in the election of objects, and in the proſecution or avoidance of them; than I do at their ſimple *Perception* of them by their outward ſenſes: ſince I conceive the one to be as much *Mechanical*, as the other, though perhaps the reaſon of the one, is of more difficult explication than that of the other.

When

When you hear the Muſick of a *Church Organ*, is it not as pleaſant to your mind, as the Muſick is to your ear, to conſider how ſo many grateful notes, and conſonances that compoſe the charming Harmony, do all ariſe only from wind blown into a ſet of pipes gradualy different in length and bore, and ſucceſſively let into them by the apertures of their valves? and do you not then obſerve the Effect of this ſo artificial inſtrument highly to excell both the Materials of it, and the hand of the Organiſt that plaies upon it? the like Harmony you have perhaps ſomtimes heard from a *Muſical Water-work*, as the vulgar calls it; an *Organ* that plaied of itſelf, without the hands of a Muſician to preſs the jacks, meerly by the force of a ſtream of Water opening and ſhuting the valves alternately, and in an order predeſign'd to produce the harmonical ſounds, conſonances and modes requiſite to the compoſition, to which it had been ſet.

Now, to the *firſt* of theſe *Organs* you may compare a *Man*; in whom the *Rational* Soul ſeems to perform the office of the *Organiſt*, while governing and directing the Animal Spirits in all their motions, ſhe diſpoſeth and ordereth all Fa-

culties of the inferior, or Senſitive Soul, according to her will and pleaſure: and ſo makes a kind of Harmony of *Reaſon*, *Senſe*, and *Motion*.

And to the *Other*, or *Hydraulic* Organ you may compare a *Brute*, whoſe *Senſitive* Soul being ſcarcely moderatrix of of herſelf, and her Faculties, doth indeed in order to certain ends neceſſary to her nature, perform many trains of actions; but ſuch as are (like the various parts of an Harmonical Compoſition) regularly preſcribed (as the notes of a Tune are prickd down) by the law of her creation, and determined for the moſt part to the ſame thing; viz. the Conſervation of herſelf. So that ſhe ſeems to produce an Harmony of *Life*, *Senſe* and *Motion*.

But this *Analogy* ſeems to be much greater in Brutes of the *loweſt* order, ſuch upon whoſe Souls or natures there are not many Types or Notes of actions to be done by them, imprinted; and which according to that common ſaying of the Schools, *non tam agunt*, *quàm aguntur*, act rather by neceſſary impulſe, or conſtraint, than freely, and of their own accord: than in more perfect Animals, whoſe actions are ordained to more, and more conſiderable uſes; and upon whoſe

Souls

Souls therefore more original leſſons are as it were prick'd down; and to which we cannot juſtly deny a power of both *varying* thoſe innate prints, and *compounding* them one with another occaſionaly. Which Power ſeems to be radicated in the *Corporeal Soul*, by nature ſo conſtituted, as to be *knowing* and *active* in ſome certain things neceſſary to it; and capable alſo of being afterward taught, by various accidents uſually affecting it, both to know other things, and to do far more, and more intricate actions.

Art. 17. The *Knowledge* of *Brutes*, either *Innate* or *Acquired*.

All the *Knowledge* therefore theſe more *perfect* Brutes are obſerved to have, muſt be either *Innate* or *Adventitious*. The *Former* is commonly nam'd *Natural Inſtinct*; which being by the Omnipotent Creator, in the very act of their Formation, infuſed, and as an indelible Character impreſs'd upon their very principles or natures; both urges them to, and directs them in certain actions neceſſary to the prorogation of their life, and to the propagation of their kind. The *Other* is by little and little *acquired*, by the daily *perception* of *new objects*, by *imitation*, by *experience*, by *mans teaching*, and by ſome other waies: and in ſome Brutes, is advanced to a higher degree than in others. Nevertheleſs this ſame acquired cogni-

tion, and *Cunning* alſo (how great ſoever) doth in ſome of them depend altogether upon *inſtinct natural*, and the frequent uſe of it.

Here it would not perhaps be very difficult for me to recount, what ſorts of *actions* done by more perfect Beaſts, are referrible to their *Congenite* Knowledge alone; what to their acquired alone; and what to a combination of both. I could alſo ſhew how their acquir'd knowledge ariſeth by degrees from impreſſions of new objects, from examples, or imitation, from experience and other adventitious helps juſt now mentioned. I might moreover explain in what manner the *direct* images of things brought into the common Senſory, produce firſt *Imagination*, and then *Memory*; how the ſame images *reflex'd*, inſtantly raiſe *Appetite*, if they appear good and agreeable; or *Averſion*, if diſpleaſing and hurtfull; and how thereupon in the ſame inſtant *Local Motions* ſucceed, for proſecution, or avoidance of the things themſelves. All theſe, I ſay, I might deduce from notions competent to a *Corporeal* Soul, and from the powers of a Body informed and actuated thereby, both being comparated for ſuch determinate actions by artifice Divine; without bringing in-

to

to the ſcene any *immaterial* natures (as ſome have done) to ſolve the difficulties concerning the ſcience or knowledge of Brutes. But becauſe theſe arguments have been already handled by many excellent Men, and curious wits, *Sir Kenelm Digby*, *Monſieur des Cartes*, *Mr. Hobbes*, &c. and moſt accurately by *Dr. Willis*, in his late Book *de Anima Brutorum*, and becauſe a further inquiſition into them is not abſolutely neceſſary to my deſign of explicating the reaſons of the *Paſſions*: I therefore ſhall ad no more concerning them; but contenting myſelf with the hints I have given, conclude this Section with two pertinent and remarkable clauſes.

Art. 18. That *Brutes* are directed only by *natural inſtinct*, in all actions that conduce either to their own *preſervation*, or to the *propagation* of their *ſpecies*: not by *Reaſon*.

Manifeſt it is, that all Brute Animals of what kind ſoever, are by *natural inſtinct* alone, as by an eternal rule, or law engraven upon their hearts, urged and directed to do all things that conduce either to their own *defenſe* and *conſervation*, or to the *propagation* of their *ſpecies*. And hence it is neceſſarily conſequent, that in order to their obſervance of this congenite law, or accompliſhment of theſe two grand Ends of their Creation, they muſt all, by the dictates of the ſame *natural inſtinct*, both *know*, whatever things are *convenient* and *beneficial*, whatever

ever are *inconvenient*, *hurtful* and *deſtructive* to them; and according to this knowledge, *proſecute* theſe with *hatred* and *averſation*, thoſe with *love* and *delight*. When therefore we obſerve *Brutes* to diſtinguiſh betwixt wholeſome and venomous plants, to ſeek for convenient food, cunningly to hunt after prey, retreat from injuries of weather, provide themſelves denns and other ſecret places for reſt and ſecurity, travell from one Climate to another, and change their ſtations at certain periods and ſeaſons of the year, to love their benefactors, and fly from their enemies, to court their mates, build neſts and other nurſeries for their yong, to ſuckle, feed, cheriſh, protect and teach them, to uſe a thouſand pretty ſhifts and artifices to elude their perſuers, in fine, to manage all their affairs regularly and prudently, as it were by counſel and deliberation, in order to the two principal ends preordained by the Divine Wiſedom: when we (I ſay) obſerve all theſe their actions, we are not to refer them to a principle of *Reaſon*, or any *free* and *ſelf-governing* Faculty (like the *Rational* Soul of Man) wherewith they are endowed; but only to *Natural Inſtinct*, by which they are incited and directed.

Neither

Art. 19. Nor *Material Neceſſity.*

Neither are we to give credit to their opinion who hold, that all ſuch actions ariſe from a kind of *Material Neceſſity* (ſuch as *Democritus* fancied) and without any intention, or Scope aimed at by the Beaſts themſelves; merely from the *congruity* or *incongruity* of images impreſſed upon the organ of the ſenſe affected: as if Brute Animals were as little conſcious of their own actings, as artificial Engines are of their motions, and the reaſons of them. For we cannot but obſerve, that Brutes, by virtue of natural inſtinct, perform not only *ſimple* acts excited by ſome one ſingle impreſſion made upon this or that Senſory, by an external agent, or object; as when the ſcorching heat of the Sun in ſommer beating upon them, makes them to retire to cool and ſhady places for refuge: but alſo many other *Compound* actions, ſuch to which a long ſeries, or chain of ſubſervient acts is required. For inſtance; in the Spring, when Birds feeling the warmth and invigorating (I had almoſt call'd it alſo the *prolific*) influence of th' approaching Sun (that Univerſal Adjutant of Generation) find themſelves pleaſantly inſtigated to their duety of *Propagation*; then, without any other impulſe, or direction, but that of natural inſtinct, they dextrouſly,

and

and as it were with counſel and deliberation, addreſs themſelves chiefly to that moſt delightful work. Firſt, with a kind of chearful Solemnity they chooſe, and eſpouſe their Mates, all their Femals bringing love, obſequiouſneſs, diligence and feather-beds for their dowry. Then they ſeek for places convenient to reſide in, and there with skill and art exceeding the proudeſt of humane Architecture, they build their Neſts. Which are no ſooner finiſhed, than they lay their Eggs therein. Upon theſe in the next place they ſit with admirable conſtancy and patience, untill they have hatch'd them. And that great work done, they in fine with exemplary tenderneſs and care feed, cheriſh and protect their young, till they are able to live of themſelves. Now here, you ſee, is a multiplicity of actions regularly and with deſign done in order to one grand ſcope, or end: ſuch as cannot poſſibly proceed from ſimple impreſſions of external objects. 'Twere eaſy for me here to invite you to reflect on the admirable Republics of *Bees* and *Piſmires*, in which all the conſtitutions of a moſt perfect Government are exemplified: yet without writen laws or promulgation of Right: but the former example is ſufficient. I conclude then, that ſince in all

theſe

theſe, the affairs or buſineſſes of Brutes are managed and adminiſtred always after one and the ſame manner, without any variety: that is a convincing argument, that the enterpriſes and works of Brutes of this ſort, are excited neither by *external objects*, whoſe impulſe is ever various; nor by any internal *purpoſe* of mind, which is more mutable than the wind; but by a principle more *certain* and *fix'd*, and always *determined* to one thing; which can be nothing elſe but *Natural inſtinct*.

And how far the power and influence of this *inſtinct* may extend toward the excitation of the various *Paſſions* to which the *Senſitive Soul* is of her own nature ſubject and prone; will appear more clearly from our ſubſequent Enquiry into their proper cauſes and motions: to which I now haſten; having thus long detained you in hearing what ſeems to me moſt probable and conſentaneous to reaſon, concerning the ſubſtance, original, proprieties and faculties of the *Senſitive Soul*, common to Man with Brutes. Which was my firſt *Preliminary*. ¶

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of the Nature Origin, and principal Seat of the Rational *Soul in Man.*

Art. 1. The Excellency of a *Rational* Soul.

HOw neer ſo ever Brute Beaſts may be allowed to approach to the Divine faculty of *Reaſon*, or *Diſcours*: yet moſt certain it is, no one of them hath ever been obſerved to *attain* thereunto. For, if we with all favor and partiality imaginable, examine the *Effects* of either their *innate*, or acquired *Knowledge*, or of *both* conjoyned, and improved into Habits by long practice and experience: yet in the end we ſhall be forced to confeſs, that even the moſt intricate, and moſt cunning of all their actions, come far ſhort of thoſe that are ordinarily done by *Man*, by virtue of the *Reaſonable Soul*, wherewith he is by the immenſe bounty of his Creator, endowed.

This is a *Verity* ſo obvious to every Man of common ſenſe and underſtanding. ſo evident by its own ſplendor; that it needs neither *Arguments* drawn from rea-

ſon

ſon to eſtabliſh, nor *Examples* drawn from frequent obſervations to illuſtrate it: eſpecially now after the many excellent diſcourſes thereupon written by Learned Men of almoſt all ages, all nations, all profeſſions. It being therefore unneceſſary for me by prolix reaſoning to evince, and ſuperfluous by multiplicity of inſtances to elucidate the vaſt diſparity betwixt the proper *Acts* and *Operations* of a *Reaſonable* Soul, and thoſe inferior ones of a *Senſitive*: I ſhall only in brief, and analytically recount to you a few of thoſe many *Excellencies* and *Prerogatives* eſſential to the former, and by the law of nature incommunicable to the later.

The *Preeminence* then of Mans *Reaſonable* Soul is undeniably manifeſt from both her *Objects*, and her *Acts*.

Her *Objects* are all things whatſoever, true or falſe, real or imaginary, within or without the World, ſenſible or inſenſible, infinite or finite: for, to all theſe can ſhe extend her unconfined power of ſpeculation. I doubt indeed, whether it be poſſible for her in this life, while ſhe is obliged to ſpeculate all things by the help of images, or corporeal repreſentations, to have an adequate, and full cognition of the ſuperexcellent nature of *God*:

Art. 2. Manifeſt from her proper *Objects*.

God: but yet it cannot be denied, that ſhe is capable of knowing for certain, that there *is* ſuch an incomprehenſible Being as God, and that He is *infinite* and *Eternal.* I doubt alſo, whether the mind of Man be capable of any true notion of an *Angell, Spirit, Dæmon* or other the like Beings which the Schools commonly (how intelligibly, let others diſpute) call *immaterial Subſtances*; becauſe I myſelf can repreſent to my thoughts nothing but under ſome certain figure and quantity, which are inſeparable from body: and yet who dares deny th' *Exiſtence* of ſuch Beings in the World? To ſpeculate ſuch objects then, as fall not under the perception of any of the ſenſes, is the prerogative of a *Rational* Soul: nor can a *Senſitive* poſſibly have any knowledge of things above the ſphere of her own nature; all her faculties being *corporeal*, and by conſequence *limited* to corporeal objects, and thoſe too no other than what are perceptible by the *ſenſes.*

Art. 3. And *Acts.* Her *Acts* alſo equaly declare her tranſcendent Powers. That act of ſimple apprehenſion, which in Brutes is Imagination, is in Man *Intellection*: and the intellect preſides over imagination, diſcerning the Errors of it occaſion'd by the ſenſes, and correcting them; yea ſubli-

ming

ming the notions thereof into true and uſefull ones. And as for forming of *Propoſitions*, by compounding or dividing the ſimple notions of ſenſible things; that power is indeed common to the *Senſitive* Soul alſo, and uſualy exerciſed by her, when an image of ſome object newly admitted, meets with one or more images either formerly ſtored up in the Memory, or at that inſtant ſuggeſted by natural inſtinct; and is found aſſociable, or repugnant to them: but yet the ſame falls incomparably ſhort of that which belongs to the *Human Intellect*. Which doth not only *review* all propoſitions conceiv'd from the Phantaſy; but *judges* alſo whether they be true or falſe, congruous or incongruous; and then orders and diſpoſes them accordingly into trains of notions convenient either to Speculation, or to practice. Moreover, it reſtrains the *Phantaſy*, of itſelf inſtable and prone to ramble through various phantaſms; calls it away from extravagant and uſeleſs conceptions, directs it to others more conform to reaſon, and at pleaſure confines it within certain bounds, that it may not divert, or range too wide from the purpoſe. All which Acts give clear evidence, that there is in *Man* a Soul ſuperiour to the ſenſitive, and which mode-

rates and governs all the faculties and operations of it: yea, more yet, which from repreſentations ſenſible deduces many other notions of things altogether unknown to ſenſe, and which the Phantaſy is of itſelf wholly incapable to imagine. For, it underſtands *Axioms*, or firſt principles, and that by its own power alone, without recourſe to corporeal *ſpecies*: and (what is yet more noble and ſublime) by a reflex act views *itſelf*, thinks that it thinks, from thence certainly knowing its own *Exiſtence*, which cannot be either perceived by ſenſe, or imagined by Phantaſy. Whereas neither the *Senſe*, nor *Imagination* (for of theſe there are no images extant) can perceive that they perceive, or imagine. To theſe royal prerogatives of Mans *Rational* Soul, let us ſubjoyn the native right ſhe hath to the whole *Encyclopædia* or Zodiac of *Arts* and *Sciences*; *Theology*, *Logic*, *Phyſic*, *Metaphyſics*, *Mathematics*, *Algebra*, *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, *Mechanics*: which being all (*Theology* alone excepted) the products or creatures of Mans *Mind*, ſufficiently atteſt their Author to be an *Agent Spiritual*, admirably *intelligent*, *immaterial*, and therefore *immortal*.

Now if this be true (as moſt certainly it is) then one of theſe two *Aſſumptions*

ons must be so too. Either the *Rational* Soul of man doth *alone* perform all offices not only of *Understanding* and *discourse*, but of *sense* also, and *life*; and so administer the whole oeconony of Human nature. Or else there are in every individual Man *two* distinct Souls conjoined, and acting together: one, only *Rational*; t'other merely *Sensitive*; that as *Queen* regent, this as *inferior* and *subordinate*.

The FIRST seems to me not a little improbable.

Art. 4. *Life* and *Sense* depend not on the the *Rational* Soul of man.

For, (1) all acts of the Senses, and animal Motions, as likewise the Passions, are *corporeal*, *divided* and *extended*, to various parts: and therefore the *Rational* Soul, which we conceive to be *incorporeal*, *indivisible* and *finite*, seems incapable to cause or impress those motions *immediately*, or by herself. To me (I confess) it seems Unintelligible, how an incorporeal Agent, not infinite, can physically act in, and upon a gross body *immediately*, or without the intervention of a third thing; which though corporeal too, is yet notwithstanding of parts so spirituous, and of a constitution so subtil, as to approach somwhat neerer to the nature of a pure *Spirit*, than solid and ponderous body doth. *Flame*, and

light I acknowledge to be *bodies*; but yet methinks there is less of *disproportion*, or disparity betwixt them and a substance purely spiritual, than is betwixt a pure *Spirit* and a gross, heavy body, such as ours is. And therefore in my weak judgment, it is more conceivable that the *Reasonable* Soul should have some spirituous, and subtile thing as flame, or light is, viz. the *Sensitive* Soul, conjoyned with her, to be a convenient *Medium* betwixt herself and the gross body, to receive her immediate influence, and actuate the body according to her will and pleasure: than it is, that she should *immediately* move and actuate the body, betwixt whose nature and her own there is great disparity.

(2) As for that nice and amusing doctrine of the *School-men*, that *in Man the Sensitive Soul is eminently contained in*, and (to use their very term) *as it were absorpt by the Rational*; so that what is a *Soul* in *Brutes*, becomes a mere *Power* or quality in *Man*: this I think (as many other of their superfine distinctions doe) sounds like nothing put into hard words. For, how can it be imagined possible, the eternal law of nature should be so far violated, as that a *substance* should be changed into an accident? that the *sen-*

sitive

ſitive Soul which is Corporeal and extenſe, and which they themſelves allow to be actually exiſtent in the body, before the infuſion of the *Rational*; ſhould upon acceſſion of the Rational, loſe its former eſſence, and degenerate into a naked *Quality*? This is (I profeſs) a Myſtery much above my comprehenſion.

(3) If it be affirmed, that the *Rational* Soul doth, at her entrance into the body, introduce *life* alſo, and *ſenſe*; and ſo there is no need of any other principle of life and ſenſe, where ſhe is: then muſt it be granted, that *Man* doth not generate a *Man animated*, or endowed with life and ſenſe; but only an inform body, or rude maſs of fleſh. And how abſurd that would be, I leave to your judgement.

Art. 5. And therefore *he* ſeems to have alſo a *Senſitive* Soul.

Theſe Reaſons diſcovering the improbability of the *firſt* Aſſumption; what can remain to hinder us from embracing the OTHER, viz. that there are in every individual Man, *two diſtinct* Souls, coexiſtent, and conjoin'd; one by which he is made a *Reaſonable* creature, another by which he becomes alſo a *living*, and *Senſitive* one? Eſpecially ſince the truth of this ſeems ſufficiently evident even from that ψυχομαχία, or *civil war* too frequently hapning betwixt theſe twins, which every Man ſometimes feels

in his own breast, and whereof the holy *Apostle* himself so sadly complain'd. For, this intestine War, seeing it cannot arise from one and the same thing possessed with affections mutually repugnant, and inclining us two contrary waies at once; argues a *Duumvirate* of Rulers reciprocaly clashing, and contending for superiority; and such too that are as remote in their natures, as different in the modes of their subsistence.

Art. 6. That there are in every individual Man *two* distinct *Souls* coexistent, argued from the *civil warr* observed betwixt them.

Upon this War depend all the *Passions* by which the restless Mind of Man is so variously, and many times also violently agitated, to his almost perpetual disquiet and vexation: and upon the *success* of it depends all the *happiness*, or *misery* of not only his present life, but that which is to come. To enquire therefore awhile into the *grounds* and *reasons* of this fatal discord; will be neither loss of time, nor digression from our purpose.

Art. 7. The *Causes* of that warr.

That Man then is endowed, as with two distinct faculties of *Knowing*, viz. *Understanding*, and *Imagination*; that proper to his *Rational*, this to his *Sensitive* soul: so likewise with a twofold *Appetite*, viz. *Will*, which proceeding from his Intellect, is immediate attendant of the Rational soul; and *appetite Sensitive*, which

which cohering to the Imagination, is as it were the factor or procurer to the Corporeal Soul: is the common doctrine of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, to this day read and aſſerted in the Schools; nor ought it to be rejected. But then it muſt not be ſo underſtood, as if the *Rational* ſoul *herſelf*, which ſeems to be immaterial, and conſequently exempt from paſſion, were upon every appulſe of *good* or *evil* objects, ſubject to all the turbulent affections of *deſire* or *averſation*: for, this would be manifeſtly repugnant to the excellency of her *ſpiritual* nature, and inconſiſtent with her dignity and *ſuperintendency* over the inferiour powers. *Affections* ſhe hath indeed of her own, ſuch as are competent and proper to her ſemidivine Eſſence. It is not to be doubted, but that in the contemplation of *true* and *good*, and chiefly of what is ſupremely both true and good, the *Deity*; as likewiſe in works of *beneficence*, in the *cognition* of things by their cauſes, in the exerciſes of her *habits* aſwell the *contemplative*, as the *practical*; and in all other her proper acts, the Reaſonable Soul feels in herſelf a very great *Complacency*: as on the contrary, the want of theſe doth affect her with as great *Diſpleaſure*. Nor is it to be doubted, but our love of God,

and all other real goods; and our deteſtation of vices and vicious Men; as alſo all other pure and ſimple *affects* ariſing and continuing without *perturbation* or diſquiet: belong only to the *Reaſonable* Soul, which (to uſe the elegant ſimile of *Plato*) ſeated in a higher ſphere of impaſſibility, like the top of mount *Olympus*, enjoys perpetual ſerenity: looking down the while upon all tumults, commotions and diſorders hapning in the inferior part of man; as that doth upon the clouds, winds, thunders and other tempeſts raiſed in the air below it. But as for all *vehement* affections, or *perturbations* of the *Mind*, by which it is uſualy commoved, and inclined to this or that ſide, for proſecution of good, or avoidance of evil: *theſe* certainly ought all to be aſcribed to the *Corporeal* Soul; and ſeem to have their original in the ſeat of th' *Imagination*, probably the middle of the brain. Nevertheleſs, for that the Intellect, as it reviews all Phantaſms formed by imagination, and at pleaſure regulates and diſpoſes them; ſo it not only perceives all concupiſcences, and tempeſts of paſſions uſed to be ſtirr'd up in the imagination, but alſo (while it freely exerciſeth its native power and juriſdiction) moderates, governs, and gives

law

law to them: for theſe reaſons, when the Rational Soul approves ſome, and rejects others; raiſeth ſome, and compoſes others of thoſe paſſions, and directs them to right ends; ſhe may alſo be ſaid, by ſuch her dictates, to exerciſe acts of *Will*, as Arbiter, and to will or nill thoſe things, which the *Senſitive Appetite* deſires or abhors by her permiſſion or command.

Art. 8. wherein ſomtimes the *Senſitive* appetite prevails.

But yet this empire of the Rational Soul is not ſo abſolute over the Senſitive, when this proceeds to *Appetite*, as when it is imployed about the diſcernment and *Knowledge* of ſenſible objects. For, the *Senſitive* being much neerer allied to the *body*, and immediate Guardian thereof; is by that affinity and relation obliged to addict itſelf altogether to the gratification, welfare and conſervation of the ſame. And that this province may be more grateſull and agreeable to ſo delicate a Governeſs, ſhe is continualy courted and preſented by all the *Senſes* with variety of blandiſhments and tempting delights. So that charmed by thoſe powerful enchantments of ſenſible objects, and intirely taken up with care of the body, and in that reſpect prone to purſue pleaſures: ſhe too often proves deaf to the voice of *Reaſon* adviſing the contrary, and refuſes

to

to be diverted from her sensual to nobler affections.

Yea somtimes grown weary of subjection, she takes occasion to cast off her yoke of allegiance, and like a proud and insolent Rebell, aspires to unbounded license and dominion. And then, then it is we feel those *Twins* strugling within us, that intestine war betwixt the *Flesh* and the *Spirit*, that dire conflict of the *Sensitive Appetite* with *Reason*; which distracts one Man into two Duellists, and which ceaseth not, till one of the Combatants hath overcome and brought the other to submission. And (what is yet more deplorable) the event of this combat is often so unhappy, that the *nobler* part is subdued and led captive by the *ignoble:* the forces of *sensual* allurements then proving too strong for all the guards of *Reason*, though assisted by the auxiliary troops of *Moral* precepts, and the sacred institutes of *Religion.* When the divine *Politie* of the Rational Soul being subverted, the whole unhappy man is furiously carried away to serve the brutish lusts of the insolent usurper, and augment the triumphs of libidinous carnality: which degrades him from the dignity of his nature, and cassating all his royal prerogatives, debases him to a parity with

with beasts, if not below them; for, *Reason* once debauch'd so as to become *brutal*, leads to all sorts of *excess*; whereof beasts are seldom guilty.

Art. 9. And sometimes the *Rational.*

Yet this is not alwaies the issue of the war. Sometimes it happens that the victory falls to the right side; and the *Princess* overpowring the Rebell, reduces her to due submission and conformity. Nay somtimes *Reason*, after she hath been long held captive, breaks off her fetters; and remembring her native Soveraignty, grows conscious and ashamed of her former lapses: and thereupon with fresh courage and vigour renewing the conflict, vanquishes and deposes the *Sensitive* Soul with all its legions of lusts, and gloriously re-establishes herself in the throne. Yea more, at once to secure her empire for the future, and expiate the faults of her male-administration in times past; she by bitter remorse, severe contrition, and sharp penance, punishes herself, and humbles her traitorous enemy the Flesh. And as the *war* itself, so this act of *Conscience*, this *self-chastising affection*, being proper to Man alone; doth clearly shew, *that in Man there are either two Souls, one Subordinate to the other*; or *two parts of the same Soul, one opposing the other*, and contending about

about the government of him and his affections. But which of these two consequents is most likely to be true, you may have already collected from my discourse precedent.

It remains then, that I give you some account of the Opinions, or rather *Conjectures* of Men (for they can be no other) which seem to me most probable, concerning the *Origin* of the *Reasonable* Soul; concerning the principle *seat* of it in the body; concerning its *connexion* with the *Sensitive Soul*; and concerning the manner of its *Understanding*.

Art 10. That the *Rational* Soul is *created* immediately by God.

For the *First*; if the Rational Soul be a *pure Spirit*. i. e. a simple or incompound substance; as I have already shewn her proper *acts*, *affections* and *objects* seem to infer, and as most wise men, ancient and modern, Ethnics and Christians, Philosophers and Theologues have unanimously held her to be: and if it seem inconsistent with the purity and simplicity of such a Being, to be generated by the Parents, who are compound Beings, as reason teacheth us it is: granting this, I say, nothing can remain to divorce me from that common opinion which holds, that she is *created immediately by God, and infused into the body of a human* Embryon, *so soon as that is organized, formed and prepared to receive her.* For,

For, as to that grand *Objection*, that the *Son* oftentimes moſt exactly reſembles the *Father*, not only in temperament, ſhape, ſtature, features and all other things diſcernable in the body; but in diſpoſition alſo, wit, affections, and the reſt of the Animal faculties: and therefore it muſt needs be, that the Father begets the Rational Soul, as well as the body: it is eaſy to detect the weakneſs thereof, in the violence of the illation. Since all thoſe endowments and faculties wherein the chief ſimilitude doth conſiſt, proceed immediately from the *Corporeal* Soul, which I grant to be indeed *Ex traduce*, or propagated by the Father; but not the *Rational*, which is of Divine Original.

Art. 11. The *reſemblance* betwixt Father and Son, imputed to the *Senſitive* Soul.

For the *Second*, viz. the *Rational* Souls chief *ſeat* or Manſion in the body, tho I cannot conceive how, or in what manner an *immaterial* can reſide in a *material*, becauſe I can have no repreſentation or idea in my mind of any ſuch thing: yet nevertheleſs when I conſider that all impreſſions of ſenſible objects, whereof we are any ways conſcious, are carried immediately to the *Imagination*; and that there likewiſe all Appetites, or ſpontaneous conceptions and intentions of actions are excited: I am very apt to judge the

Art. 12. The *Rational* Soul *ſeated* in that part of the brain which ſerves to *Imagination*.

the *Imagination* to be the *Eſcurial*, or imperial palace of the *Rational* Soul, where ſhe may moſt conveniently both receive all intelligences, from her Emiſſaries the ſenſes, and give forth orders for government of the whole ſtate of Man. That the whole Corporeal ſoul ſhould be poſſeſſed by the *Rational*, ſeems neither *competent* to her Spiritual nature, which is above Extenſibility; nor *neceſſary* to her Empire over all: no more than it is neceſſary for a King to be preſent in all parts of his dominions at the ſame time. And if ſhe be as it were inthroned in any one part thereof; what part ſo convenient, ſo advantagious as the *Phantaſy*, where ſhe may immediately be informed of all occurrents in the whole body, and whence ſhe may iſſue forth mandates for all ſhe would have done by the whole or any member thereof? I think therefore, I may affirm it to be probable, that this *Queen* of the Iſle of Man hath her *Court*, and *Tribunal* in the nobleſt part of the *Senſitive* Soul, the *Imagination*, made up of a ſelect aſſembly of the moſt ſubtil Spirits Animal, and placed in the middle of the Brain. As for the *Conarion*, or *Glandula pinealis* ſeated neer the center of the brain, wherein *Monſieur Des Cartes* took ſuch

pains

pains to lodge this Celeſtial gheſt; all our moſt curious Anatomiſts will demonſtrate that *Glandule* to be ordained for another, and that a far leſs noble uſe, which here I need not mention.

For the *Third*, to wit, what *obligeth* the *Rational* Soul to continue reſident in the *Imagination* during this life; truely I cannot think either that ſhe is capable of, or that ſhe needs any other *ligament* or tye, than the infringible law of nature, or *Will* of her Divine *Creator*: who makes and deſtines her to reſide in the body of man, to be his *Forma informans*; and gives her therefore a ſtrong *inclination* to inhabit that her inne or lodging: ordaining her to have a certain *dependence*, as to her operation, upon the *Phantaſy*, ſo that without the help and ſubſerviency thereof, ſhe can know or underſtand little, or nothing at all. For, it is from the *Imagination* alone that ſhe takes all the repreſentations of things, and the fundamental *ideas*, upon which ſhe afterward builds up all her Science, all her wiſdom. And therefore though the Mind of one man underſtands more, and reaſoneth better than another; it doth not thence follow, that their *Rational* Souls are *unequal* in their natural capacity of underſtanding and diſcourſe: becauſe the diſparity proceeds immediately from difference

Art. 13. And there *connexed* to the *Senſitive* by the *will* of her Creator.

rence of *Imagination*, mediately and principally from the various diſpoſitions of the *Brain*. For, when the Animal Spirits, being either of themſelves leſs pure, ſubtil and active than is requiſite, or hinderd in their expanſion and motions, are not able duely to irradiate and actuate the Brain affected with ſome diſtemper, or originally formed amiſs: in ſuch caſe, the *Phantaſms* created in the *Imagination*, muſt be either deficient, or diſtorted; and the *Intellect* being obliged to judge of them accordingly, muſt be miſinformed. Hence it often happens, that by reaſon of ſome wound, contuſion, or other great hurt done to the brain, men who formerly were of acute wit, and excellent underſtanding, are more or leſs deprived of thoſe noble Faculties, and degenerate into mere fools or idiots. For, the acquiring, and loſeing the *habit* of intellection and ratiocination, depends totally upon the *Brain* and *Imagination*, the corporeal ſubject thereof: but the *Intellect* it ſelf, ſince it hath no parts, cannot be perfected by parts; being from the beginning, and of its own nature, a full and perfect power of Underſtanding. Nor doth it, by acceſſion of any whatever Habit, underſtand more: but is it ſelf rather a *Habit alwayes comparated to underſtand*. And in truth

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the principal Function of the human Intellect ſeems to be this, that it be of its own nature merely *intelligent*, that is knowing things, not by ratiocination, but by *ſimple intuition*. But during its confinement within the body, it is ſurrounded with that darkneſs, that it doth not ſimply, nakedly, and as it were by way of intuition perceive all things which it underſtands; but attains to moſt of its knowledge by *reaſoning*, that is, ſucceſſively, and by proceeding as it were by degrees. If therefore the *Organ* or inſtrument, by the help of which the Intellect is obliged to ratiocinate, or gradualy to attain to the knowledge of things, be unfit, or out of tune: no wonder if it be not able to make good Muſick thereupon.

Art. 14. Where how ſhe exerciſeth her faculty of *judging* of the images of things formed in the Imagination, ſeems to be *inexplicable*.

Concerning the *Fourth* and laſt thing therefore, namely the *Manner* how this Unintelligible *Intellect* of man comes to *know*, *ſpeculate* and *judge* of all Phantaſms or images pourtraid in the Imagination: I can much more eaſily gueſs what it is not, than what it is. I am not inclined to eſpouſe their conceit, who tell us, that the Rational Soul ſitting in the brain, ſomewhere near the original of the nerves belonging to the Senſes (as a Spider ſits watching in the centre of her net) and feeling all *ſtrokes* made upon them by the

species of ſenſible objects, diſtinguiſhes and judges of their ſeveral qualities and proprieties, by the different *modes* of their impreſſions. Becauſe, the ſuppoſition of a *percuſſion*, or ſtroke to be made by a *Corporeal* image, is manifeſtly repugnant to a Faculty *incorporeal*. But whether or no I ought to acquieſce in that *other* opinion delivered, and maintained by a whole army of Contemplative men, *viz.* That the Intellect knowes and diſcerns things by *ſimple Intuition*, i.e. by beholding their Images repreſented in the Phantaſy, as we ſee our faces repreſented in a mirror or looking-glaſs: truely I am yet to learn from wiſer heads than mine. For, though I admire the ſubtilty of the conceipt, and love not to be immodeſtly Sceptical, eſpecially in matters that tranſcend my narrow comprehenſion: yet, to ſpeak ingenuouſly, I as little underſtand how *Intuition* can be aſcribed to an *immaterial*, that hath no *Eyes*; as I do how *Feeling* of *ſtrokes* can be aſcribed to a thing that cannot be *touched*. Nevertheleſs I will not point blanck deny this latter opinion to be true, only becauſe I cannot perceive the *Competency* of ſuch an act as *intuition* to the *incorporeal* Soul of man: for, that were to make my ſcanty reaſon the meaſure of truth; and to confide more in my own dulneſs;

dulneſs, than in the admired perſpicacity of ſo many eminent Wits preceding me. Wherefore having confeſs'd my ignorance, I refer the matter to your arbitration: allowing you as much time as you ſhall think fit, ſeriouſly to conſider the ſame; and in the interim contentedly ſuſpending my curioſity, which hath too often perplexed me. For, hitherto could I never drive it into my head, how thoſe terms of *infuſion*, *connexion* and *intuition* can be intelligibly applyed to a *ſpiritual*, or incompound eſſence, ſuch as we conceive the Reaſonable Soul to be: and if I have uſed them in this diſcourſe, it was rather becauſe I could think of none *leſs improper*, than becauſe I approved them as *adequate* to the notions to which they are vulgarly accommodated. Beſides, I hold it extremly difficult, not to ſpeak ſome *non-ſenſe*, when we adventure to treat of the nature of *ſpirits*, whereof we underſtand ſo little: and you (I preſume) will rather pitty, than condemn a man for ſtumbling in the *dark*. But I have too long detain'd you upon *Preliminaries*: and therefore deprecating your impatience, invite you now from the porch into the little *Theatre* of the *Paſſions*, which I deſign'd to erect more for your divertiſement, than ſtudy. ¶

SECT. IV.

Of the Paſſions *of the Mind in* general.

TAking it for granted then, from the reaſons precedent, that in Man, beſides the Rational Soul, by which he becomes a Reaſonable creature, there is alſo a Senſitive one, by which he is made a living and ſenſitive creature; and that this *later* being merely *Corporeal*, and *coextens* to the body it animates, is by the law of its nature ſubject to various *Mutations*: I come in the next place to conſider what are the moſt remarkable of thoſe Mutations, and the *Cauſes* whence they uſually ariſe; as likewiſe the principal effects of them upon the *body* and *mind* of man.

Art. 1. A two-fold ſtate of the *Senſitive Soul*; *viz.* of *tranquillity*.

Obvious it is to every mans notice, that there is a *twofold ſtate* or condition of his *Senſitive* Soul; one of *quiet* and *tranquillity*; another of *diſquiet* and *perturbation*: every man living finding his ſpirit ſometimes calm and ſerene, ſometimes agitated and ruffled more or leſs by the winds and

and tempests of passions raised within him.

In the state of *Tranquillity*, it seems probable that the whole *Corporeal* Soul being coextens to the whole body inshrining it (as the body is to the skin envesting it) doth at the same time both inliven all parts with the vital flame of the blood, to that end carried in a perpetual round (as the vulgar conceive the Sun to be uncessantly moved round about the Earth, to illuminate and warm all parts of it) and irradiate and invigorate them with a continual supply of Animal spirits, for the offices of Sense and Motion. And this *Halcyon* state certainly is the only fair weather we enjoy within the region of our breast, and the best part of human life.

Art. 2. And *Perturbation.*

On the contrary, in the state of *Perturbation*, all that excellent *Oeconomy* is more or less discomposed. Then it seems that the same frail soul is so strongly shock'd and commoved, that not only her *vital* part, the blood, the calm and equal circulation being interrupted, is forced to undergo irregular floods and ebbs, and other violent fluctuations; but the *Animal spirits* also, impelled to and fro in a tumultuous manner, cause great disorders in the functions of sense and motion; yea

more, by their exorbitant manner of influx into the nerves of the Heart and Lungs, they move them irregularly, and so contribute to render the course of the blood yet more unequal. Nor doth the tempest stop here; it extends sometimes also to other *Humors* of the body, to the *solid* parts and members of it, and even to the discomposure of the *Reasonable Soul* her self.

Art. 3. The *first*, most *observable* in *sleep*, and when objects appear *indifferent*.

The *Tranquillity* of the Sensitive Soul is easily observable in *sleep*, when the spirits are bound up, or at least at rest; and very often also when we are *awake*, namely whensoever the objects affecting the sense, or created in the imagination, appear to import neither *good*, nor *evil* to *us*, and we are no further concerned than barely to apprehend and know them. For, then they smoothly and calmly slide into the common sensory and imagination, and soon pass away without any the least disquiet or commotion of the appetite.

Art. 4. The *other*, manifest in all *Passions*.

The *Perturbation* of it is as easily manifest in all the *passions*, which are the consequents of *desire*, or of *aversation*. For, when any object is represented under the apparence of good or evil to *us* in particular; instantly the Sensitive Soul is moved to imbrace, or avoid it; and imployes not only the Animal Spirits, her Emissaries,

ries, but the blood alſo, and other humors univerſally diffuſed through the body, and even the ſolid parts too, as inſtruments to effect her deſign. More plainly; when the Imagination conceives any thing to be embraced as good, or avoided as evil; preſently by the ſpirits reſiding in the brain, and ranged as it were into order, the Appetite is formed: and then the impreſſion being tranſmitted to the Heart, according as that is contracted or dilated, the blood is impelled and forced to various fluctuations, and irregular motions: and thence the Appetite being by inſtinct tranſmitted to the nerves ordained for that uſe, they cauſe motions of the ſolid parts reſpective thereunto. And this we may conjecture to be the *order* of *motions* excited ſucceſſively in the phantaſy, ſpirits, blood and ſolid parts, in every Paſſion of the mind of what ſort ſoever. Nor can it indeed ſink into my dull head, by what other means of mutual intercourſe, beſides ſuch a quick tranſmiſſion of ſpirits firſt from the brain into the *Præcordia*, and thence back again to the brain, by nerves to that end extended betwixt thoſe ſources of life and ſenſe, the great and ſpeedy *commerce* in all paſſions obſerved to be maintained between them, can be effected.

Art. 5. That in the state of *Perturbation*, the *Sensitive* Soul varieth her *Gestures*, by *Contraction* or *Expansion*.

But however this admirable Commerce may be otherwise explained, it is lawful for us us to conceive, that the *Sensitive* Soul, when put into this state of *perturbation*, doth strangely vary her *Postures*, according to the diversity of motions caused in her: and though that diversity be very great, yet that in all perturbations whatever, she is more or less *amplified*, so as to swell beyond her ordinary bounds; or more or less *contracted* within her self, so as to be less extense or diffused, than usually she is at other times, in her state of *tranquillity*: as will be exemplified in all the passions we design particularly to describe. Mean while it is observable, that sometimes she being affected with *joy*, or *pride*, and as it were exulting above measure, doth advance and *expand* her self, as if she strove to be greater, and to stretch her grandure beyond the narrow limits of the body. Whereupon the *Animal Spirits* being respectively commoved in the brain, enlarge the sphere of their irradiation, and by a more abundant influx vigorously agitate the *Præcordia* or *vital* parts, so forcing the *blood* to flow more copiously into all parts, and to diffuse it self more freely and speedily through the whole body. On the *contrary*, sometimes being surprised with *grief*, or *fear*, she *contracts* her self into a narrower compass;

compaſs; ſo that ſhrunk up to a ſcantling leſs than her uſual circuit of emanation, ſhe becomes of too ſmall a ſize vigorouſly to actuate the body as ſhe ought. Whence the *Animal faculties* drooping as it were, perform their actions either ſlowly and weakly, or perverſly: and the *Præcordia* wanting their due influx of ſpirits, almoſt flagg, ſuffering the *blood* to remain in their conduits longer than it ought, even to danger of ſtagnation, and conſequently of ſudden death. Theſe two contrary Motions therefore of *Contraction* and *Expanſion*, I ſuppoſe to be the two *General* ones, to which all the various *Poſtures* of the *Senſitive* Soul, when ſhe is perturbed, may be commodiouſly referr'd: it ſeeming to me, conſidering her to be exactly like a *Flame*, and obnoxious to the like accidental mutations, that ſhe is not naturally capable of other beſides theſe; and that how great ſoever the variety of ſuch her *Mutations* may be in the vaſt diverſity of *Paſſions*, yet they are all but ſeveral *degrees*, and divers *modes* of either her *Extenſion*, or *Contraction*.

This being then ſuppoſed, I proceed to the firſt and *General Cauſes* of all Paſſions. Where I obſerve *firſt*, (what was only hinted a little afore) that it is not the ſimple repreſentation of *good* or *evil* in any object,

Art. 6. We are not moved to Paſsion, by Good or Evil, but only when we conceive the ſame to concern *our ſelves* in particular.

object, how great soever it be, that is sufficient to raise Commotion in the sensitive Soul; for, we usualy without perturbation behold the prosperous or adverse events befalling *other* Men no waies related to us: and therefore it is further required to the moving our affections, that the good or evil apprehended, be by us conceived to concern *ourselves* in particular, or our *Friends* at least, and near relations, who in this case are part of our selves. *Secondly*, that even that good or evil wherein a Man conceives himself to be concern'd, is not always apprehended by him under one and the same *ration* or aspect; but *variously*, aswell in respect of the *object* itself, as of the *Subject* to which it doth more peculiarly and immediately appertain. Of the divers rations under which one and the same *object*, good or evil, may be apprehended by one and the same Man, respectively to the various *circumstances* thereof; we shall more opportunely speak anon. And as for those that respect the *Subject*, or Man *apprehending*; it is worthy our serious remark;

Art. 7. All Passions distinguished into *Physical*, *Metaphysical*, and *Moral*.

That all Good or Evil represented to Man, doth concern the *Sensitive* Soul, either as she is *distinct* from the body, and abstract from all relation; or as she is intimately

timately *conjoyn'd* to the *body*, and interreſſed therein; or finally as ſhe is *ſubordinate* to the *Rational* Soul. For, though every *Affect* or Paſſion be founded in the *Corporeal* Soul, yet it always reſpects the good or evil of one or other of theſe three ſubjects, and is firſt raiſed on the behalf of this, that, or the other. Wherefore according to this triple relation of the *Senſitive* Soul, all Paſſions incident thereto; may be ſaid to be either *Phyſical*, or *Metaphyſical*, or *Moral*: of which in their order.

Art. 8. What are paſſions *Phyſical.*

1. Paſſions meerly *Phyſical*, or which properly belong to the *Senſitive* Soul *alone*, are thoſe natural and occult *inclinations* and *averſations* commonly call'd *Sympathies* and *Antipathies*, whereby one Man, more than another, is not only diſpoſed, but even by ſecret impuls forced to affect, or diſlike ſuch or ſuch a perſon, or thing, without any manifeſt cauſe or inducement ſo to do. Of *Sympathies* betwixt *Perſons* there is great variety of Examples, eſpecialy in *Lovers*; among whom many are not allured by that grand bait of the Senſitive Soul, *Beauty*; but ſtrongly attracted, and as it were faſcinated by they know not what hidden Congruity or (as the *French* call it) *agreeableneſs of Spirits:* which enchains them

them ſo firmly to the perſons beloved, that notwithſtanding the deformities they ſee and acknowledge to be in them, yea and the contempt they ſomtimes receive from them, they ſtill doat upon, and with delightful ſubmiſſions court and adore them. And as for *Antipathies* as well toward *Perſons* as *things*; inſtances of them alſo are without number, and many ſhew themſelves at our very table. Where one Man abhors a *breſt* of *Mutton*, yet loves the *Shoulder* cut from it; a ſecond ſwoons at the ſight of *Eels*, and yet will feaſt upon *Lampreys* or *Congers*; a third abominates *Chees*, but is pleaſed with *Milk*; a fourth deveſts roſted *Pigg*, yet can make a meal upon *bacon*. This Man ſweats at preſence of a *Cat*; that falls into an agony by caſting his eye upon a Frogg or Toad; an other can never be reconciled to Oyſters. Nay more, there are who feel themſelves ready to faint, if a *Cat* be hidden in ſome ſecret place of the room wherein they are, though they ſuſpect no ſuch encountre of their natural enemy, till they are wounded with the inviſible darts or emanations from her body. And all theſe admirable Effects proceed not from any poſitive Evil or malignity in the things abhorred; for, what's one Mans meat, is an others

poyſon:

poyſon: but only from their *incongruity*, or occult *Enmity* to this, or that particular Senſitive Soul. For if at any time it happens, that the conſiſtence of Animal Spirits that conſtitute the *lucid* or *Senſitive* part of this Soul, be by the encountre of any object, put into great diſorder: ſhe ever after abhors the approach, or *effluvia* of the ſame. Whereas the *Congruity* of particles proceeding from an object, to the contexture of the Soul, is on the contrary the ground of all her ſecret *Amities*.

Art. 9. What *Metaphyſical*.

2. Paſſions *Metaphyſical*, or which ſeem to have their firſt riſe from, and principaly to relate to the *Rational* Soul, are thoſe which *Divines* call *devout* and *religious Affections* directed to objects *ſupernatural*, and chiefly to *God*. For, when our nobler Soul reflecting upon the excellency and immortality of her nature, aſpires by ſublime ſpeculations toward her ſupreme felicity, the contemplation and love of her Creator; and determines her Will to perſue that incomprehenſible, becauſe infinite ſubject of all perfections, which alone can ſatisfy her underſtanding with light or knowledge, and her will with love: ſhe doth not only exerciſe herſelf in ſimple and abſtracted conceptions, ſuch as are proper

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to her immaterial eſſence alone, and conformable to the dignity of the thing ſhe ſpeculates; but communicates her affects alſo to the Senſitive Soul, by whoſe ſubordinate motions ſhe is obliged to act reſpectively to her end. And theſe motions or acts being thus traduced from the ſuperiour to the inferior Soul, and thence derived firſt to the brain and imagination, then to the heart; produce therein, and ſo in the blood, the various motions that conſtitute ſuch Paſſions, as we obſerve in our ſelves, when we are moſt ardently urged to acts of devotion and piety toward the ſupream Being. Whence it is doubtleſs, that *Divine love*, *deteſtation of ſin*, *repentance*, *hope of Salvation*, *fear of incenſing Divine juſtice*, and moſt, if not all other acts (or paſſions) of devotion are commonly aſcribed to the *heart*: and that not without ſome reaſon. For, though I cannot admit the *heart* to be the Seat of the Paſſions, as the *Ariſtoteleans* unanimouſly hold it to be, only becauſe of the ſenſible *alterations* therein produced in moſt paſſions: ſince in truth thoſe alterations are rather conſequents, than cauſes of Paſſions; and ſince they are not felt by us as in the heart, but only by means of the nerves deſcending thither from the brain; as pain

is not felt as in the foot, but by intervention of nerves betwixt the foot and the brain; and as the ſtarrs appear to us as in heaven, by mediation of their light affecting our Optick nerves. So that it is no more neceſſary the Soul ſhould exerciſe her functions, or receive her paſſions immediately in the heart, only becauſe ſhe feels her paſſions therein; than it is ſhe ſhould be in heaven, becauſe ſhe ſees the ſtarrs to be there; or in the foot, becauſe pain appears to her to be there. Notwithſtanding this I ſay, yet the adſcription of theſe devout Paſſions to the *heart*, is not altogether deſtitute of reaſon. For, (for inſtance) when the inferiour Soul is commanded by the Superior, to humble, and as it were to proſtrate herſelf in adoration of the ſacred Majeſty of God; inſtantly both parts thereof, as well the Senſitive, as the Vital, are forced to repreſs and reſtrain their wonted emanations or effuſions. Whereupon the Animal Spirits being in whole legions withdrawn from miniſtring to the Imagination and Senſes, are by the nerves tranſmitted in crowds to the heart: which while they cloſely contract and ſhut, they cauſe the blood to remain longer than is uſual, in the cavities thereof, and by that means keep

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it both from being too much kindled in the Lungs, and from being sent from the heart in too great abundance into the rest of the body, and more especialy into the brain; as if Nature itself had instituted, that in sacred passions the blood, or principal seat of life, should be offered up to the Author of life, upon the altar of the heart, while the brain, or seat of reason, is kept serene and clear. Nor is it difficult to a man praying to Almighty God with fervency of Spirit, to observe in himself, that his blood is more and more arrested and detained within his breast the while; insomuch that his heart seems to swell, his lungs to be oppreſt, and he is forced frequently to interrupt his oraisons with profound sighs, for attraction of fresh aer: as if the reasonable Soul not content to devote herself alone, and pour forth her holy desires to God, laboured to make a libation also of the vital blood, for a propitiatory oblation. So that though the Soul cannot in strictness of truth be said to receive her passions in the heart; yet since the alterations caused in us by them, are greater and more sensible in the heart, and consequently in the blood, than in any other part of the whole body beside: I am not so addicted

dicted to vitilitigation, as to contend about the propriety of those expressions in scripture, which seem to ascribe all our sacred passions principaly to the heart.

3. And as for Passions *Moral*; I refer to their classis all those that are excited in the Sensitive Soul, upon her perception of such good or evil objects as concern her confederate the *Body*, with which she is most intimately conjoynd, and upon whose welfare her safety doth necessarily depend. Concerning these in general, it is remarkable, that though the Sensitive Soul hath secret loves and aversations of her own, commonly called (as we have already said) *Sympathies* and *Antipathies*; and though she owes obedience to the commands and dictates of her superior, the Rational Soul: yet being by so strict a ligue, and as it were a conjugal union affianced to the body, she is strongly inclined to prefer the conservation of that her favorite, to all other relations; and accordingly to gratify and indulge it even in those things that are prohibited by religion and reason. So that no wonder if she be affected with pleasure, or pain, and with all other passions referible to them, for the prosperous or adverse state of the body.

Art. 10. And what *Moral*.

To make this our entrance into the spring-head of all Passions somwhat more lightsome; we are here to recount *two fundamental* verities, both of so conspicuous evidence, I do not remember, I ever heard them contradicted.

Art. 11. All Passions referred to *Pleasure* or *Pain*.

One is, that all *Affects* which external objects can possibly excite in us, in respect of the various modes or manners by which they fall under our notice, may be commodiously referred to two general heads, namely *Pleasure*, and *Pain*. For, whatever is perceived by the Senses, appears to the Soul to be *Good*, or *Evil*, gratefull, or offensive; and whatever is offered to her under the apparence of *Good*, or Gratefull, instantly causeth some certain *Pleasure* in her: as on the contrary, whatever is represented to her as *Evil*, or offensive, as quickly raiseth in her some kind of *Pain*, or trouble: provided (as was before advertised) she apprehend herself to be any way concerned in such good, or evil. So that we cannot but applaud the judgment of *Epicurus* and *Aristotle* in constituting but two kinds of Passions, namely *Pleasure* and *Pain*: the *one* calling them ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, *voluptatem & dolorem*; the *other* naming them ἡδονὴν καὶ λυπὴν, *voluptatem* & *molestiam*.

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The *other* is, that all the various motions of the ſpirits and blood, or of the Senſitive Soul, excited in the various Paſſions, may likewiſe be conveniently reduced to two general heads, namely *Contractions*, and *Effuſions*; which our Maſter *Galen*, I remember, terms Σύστολας, καὶ διαχύσεις: as they are referred to Pain and Pleaſure. Becauſe in *Pleaſure*, the Soul *dilateth* herſelf as much as ſhe can, that is, ſhe diffuſeth the ſpirits, as her Emiſſaries, to meet and receive the *good* repreſented to her: and in *Pain*, ſhe on the contrary *compreſſeth* or withdraws herſelf inward, that is, ſhe recalls the ſpirits toward herſelf, in avoidance of the *Evil* apprehended.

Art. 12. And all their *Motions*, to *Contraction* and *Eff*

Manifeſt it is therefore, that all Corporeal Paſſions have their roots grounded in *Senſe*, whereof pleaſure and pain are two oppoſite affects: one, πάθος οἰκεῖον, agreeable and *familiar* to nature; the other, ἀλλότριον, *alien* and offenſive.

And that I may, as far as I am able, explain wherein *pleaſure and diſpleaſure of ſence doth conſiſt*; I take liberty to ſuppoſe, that at firſt when an object affects the Senſory with ſoft and ſmooth touches, or motions, ſuch as are conſentaneous to the delicate contexture of the nerves of which the ſenſory is chiefly compoſed,

Art. 13. Wherein conſiſt *Pleaſure* and *diſpleaſure* of ſenſe.

poſed, or to the internal motions of the ſpirits therein reſiding; it inſtantly cauſeth that gratefull ſenſe called *delight*: as on the contrary, if the object invade the ſenſory with aſperity, or violence, ſuch as hurts the tender nerves thereof, or hinders the natural motions of the ſpirits therein; then it produceth that ingrateful ſenſe call'd *diſpleaſure* or *pain*. The impreſſion being thus made by the object upon the Organ of ſenſe, and thence by a certain motion of the ſpirits reſembling the waving of water, carried on to the brain; if it be *pleaſant*, it immediately puts the ſpirits therein reſerved, into brisker, but regular motions conformable to their nature and uſes: if *diſpleaſing*, it puts them into confuſion. If the impreſſion be *light*, the motion thereby cauſed in the brain, ſoon decayeth, and vaniſheth of itſelf: if *ſtrong*, the motion is continued from the brain down to the breaſt, and the heart and blood participate thereof reſpectively; and ſo *paſſion* inſtantly ſucceeds. But whether this be the true manner of objects producing pleaſure, or diſpleaſure of ſenſe, or not, moſt evident it is, *that we have, as no* conceptions *of things without us in the* brain, *ſo no* paſſions *for them in the* heart, *but what have their firſt original from Senſe.*

Now

Art. 14. A rehearsal of the heads handled in this *Section*.

Now having in this manner shewn as plainly as I could (1) what *Mutations* are incident to the Sensitive Soul (2) what are the most considerable *Causes* of those Mutations (3) what the most remarkable *Effects* and consequents of them upon the body and mind of Man (4) the *Differences* of Passions respective to the various *relations* of the Sensitive Soul to the Rational, and to the body (5) that all passions are referible to *pleasure*, or *pain* (6) that all *Motions* of the Spirits and blood caused in passions, belong to *Contraction*, or *Effusion:* and (7) wherein consist *pleasure* and *displeasure* of Sense: our next work must be to speak

SECT. V.

Of the Passions in particular.

Art. 11. Why Men have not been able to observe *all* Passions incident to the *Sensitive* Soul.

NOt of all that are incident to the mind of Man, which were extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible for me to do. For, seeing the objects that raise pleasure and displeasure are innumerable; and the various waies or manners by which they affect the sense,

and excite motions in the brain, ſpirits and heart, are equaly innumerable: even thoſe Philoſophers themſelves who have with all poſſible attention of mind laboured to ſearch out the ſeveral ſorts of Paſſions, have not been able to take notice but of very few, nor to give names to all thoſe neither. Beſides, conſidering of how ſubtil particles, how fluid and eaſily moveable a ſubſtance, and how delicate a contexture the Senſitive Soul ſeems to be compoſed; we may ſoon conceive her to be ſubject to greater variety of impreſſions, commotions, fluctuations, inclinations, alterations and perturbations, than can poſſibly be obſerved and diſtinguiſhed even by the moſt curious. It may well ſuffice then to enumerate and deſcribe the moſt *remarkable* of her Paſſions, ſuch as like ſo many leſſer ſtreams, flow from the two general fountains before mentioned, *Pleaſure* and *Diſpleaſure* of ſenſe, or motions begun in the ſenſory, traduced to the brain, and continued to the heart; and that are of a more *ſimple* nature.

Art. 2. The Paſſions beſt diſtinguiſhed by having reſpect to the circumſtances of *Time*.

Which that we may perform with more of order, and leſs of obſcurity; we are to conſider, that the Paſſions receiving their moſt notable diverſity from certain

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circumſtances of *Time*, may therefore be moſt intelligibly diſtinguiſhed by having reſpect to the ſame Circumſtances. For, ſince there are of *Conceptions* three ſorts, whereof one is of that which is *preſent*, which is *ſenſe*; another, of that which is *paſt*, which is *Remembrance*; and the third, of that which is *to come*, which is called *Expectation*: it is manifeſtly neceſſary, that the condition of the pleaſure, or diſpleaſure conſequent to conceptions, be diverſified, according as the Good or Evil thereby propoſed to the Soul, is *preſent*, or *abſent*. For, we are pleaſed, or diſpleaſed even at things paſt; becauſe the *Memory* reviving and reviewing their images, ſets them before the Soul as preſent, and ſhe is affected with them no leſs than if the things themſelves were preſent. So alſo of things *future*; foraſmuch as the Soul by a certain providence preoccupying the images of things that ſhe conceives to come, looks upon them as realy preſent, and is accordingly pleaſed or diſpleaſed by *Anticipation*: every conception being pleaſure, or diſpleaſure *preſent*. This being preſuppoſed we proceed to the *Genealogy* of the paſſions.

When the image of any *new* and *ſtrange* object is preſented to the Soul, and gives her Art. 3. Admiration.

her hope of knowing ſomwhat that ſhe knew not before; inſtantly ſhe *admireth* it, as different from all things ſhe hath already known; and in the ſame inſtant entertains an appetite to know it better, which is called *Curioſity* or deſire of Knowledge. And becauſe this *Admiration* may, and moſt commonly is excited in the Soul before ſhe underſtands, or conſiders whether the object be in itſelf convenient to her or not: therefore it ſeems to be the *firſt* of all paſſions, next after Pleaſure and Pain; and to have no *Contrary*: becauſe when an object perceived by the ſenſe, hath nothing in it of new and ſtrange; we are not at all moved thereby, but conſider it indifferently, and without any commotion of the Soul. Common it is doubtleſs to Man with *Beaſts*; but with this *difference*, that in *Man* it is always conjoyned with *Curioſity*; in Beaſts, not. For when a *Beaſt* ſeeth any thing new and ſtrange, he conſidereth it ſo far only as to diſcern whether it be likely to ſerve his turn, or to hurt him; and acordingly approacheth neerer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas *Man*, who in moſt events remembreth in what manner they were cauſed and begun, looks for the cauſe and beginning of every thing that ariſeth new to him

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Whence it is manifeſt, that all natural *Philoſophy*, and *Aſtronomy* owe themſelves to this paſſion: and that ignorance is not more juſtly reputed the mother of Admiration, than Admiration may be accounted the mother of knowledge; the degrees whereof among Men, proceed from the degrees of Curioſity. Now this Paſſion is reducible to *delight*, becauſe *Curioſity* is delight: and ſo by conſequence is *Novelty* too, but eſpecialy that novelty from which a Man conceiveth an opinion of *bettering* his own eſtate, whether that opinion be true or falſe: for in ſuch caſe, he ſtands affected with the hope that all Gameſters have while the Cards are ſhuffling; as *Mr Hobbs* hath judiciouſly obſerved.

Art. 4. Which cauſeth no *commotion* in the heart and blood.

Nevertheleſs it ſeems rather a *calm* than a tempeſt of the mind. For, in Admiration, whereby the Soul is *fixt* upon the contemplation of an object that appears to her new and ſtrange, and therefore well worthy her higheſt conſideration; the Animal ſpirits are indeed ſuddainly determined, and with great force, partly to that part of the brain, where the image is newly formed, and partly to the Muſcles that ſerve to hold the organs of the external ſenſes in the ſame poſture in which they then are, that ſo the object

ject may be more clearly and distinctly perceived: yet in the *heart* and *blood* there happens little or no commotion or alteration at all. Whereof the reason seems to be this; that since the Soul at that time, hath for her object, not good or evil, but only the Knowledge of the thing which she admires; she converts all her power upon the brain alone, wherein all sense is performed, by the help whereof that knowledge is to be acquired. And

Art. 5. And yet is dangerous, when *immoderate.*

Hence it comes, that *Excess* of Admiration sometimes induceth a *Stupor*, or *Astonishment*; and where it lasteth long, that wonderful disease of the brain, which Physicians name *Catalepsis*, whereby a Man is held stiff, motionless, and senseless, as if he were turned into a statue. For it causeth that all the Animal Spirits in the brain are so vehemently imployed in contemplating and conserving the image of the object, that their usual influx into other parts of the body is wholy intercepted, nor can they by any means be diverted: whereby all members of the body are held in a rigid posture, inflexible as those of a dead carcas, or of Man killed by lightning. Of this admirable effect of excessive Admiration, *Nich. Tulpius*, an eminent Physician of *Amsterdam*, hath recorded (*observ.*

ſerv. medic. lib. 1. *cap.* 22.) a memorable Example in a young Man of our Nation, who violently reſenting a ſuddain and unexpected repulſe in his love, and aſtoniſhed thereat, became as it were congeal'd in the ſame poſture, and continued rigid in his whole body till next day. Immoderate Admiration therefore cannot but be, by fixation of the Spirits, hurtfull to health.

Art 6. Eſtimation and Contempt.

After admiration followeth *Eſteem*, or *Contempt*, according as the thing appears great and worthy eſtimation, or of ſmall value and contemptible. For which reaſon we may eſteem or contemn *ourſelves* alſo: from whence ariſe firſt the *Paſſions*, and conſequently the *Habits* of *Magnanimity*, or *Pride*; and of *Humility* or *Abjection*. But if the Good that we have a great eſteem of in another man, be extraordinary: then our eſteem is increaſed to *Veneration*; which is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the *power* to do unto us both *good* and *hurt*, but not the *will* to do us *hurt*; accompanied with an inclination of the Soul to ſubject our ſelves to him, and by fear and reverence to purchaſe his favour. All which is evident in our worſhip or veneration of God.

That

Art. 7. Both consequents of *Admiration.*

That these two contrary Passions; *Existimation* and *Contempt*, are both *consequents* of *Admiration*; is inferrible from hence, that when we do not admire the the greatness or smalness of an object, we make neither more nor less of it than reason tells us we ought to doe; so that in such case we value or despise it without being concerned therein, that is, without passion. And although it often happens, that *Estimation* is excited by *Love*, and *Contempt* proceeds from *Hatred*; yet that is not universal, nor doth it arise from any other cause but this, that we are more or less prone to consider the greatness or meanness of an object, because we more or less love it.

Art. 8. That there is no just cause for a man to have a high value for *himself* but the *right use* of his *free-will.*

But though Estimation and Contempt may be referred to any objects whatsoever, yet are they then chiefly observed, when they are referred to *ourselves*, that is, when we put great or small value upon our own *merit*. And then the motions of the Spirits upon which they depend, are so discernible, that they change the very countenance, gestures, walking, and in word all the actions of those who think more haughtily or meanly of themselves than is usual. But for *what* may we have a high esteem of ourselves? Truely I can observe but *one* thing that may give

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us juſt cauſe of ſelf-eſtimation; and that is the *lawful uſe* of our *free will*, and the ſoveraignity we exerciſe over our Paſſions. For (as the incomparable *Monſieur des Cartes* moſt wiſely noteth) take away the actions dependent upon our Free will, and nothing will remain for which we can deſerve to be praiſed or diſpraiſed with reaſon: and that in truth renders us in ſome ſort like unto God Almighty, by making us Lords of ourſelves; provided we do not through careleſneſs and poorneſs of Spirit, loſe the rights and power that royal prerogative of our nature conferreth upon us. Wherefore I am of the ſame *Des Cartes* his opinion, that true *Generoſity*, which makes a Man meaſure his own merit by right reaſon, doth conſiſt only in this; that he both knowes he hath nothing truely his own, except this free diſpoſition of his Will, nor for which he juſtly can be commended or blamed, but that he uſeth that liberty well: and finds in himſelf a firm and conſtant purpoſe ſtill ſo to do; that is, never to want will to undertake and perform all things that he ſhall have judged to be the *better*; which is *perfectly to follow Virtue.*

Art 9. Pride.

Whereas *Pride*, which is a kind of Triumph of the mind from an high Eſtimation

on of ones-ſelf without juſt cauſe, expreſſed chiefly by haughty looks, *oſtentation* in words, and inſolency in action; is a Vice ſo unreaſonable and abſurd, that if there were no *Adulation* to deceive men into a better conceipt of themſelves than they realy deſerve; I ſhould number it among the kinds of *Madneſs*. But the contagious aire of *Aſſentation* is diffuſed ſo univerſaly, and hath infected the tongues of ſo great a part of mankind, that even the moſt *imperfect* frequently hear themſelves commended and magnified for their very defects: which gives occaſion to perſons of ſtupid heads, and weak minds, and conſequently of eaſy belief, to fall into this Tympany of *Pride* or *falſe Glory*. A paſſion ſo far different from true *Generoſity*, that it produceth effects abſolutely contrary thereunto. For, ſince other Goods, beſides the virtuous Habit of uſing the liberty of our wills according to the dictates of right reaſon, as *Wit*, *Beauty*, *Riches*, *Honours* and the like, are therefore the more eſteemed, becauſe they are *rare*, and cannot be communicated to many at once: this makes *Proud* men labour to depreſs others, while themſelves being inſlaved to their own vicious cupidities, have their Souls unceſſantly agitated by *Hate*, *Jealouſie*, or *Anger*.

The

Art. 10. Humility.

The contrary to Self-estimation, is *Humility*: whereof there are likewise two Sorts; one, *Virtuous* or *Honest*; the other, *Vicious* or base.

Virtuous.

The *Virtuous*, which is properly named *Humility*, consisteth onely in that reflexion we make upon the *infirmity* of our nature, and upon the errors we either have heretofore committed, or may in time to come commit: and maketh us therefore not to prefer ourselves before others, but to think them equaly capable of using their freedom of Will, as well as ourselves. Whence it is, that the most *Generous* are also the most *Humble*. For being truely conscious both of their own infirmity, and of their constant purpose to Surmount it, by doing none but virtuous actions, that is, by the right use of the liberty of the Will, they easily perswade themselves, that others also have the same just sentiments, and the same good resolution in themselves; because therein is nothing that depends upon another. Wherefore they never despise any man, and though they often see others to fall into such Errors that discover their weakness; yet are they still more prone to excuse, than to condemn them, and to believe their faults proceeded rather from want of knowledge and

and circumſpection, than from defect of an inclination and will to good. So that as on the one ſide, they think not themſelves much *inferiour* to thoſe who poſſeſs *more* of the goods of Fortune, or exceed them in wit, learning, beauty &c. So neither do they on the other, think themſelves to be much *Superiour* to others, who have *leſs* of thoſe perfections; becauſe they look upon ſuch qualities as not worth much conſideration, in compariſon of that *goodneſs* of Will, upon which alone they have a juſt valuation of themſelves, and which they ſuppoſe that every man equaly hath, or at leaſt may have. This Humility therefore is inſeparable from true Generoſity: and being well grounded, always produceth *Circumſpection* or *Caution*, which is *fear* to attempt any thing raſhly.

Art 11. *Vicious* or *Dejection* of Spirit.

The *Vicious* Humility, which is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Dejection* or *Poorneſs* of Spirit, proceeds likewiſe from an apprehenſion of our own infirmity; but with this *difference*, that a man conceives himſelf to be ſo far deprived of the right and uſe of Fre-will, that he cannot but doe things againſt his inclination, and of which he ought afterward to repent; and believes himſelf not able to ſubſiſt of himſelf, but to want many things whoſe

whose acquisition depends upon another. So it is directly opposite to Generosity or Bravery of mind, and it is commonly observed, that poor and *abject* Spirits are also *Arrogant* and *Vain-glorious*: as the Generous are most modest and humble. For, these are above both the smiles and and frowns of Fortune, still calme and serene aswell in adversity as prosperity: but *those* being slaves to Fortune, and wholy guided by her, are puffed up by her favourable gales, and blown down again by her gusts. Nor is it a rarity to see men of of this base and servile temper, to descend to shamefull submissions, where they either expect some benefit, or fear some evil: and at the same time to carry themselves insolently and contemptuously toward others, from whom they neither hope nor fear any thing. This Ague of the Soul then, being ill grounded, doth so shake a man with *distrust* of himself, that it utterly Cows him, and keeps him from daring to attempt any worthy action, for fear of ill success: which Vice the *Lord Bacon* calls *Restifeness* of mind, and *falling out of love with ones-self.*

Art. 12. Shame and Impudence.

There is yet another remarkable Passion that seem's to belong to Humility, and that is *Shame.* Which ariseth from an unwary discovery of some *Defect* or infir-

mity in us, the remembrance whereof ſenſibly dejecteth us, and puts us for the moſt part to the *Bluſh*, which is its proper Sign. That it is a ſort of *Modeſty* or diffidence of our ſelves, is manifeſt from hence; that when a man thinks ſo well of himſelf, as not to imagine another can have juſt cauſe to contemn him; he cannot eaſily be checkd by *Shame*: and as the *Good* that is or hath been in us, if conſidered with reſpect to the opinion others may conceive of us, doth excite *Glory* in us; ſo doth the Evil whereof we are conſcious, produce *Shame*. And yet it cannot be denied but that in this diſcouraging Affect there is alſo ſome mixture of *Grief* or ſecret regret, proceeding from apprehenſion of *Diſpraiſe*: becauſe being ever accompanied with inward diſpleaſure at the defect or fault uncircumſpectly diſcovered, it cools or damp's the Spirits, teaching more warineſs for the future. The *Contrary* to this, is *Impudence*; which is contempt of Shame, yea and oftentimes of Glory too. But becauſe there is in us no ſpecial motion of the Spirits and heart, that may excite Imprudence; it ſeems to be no Paſſion, but a certain *Vice* oppoſite to Shame, and to Glory alſo, ſo far forth as they are both good and laudable: as *Ingratitude* is oppoſed to *Gratitude*, and

Cruelty

Cruelty to *Commiseration.* And the chief cause of this vicious *insensibility of Honor*, is founded in grievous *contumelies* to which a man hath been accustomed in former times, and which he by degrees comes to despise, as of no force to hinder his enjoyment of commodities belonging to his body, whereby he measures all *good* and *evil:* thereby freeing himself from many necessities and streights to which honor would have obliged him. This therefore being no Passion, we are not concerned here further to consider it.

But as for *Pride* and *Dejection*; that they are not onely *Vices*, but *Passions* too, is evident enough from the *commotion* of the Spirits and blood that discovers itself outwardly in men surprised by them upon any new and suddain occasion. The same may be said of *Generosity* also and *Humility*. For, notwithstanding their *Motions* be less quick and conspicuous, and that there seem to be much less of Convenience or fellowship betwixt Virtue and Passion, than between Passion and Vice; yet no reason appears, why the same *Motion* that serves to confirm a conception that is *ill* grounded, may not serve likewise to confirm the same conception though it be well grounded. And because *Pride* and *Generosity* consist equaly in *Self-esteem*,

Art. 13. That *Pride* and its contrary, *Abjectness* of Spirit, are not only *Vices* but *Passions* also.

differing only in the *injuſtice* and *juſtice* thereof: they ſeem to be but one and the ſame Paſſion originaly excited by a certain motion, not ſimple, but compoſed of the motions of *Admiration*, *Joy* and *Love*, aswell that love which is conceived for oneſelf, as that for the thing which makes one to value himſelf: as on the Contrary, the *Motion* that cauſeth *Humility*, whether it be Vertuous or Vicious, ſeems to be compoſed of the motions of *Admiration*, *Grief*, and *Self-love* mixt with *Hatred* of the *Defects* that give occaſion to one to conceive a mean opinion of himſelf. Now what are the *Motions* of the Spirits or Senſitive Soul, that produce *Admiration* and *Pride*; we have formerly declared: and as to thoſe that are proper to each of the other paſſions already conſidered; they remain to be particularly deſcribed in their due places. ¶

Art. 14. Love and hatred.

As Admiration, the firſt of all the Paſſions, ariſeth in the Soul before ſhe hath conſidered whether the thing repreſented to her, be good and convenient to her, or not: ſo after ſhe hath judged it to be *good*, inſtantly there is raiſed in her the moſt agreable and complacent of all Paſſions, *Love*; and when ſhe hath conceived the ſame to be *Evil*, ſhe is as quickly moved to *Hatred*. For *Love* ſeems to be nothing

thing but a *Propenſion* of the Soul to that thing which promiſeth *pleaſure* or good to her: and *Hatred* is nothing but the Souls *Averſation* from that which threatens *Pain* or *Grief*.

By the word *Propenſion* here uſed, is to be underſtood, not *Cupidity* or deſire, which is in truth a diſtinct paſſion proceeding from love, and always reſpecting the *future*; but *Will* or *conſent* by which we conſider ourſelves as *already* joyned to the thing loved, by a certain conception of ourſelves to be as it were a part thereof. As on the contrary, in *Averſation* or *Hate*, we conſider ourſelves as *intirely ſeparate* from the thing hated.

Art. 15. Defined.

According to theſe two oppoſite notions, I ſhould define *Love* to be a *Commotion of the Soul, produced by a motion of the Spirits, which inciteth her to joyn herſelf, by her will, to objects that appear convenient and gratefull to her*: and *Hatred*, to be a *Commotion produced by the ſpirits, that inciteth the Soul to be willing to be ſeparated from objects that are repreſented to her as ungratefull and hurtfull*.

Art. 16. *Love*, not well diſtinguiſhed into *Benevolence* and *concupiſcence*.

Of *Love* there are made by the Schools *two* Sorts, whereof the firſt is commonly called *Amor Benevolentiæ*, love of *Benevolence* or *Good-will*, whereby we are incited to wiſh well to the thing we love: the other,

Amor Concupiſcentiæ, which cauſeth us to *deſire* to enjoy or poſſeſs the object loved. But this Diſtinction, if conſidered without prejudice, will be found to concern onely the *Effects* of love, not the eſſence of it. For, ſo ſoon as a man hath in *Will* joyned himſelf to an object, of what nature ſoever it be; he is at the ſame inſtant carryed toward it by *Benevolence*, or (to ſpeak more plainly) he in will alſo adjoyns thereunto what things he believeth conducible to the good thereof: which is one of the principle *Effects* of love, but doth not infer a different *Species* of it. And the ſame object, if it be judged good to be poſſeſſed, or to be joyned to the Soul in *another manner* than by the will alone; is inſtantly *deſired*: which alſo ought to be accounted among the more frequent *effects* of love. Whence I conclude, that *Deſire* connexed to *Love*, is *Benevolence*: as connexed with *Hate*, it is *Malevolence* or ill will. I add, that as *Amity* or Friendſhip ſeems to be nothing but conſtancy of *Love*: ſo *Enmity*, nothing but conſtancy of *Hatred*.

Art. 17. But by the various degrees of *Eſtimation*.

If then you ſeek for a more genuine *Diſtinction* of *Love*, I know not how better to gratify your Curioſity, than by entertaining it with that delivered by the moſt excellent *Monſieur Des Cartes* in his book

book concerning the *Passions*; which I will therefore faithfully recite. "*Love* "(saith He) may, in my judgement, be "with good reason distinguished by the "several *degrees* of *Esteem* we have of the "thing loved. For, when a man hath "*less* esteem for an object, than for him-"self, and yet loves it; his love is no more "but *Simple Propension* or *Benevolence*: "when as much as for himself, 'tis *Amity* or "Friendship; when *greater* than for him-"self, it may be called *Devotion*. By "the *First*, a flower, a Bird, a Horse &c. "may be loved. By the *Second*, no man "of understanding can love any thing but "Men, who are so properly the object of "this passion, that one can hardly be found "so imperfect, but he may be conjoyned "to another in the most perfect bond of "friendship, if that other conceive him-"self to be truely and sincerely beloved "by him, and think him to have a Soul "truely noble and generous. And as for "the last, *Devotion*; indeed the princi-"pal object thereof is *God Almighty*, to-"ward whom there is no man living, who "considers as he ought, the incompre-"hensible perfections of the Divine na-"ture, but must be devote (for, as *Sene-"ca, Deum colit, qui novit*) Yet there is a "Devotion also to ones Prince, or Coun-"try,

"try, or City, or to any private perſon, "whom we eſteem above ourſelves. And "the difference betwixt theſe three ſorts "of Love, is chiefly manifeſt from their "divers Effects. For when in each of "them the perſon loving conſiders himſelf "as joyned and united to the thing loved; "he is always ready to quit or leave the "leaſt part of the whole that he makes with "the ſame, to preſerve the reſt. Whence "it comes that in ſimple *Benevolence*, the "Lover always prefer's himſelf to the "thing loved: but on the contrary, in "*Devotion*, he always prefers the thing "loved, ſo far above himſelf, that he "fears not to dye for the converſation "thereof, of which noble Love there "have been glorious Examples in men "who have voluntarily expoſed them-"ſelves to certain death, for defence of "their Prince, or of their City, yea "ſometimes alſo for private perſons to "whom they had particularly devoted "themſelves.

Art. 18. That there are not ſo many diſtinct ſorts of *Love*, as of *objects* to excite it.

This Diſtinction being admitted (as in my opinion it well deſerves to be) there will remain no neceſſity of conſtituting ſo many diſtinct ſorts of Love, as they are various *objects* to excite it: ſeeing there are many Paſſions very different among themſelves, and in reſpect of their ſeveral objects

objects, which yet agree in this, that they all participate of Love. For Example, the Passion by which the *Ambitious* is carried on to Glory, the *Avaricious* to riches, the *Drunkard* to wine, the *Libidinous* to women, the *Honest* to his friend, the *Uxorious* to his wife, the good *Father* to his Children, &c. differ very much among themselves, and yet so far resemble each other, that they all participate of *Love*. But the love of the *first four* aimeth at nothing but the possession of their peculiar objects; nor have they indeed any thing of love for those objects, but only *Desire* mixt with some other special passions. Whereas the love of a *Parent* to his Children, is so pure, that he desires to obtain nothing at all from them, nor to possess them in any other manner than he doth already, or to bring them to a neerer conjunction with himself; but considering them as parts of himself, seeks their good as his own, yea with greater care than his own, as not fearing to purchase their felicity at the rate of his own undoing. And the Love of an honest man to his *Friends*, is also of the same perfection. But the Love of a man to his *Mistress*, commonly distinguished by the name of the *Erotic passion*; is alwaies mixed with desire of *Fruition*.

And

Art 19. *Hatred* less various than Love.

And as for *Hatred*; though that be directly opposed to Love: yet cannot it be distinguished into as many different kinds; because the difference betwixt *Evils* from which we are by our will separated, cannot be so well *observed*, as that which is betwixt the Goods to which we are by by our will joyned.

Art. 20. *Desire*, alwaies a *Consequent* of Love.

From what hath here been said concerning Love, as distinguishable chiefly by the several degrees of *Estimation* conceived for the thing loved, it may easily be collected. that from Love ariseth *Cupidity* or *Desire*, whereby the Soul is disposed to covet for the time to come, those things which she represent's to herself as convenient and likely to afford her pleasure. Thus we desire not onely the presence of an absent good, but also the conservation of the good that is present: yea we desire likewise the absence of Evil, aswell that which is already incumbent, as that which we believe possible to come upon us in the future. For in *Cupidity* or Desire of any thing whatsoever, which the Soul judges to be wanting to herself; she alwaies looketh foreward to the *time to come*.

Art. 21. But not alwayes *Concomitant* of it.

It may be collected also, that though *Desire* cannot be without *Love*, yet *Love* may be without *Desire* of possessing or enjoying,

enjoying the object, otherwiſe than by the pure embraces of the *will* alone. And this may be confirmed by obſervations of the different *Motions* of the Soul and Spirits raiſed in theſe two Paſſions, and the divers *ſymptoms* conſequent thereunto. For

Art. 22. The *Motions* of the Soul and Spirits in Love, and their *Symtoms*.

In *Love*, when it is not accompanyed either with *Cupidity*, or with vehement *Joy*, or with *Sadneſs*, but continues pure and *ſimple*; the Soul being incited to conjoyn herſelf in will to objects that appear good and convenient to her, and inſtantly *dilated*; the *Animal Spirits* are like lightning diſpatched from the brain by the nerves inſtantly into the Heart; and by their influx render the pulſe thereof more ſtrong and vigorous than is uſual, and conſequently the circulation of the blood more nimble and expedite. Whereupon the blood being more copiouſly diffuſed by the arteries, and more particularly thoſe aſcending to the brain, carries with it a recruit of vital ſpirits newly enkindled: which being there further ſublimed or refined, and corroborating the idea or image that the firſt cogitation hath formed of the thing loved, oblige and in ſome ſort compell the the Soul to continue fixed upon that cogitation, and continually to indulge the ſame.

ſame. And herein, if I am not much miſtaken, doth the paſſion of *Love* principally conſiſt. For, they who are affected therewith, have their pulſe *equal* (the Spirits that cauſe it, being immitted into the *Cardiac* nerves with an equal and placid motion) but ſtronger and more frequent then ordinary; they feel a certain agreable heat diffuſed in their breaſt; they find their brain invigorated by abundance of Spirits, and thereby grow more ingenuous; and in fine they digeſt their meat quickly, and perform all actions of life readily and with alacrity. All which may be aſcribed to the free and expedite, but equal Circulation of the blood, cauſed by a copious influx of Animal Spirits into the Heart. Whence we may ſafely conclude, that this grateful paſſion is highly beneficial to all parts of the body, and conduceth much to the conſervation of health; provided it continue within the bounds of moderation. But if it exceed them, and break forth into a wild and furious *deſire*; then on the contrary, by degrees enervating the members, it at length induceth very great weakneſs and decay upon the whole body. For, Love accompanied with vehement deſire, doth ſo intirely imploy the Soul in the conſi-

deration

deration of the object desired, that she retains in the brain the greatest part of the Spirits, there to represent to her the image thereof: so that the whole stock of nerves, and all the Muscles are defrauded of the influx of Spirits from the brain, with which they ought to be continualy inspired or invigorated. Whence in process of time the whole *Oeconomy* of nature is perverted, and an universal *languor* ensueth.

Art. 23. The *Motions* of the Soul and Spirits in *desire*.

And in *Cupidity*, whereby the Soul is so *effused* towards good or pleasure represented to her as certainly to come, as that she is suddainly checked and *contracted* again by reflection upon the *delay* of the same; there occurs this Singular, that it agitateth the heart more violently, and crouds the brain with more legions of spirits, than any other of all the passions. For out of *Desire* to obtain what we ardently pursue, the Spirits are most swiftly transmitted from the brain into all parts of the body that may any way serve to do the actions requisite to that end; but above all into the Heart. which being thereby dilated and contracted both more strongly and more frequently than in the state of tranquility, quickly forceth up a more abundant supply of Vital Spirits with the blood into the brain; aswell that they

they may there conſerve and corroborate the Idea of this Deſire, as that whole brigades of them may be from thence diſpatched into the Organs of the Senſes, and into all Muſcles, whoſe motions may more eſpecially conduce to obtain what is ſo vehemently deſired. And from the Souls reflexion upon the delay of her fruition, which ſhe at the ſame time makes; there ariſeth in her a *ſollicitude* or trouble, whereby ſhe is checked and *contracted* again, and the ſpirits are by intervals retracted toward the brain. So that the more ſubtil and ſpiritual blood being with the ſpirits recalled from the outward parts, the heart comes to be conſtringed and ſtreightned, the Circulation of the blood retarded, and conſequently the whole body left without ſpirits and vigor. Let none therefore admire, if many of thoſe Men whom *Luſt*, or *Concupiſcence*, *Ambition*, *Avarice*, or any other more fervent *deſire* hath long exerciſed and inſlaved, be by continual *ſollicitude* of mind, brought at length into an ill Habit of body, to leanneſs, a defect of Nutrition, Melancholy, the Scurvy, Conſumption and other incurable diſeaſes. Nor are you after this ſo clear manifeſtation of the great diſparity betwixt the Motions and neceſ-

ſary

ſary Conſequents of *Love* when *pure* and *ſimple*, and thoſe of Love commixt with *Cupidity* or ardent Deſire of enjoyment; longer to doubt, but that *Love* and *Deſire* are Paſſions eſſentialy *different*; notwithſtanding it be true, that the *Later* is alwaies dependent upon the *Former*.

Art. 24. The *Motions* of the Spirits and blood in *Hatred*.

And as for the Motions of the Spirits and blood in that anxious Affect of the mind, *Hatred*, which is directly oppoſed to Love, evident it is, that when the Soul is moved to withdraw herſelf from any object that appears to threaten *Evil* or *pain*, inſtantly the Spirits are retracted inwards to the brain, and principaly to that part of it which is the inſtrument or mint of Imagination; there to corroborate the idea of *Hatred*, which the firſt thought hath formed of the ungrateful object; and to diſpoſe the Soul to ſentiments full of bitterneſs and deteſtation: So that the while, very few of them, and thoſe too inordinately and by unequal impulſes, are tranſmitted into the Heart, by the *Pathetic* nerves, And from this offenſive *Contraction* of the whole Senſitive Soul, and as it were compreſſion of the Animal ſpirits, and ſubſequent deſtitution of the Heart, it comes, that in this ſowr paſſion alwaies the *Pulſe* is made *weak* and *unequal*, and oftentimes

tentimes *frequent* and *creeping*; that cold, mixt with a certain pricking heat not easy to be described, but sensibly injurious to the vital parts, and repugnant to their regular motions, is felt within the breast; and that even the stomach itself, diverted from its office of Concoction, nauseateth the meats it had received, and strives to reject them by vomit. Which often happens upon sight of an odious and abominable object. Now all these evil effects of *Hate*, give indisputable evidence, that it can never be either gratefull to the mind, or beneficial to the motions of life, upon which health so nearly depends: and this, because *Hate* always hath *Sadness* for its concomitant; and because by diversion of the Animal spirits, partly to assist the Imagination, partly to move the members for avoidance of the hated object, it defrauds the blood of its due supplies of spirits and fewel, retards the motion and equal distribution of it, and by that means destroies concoction, incrassates the humors, heaps up melancholy, and by degrees brings the whole body to poverty and leanness. Moreover, sometimes this disagreeable Passion is exalted to *Anger*, whereby the Soul, offended with the Evil or wrong she hath suffered, at first

Contracts

Contracts herſelf, and by and by with vehemency *ſprings* back again to her natural poſture of Coextenſion with the whole body, as if ſhe ſtrove to break out into revenge: and then it is that the ſpirits are in a tumultuous manner, and impetuouſly hurried hither and thither, now from the brain to the heart, then back again from the heart to the brain; and ſo there follow from theſe contrary motions alternately reciprocated, aſwell a violent agitation, palpitation, burning and anxiety of the heart; as a diffuſion of the blood, diſtenſion of the veins, redneſs of the face, and ſparkling of the eyes, together with a diſtorſion of the mouth (ſuch as may be obſerved in great indignation, and ſeems compoſed of laughter and weeping mixt together) grinding of the teeth, and other ſymptoms of *Anger* and fury. It is not then without reaſon Phyſicians adviſe Men to decline this paſſion, as a powerful enemy to health in all but ſuch as are of a cold, dull, and phlegmatic temperament; becauſe it inflames firſt the ſpirits, then the blood, and when violent, it puts us into *fevers*, and other acute diſtempers, by accenſion of choler, and confuſion of humors. And I could furniſh you with examples of ſome whom this ſhort

fury hath fired into perpetual *madneſs*; of others whom it hath fell'd with *Apoplexies*, others whom it hath thrown into *Epilepſies*, rack'd with *Convulſions*, unnerved with *Pālſeys*, disjoynted with the *Gout*, ſhook with *tremblings*, and the like: but that the books of *Phyſicians* are full of them.

Art. 25. *Hate* alwaies accompanied with *Sadneſs*

Here before we proceed to other conſequent Paſſions, it is fit to make a ſhort reflexion upon *Hatred*, that I may verify what was only hinted in the precedent enumeration of the evil *Effects* thereof, viz. that it is ever accompanied with *Sadneſs*. Concerning this therefore I reaſon thus. Foraſmuch as *Evil*, the proper object of *Hate*, is nothing but a *Privation*; and that we can have no conception thereof without ſome real *Subject* wherein we apprehend it to be; and that there is in nature nothing real which hath not ſome *goodneſs* in it: it follows of neceſſity, that *Hatred*, which withdraws us from ſome *Evil*, doth at the ſame time remove us alſo from ſome *Good* to which the ſame is conjoyn'd. And ſince the *Privation* of this Good, is repreſented to the Soul as a *Defect* or want belonging to her: it inſtantly affecteth her with *ſorrow*. For Example; the *Hate* that alienateth us from the evil manners of a man with whom formerly

formerly we have been acquainted, ſeparateth us likewiſe from his *Converſation*, wherein we might find ſomthing of *Good*: and to be deprived of that Good, is matter of regret and *Sorrow*. So in all other Hatred, we may ſoon obſerve ſome cauſe of *Sorrow*. ¶

Art. 26. *Hope and Fear.*

To the excitement of *Deſire* in the Soul, it is ſufficient that ſhe conceive the acquiſition of the Good, or avoidance of the Evil repreſented to her as to come, to be *poſſible*: but if ſhe further conſider whether it be *Eaſy* or *Difficult* for her to obtain her end; and there occur to her more reaſons for the facility: then there ſucceeds that gentle *Effuſion* or Tendency of the Soul toward the good deſired, which is called *Hope* or *Expectation of good to come*. Whereas on the contrary, if the greater weight be found in the other Scale, and ſhe apprehend the thing deſired, to be *Difficult*; ſhe is immediately *Contracted*, and coold with that ungrateful paſſion, *Fear*, which is *expectation of Evil to come*. And as *Hope* exalted to the higheſt degree, is changed into *Truſt*, *Confidence* or *Security*: So on the contrary, *Fear* in extremity becomes *Deſperation*. Again, if this Contraction of the Soul by Fear, be ſuddain and profound, and the Evil expected very great; then

is the paſſion called *Terror*, *Dread* and *Conſternation*, which ſometimes is ſo violent, as to cauſe *Exanimation* or ſuddain Death.

Art. 27. *Puſillanimity* and *Courage.*

If the Soul, upon apprehenſion that the Good deſired, is not indeed abſolutely impoſſible, but highly difficult for her to obtain; or the Evil feared, is not altogether impoſſible, yet extremely hard to be avoided; *perſiſt* in her *Contraction*: ſhe is daunted or cowd into that ignoble weakneſs called *Puſillanimity* or *Cowardiſe*. But if after her Contraction at firſt, ſhe exſerting her ſtrength, *ſpring* forth as it were, and with vehemency *dilate* herſelf, to ſurmount her fear, and overcome the difficulties apprehended: then is ſhe reanimated as it were, or fortified with the nobleſt of all Paſſions, *Courage* or *Boldneſs*, or *Bravery of Mind*, which makes her contemn all obſtacles to her attainment of her end, whether it be the acquiſition of good, or declination of Evil; and which (when it is not a habit or natural inclination) ſeems to be an *ardor* or *flaſhing* of the Senſitive Soul, diſpoſing her to act vigorouſly, and without fear, toward the vanquiſhing of difficulties that ſtand betwixt her and the ſcope ſhe aims at.

And of this Animoſity, *Emulation* is a ſpecies, whereby the Soul is diſpoſed to at-

attempt or enetrpriſe difficult things, which ſhe hopes will ſucceed happily to her, becauſe ſhe obſerves them to do ſo to others. But then it is to be diſtinguiſhed from ſimple *Animoſity* by two proprieties. Whereof *One* is, that it hath not only an internal Cauſe, viz. ſuch a diſpoſition of the ſpirits and body, that Deſire and Hope may have greater power in impelling the blood in abundance to the heart, than Fear or Deſpair can have in hindering that motion: but alſo an external Cauſe, namely, the *Example* of others who have been proſperous in the like attempts, which creates a belief in us, that we alſo ſhall be able to conquer the difficulties occurring as well as thoſe others have done. The *Other*, this; that *Emulation* is ever accompanied with ſecret *Grief*, which ariſeth from ſeeing ourſelves exceeded or excelled by our concurrents. But ſimple *Animoſity* wants both Example for incitement, and Grief for alloy. But both theſe paſſions equaly depend upon Hope of good ſucceſs. For,

Art. 28. *Emulation*, a ſpecies of *Magnanimity*.

Though the object of *Audacity* be difficulty, yet to animate us to contend bravely with that difficulty, we muſt be poſſeſſed with a ſtrong *hope*, or certain belief, that we ſhall at length attain our

Art. 29. *Confidence* and *Deſpair*.

end. Yet this *end* is not the ſame thing with that *object*; for, there cannot be both *Certitude* and *Deſpair* of the ſame thing at the ſame time. So when the Roman *Decii* ruſhed into the thickeſt troops of their enemies, and ran to certain death; the *object* of their daring was the difficulty of conſerving their lives in that action, for which difficulty they had nothing but Deſperation, being reſolved certainly to dye: but their *End* was, either by their example to inſpire courage into the Roman army, and by them to obtain the victory they hoped; or to acquire poſthume Glory, whereof they were certain. If therefore even in this action that was in itſelf deſperate, *Courage* were grounded upon *Hope*; we may well conclude, that it is alwaies ſo.

Art. 30. Doubting.

From the reaſons we have alleged of *Hope* and *Fear*, it is evident, that we may have thoſe contrary paſſions excited in us, though the *Event* of the thing expected no way depend upon our ſelves. But when we proceed to conſider the Event as altogether, or for the moſt part depending upon our own counſel, and perceive a difficulty to ariſe either in our election, or execution of the means whereby to obtain our end: then there im-

immediately follows a *Doubting* or *Fluctuation* of the mind, whereby we are diſpoſed to deliberate and conſult; and which is indeed a ſpecies of *Fear*. And this *wavering*, while it retains the Soul as it were in a doubtful balance betwixt two actions which are offered to her election; is the cauſe that ſhe performs neither, but takes time to conſider before ſhe determineth which to do, for fear of erring in her choice. Which *Fear*, if moderate and under the command of Prudence, is always of good uſe; in that it ſerves to prevent *Temerity* or *Raſhneſs*: but in ſome over-cautious perſons, it is ſo vehement, that though but one thing occurr to be done or omitted by them, it holds them too long upon the rack of ſuſpence, and hinders them from proceeding to action. And in this caſe, the paſſion is *Exceſs* of *Doubting*, ariſing from too ardent deſire of good ſucceſs, and weakneſs of *Underſtanding*, which hath indeed many confuſed notions, but none perſpicuous and diſtinct concerning the means to effect its deſign.

Art. 31. *Remorſe and acquieſcence*

If during this irreſolution, we have determined the liberty of our choice, and fixed upon ſome one action in order to our end; and the event be not anſwerable to our expectation: preſently we are affected

affected with that diſquiet of mind; which is named by the Greeks, *Syntereſis*; by the Latins, *Morſus Conſcientiæ*; and by the French, *Regret*; which yet doth not (as the precedent paſſions) reſpect the future, but preſent or paſt time. This *Remorſe of Conſcience* is no other but a kind of *Sorrow*, ariſing from a ſcruple interpoſed, whether what we are doing, or have done, be good, or not. And it neceſſarily preſuppoſeth *dubitation*. For, if we were clearly convinced that the action we are doing, is realy evil; we ſhould certainly abſtain from doing it: becauſe the will is not carried to any thing, but what hath ſome ſhew of goodneſs in it. And if it were manifeſt, that what we have done, is realy evil: we ſhould preſently be touched not with ſimple regret, but with *Repentance*. For, as the *Good* we have done, gives us that internal *Acquieſcence* or ſatisfaction, which is of all other Paſſions the ſweeteſt: ſo on the contrary, the ill we have done, puniſheth us with *Repentance*, which is of all paſſions the bitterеſt.

Having in this manner diſcovered the originals and diſtinct proprieties of theſe two oppoſite Paſſions, *Hope* and *Fear*, with their genuin dependents; it may not a little conduce to the illuſtration of

what

what hath here been briefly delivered concerning them, if we more expreſly deſcribe the divers *Motions* of the *Senſitive Soul* and *Spirits* that conſtitute their formal reaſons, ſo far at leaſt as thoſe motions are obſervable from their reſpective Characters or Effects.

Art. 32. The *Motions* of the Soul and Spirits in *Hope*.

In *Hope* therefore (which we defined to be a *gentle and ſweet* Effuſion or Expanſion *of the Soul towards ſome good expected to come*) if we be poſſeſſed with an opinion, that the thing deſired will ſhortly come to paſs; I conceive that preſently the Animal Spirits, which before were imployed as Emiſſaries, to contemplate the image of the object, returning toward the Soul, give notice of the approach of the gueſt expected: and that thereupon the whole Soul compoſing her ſelf by expanſion to receive and welcome the ſame, ſets open all the doors of the Senſes to admit more freely all the good belonging thereunto; retains the imagination fixt and intent upon the gratefull idea thereof; and by copious ſupplies of ſpirits diſpatched into the nerves of the Heart, ſo invigorates and quickens the pulſe thereof, that thereby the blood is more briskly ſent forth into the outward parts of the body, as it were to meet the expected thing. Whence it is, that when

when we are full of Hope, we feel a certain *inflation* both within and without in our whole body, together with a *glowing* but *pleasant heat*, from the blood and spirits universaly diffused. But if during this comfortable emotion of the Soul, there occurr any suddain cause of *Doubt* or *fear*; she is instantly checked and coold into an anxious *Retraction* of herself, and a sinking of the spirits, so that the motion of the heart becomes weaker and slower, and the external parts grow languid and pale. For,

Art. 33. The *Motions* of the Soul and Spirits in *Fear*.

In *Fear*, the Sensitive Soul, which was before expansed, being surprised with apprehension of approaching Evil, and willing to decline it, immediately withdraws herself into her retiring room, and shrinks up herself into herself; at the same time recalling her forces, the spirits, to her aid, and compressing them. If the Fear be exalted to the degree of *Terror*, and the Evil seem impendent; then at the same time the spirits are suddainly recall'd from the outguards, the pores of the skin also are shut up by strong constriction (as if the Soul would obstruct and barricado all avenues against her invading enemy) whereby the *hairs* are raised an end, and the whole body is put into a *Horror* or shaking. After this,

if

if the paſſion continue, the whole army of ſpirits being put into confuſion, ſo that they can not execute their offices; the uſual ſuccors of *Reaſon* fail, and the powers of *voluntary motion* become weak; yea ſometimes, by reaſon of a reſolution of the nerves and ſphincters of the gutts and bladder, the *Excrements* themſelves are let forth involuntarily. From this damp obſcuring the *Lucid* part of the Senſitive Soul, there quickly ſucceeds an Eclipſe alſo of the *Vital*. For the influx of the Animal ſpirits from the brain into the Cardiac nerves being intermitted, the motions of the heart muſt of neceſſity be renderd weak, and inſufficient to maintain with due vigour and celerity the circulation of the blood: which therefore ſtopping and ſtagnating in the ventricles of the heart, cauſeth *fainting* and *ſwooning* by oppreſſion; and ſometimes (where the paſſion is hightned into *Conſternation*) alſo ſuddain *death*. And from this arreſt of the blood in the heart, by ſtrong conſtriction of the nerves thereunto belonging; we may with reaſon derive that ſame anxious *oppreſſion*, and *chilling weight* which men commonly feel in their breaſt, when they are invaded by violent *Fear*; and upon which the moſt acute *Monſieur Des Cartes* ſeems to have re-

reflected his thoughts, when he defined *Conſternation* to be *not only a cold, but alſo a perturbation and ſtupor of the Soul, which takes from her the power of reſiſting evils that ſhe apprehends to be neer.*

Art. 34. The *Motions* in *Deſperation.*

This *Fear*, when it excludes all hope of evaſion, degenerateth into the moſt cruel of all paſſions, *Deſperation.* Which though by exhibiting the thing deſired as impoſſible, it wholy extinguiſh deſire, which is never carried but to things apprehended as poſſible: yet it ſo afflicts the Soul, that ſhe perſevering in her Conſtriction, either through abſolute deſpondency yeelds up herſelf as overcome, and remains half-extinct and entombd in the body; or driven into confuſion and neglect of all things, contracts a deep *Melancholy*, or flyes out into a furious *Madneſs*; in both caſes, ſeeking to put an end to her miſery by deſtroying herſelf.

On the contrary, when Fear gives place to *Hope*; and that Hope is ſtrong enough to produce *Courage*; thereby to incenſe the Soul to encounter the difficulties that oppoſe her in the way to her end: in this caſe ſhe firſt dilates herſelf with great vigor and celerity, breaking forth as it were into flaſhes of efforts; then inſtantly diffuſeth whole legions of

ſpirits

ſpirits into the nerves and muſcles, to extend them, in order to reſiſtence or ſtriking with all their forces; and uniting all her powers into a brave devoir to overcome, undauntedly purſues the the conflict. Hence it comes, that the breaſt being ſtrongly dilated and contracted alternately, the *voice* is ſent forth more ſounding and piercing than at other times; as if to ſound a defiance and charge at once: the armes are raiſed up, the hands conſtringed into fiſts, the head advanced into a poſture of daring and contempt of danger, the brows contracted, and the whole face diſtorted into an aſpect full of terror and threatnings, the neck ſwoln, and moſt other parts diſtended beyond their uſual dimenſions. All which *ſymptoms* evidently ariſe from a copious and impetuous effuſion of Animal ſpirits from the brain, and of blood from the heart, into the outward parts. ¶

From this conciſe explication of the motions of the Senſitive Soul, the ſpirits and blood, that conſtitute the paſſions of Hope and Fear, with their dependents, Animoſity and Deſperation, the clue of our method leads us to the *fifth* claſſis of paſſions.

The conſideration of good preſent, and belonging to us in particular, begets in the Art. 35. Joy.

the Soul that delight which we call *Joy*: wherein conſiſteth our poſſeſſion of that good, which the impreſſions of the brain repreſent to the Soul as her own.

Firſt I ſay, that in this delightful commotion doth conſiſt the *poſſeſſion of good*; becauſe in truth the Soul reaps no other fruit from all the goods ſhe poſſeſſeth: and when ſhe takes no delight or joy in them, it may juſtly be ſaid, ſhe doth no more injoy them, than if ſhe did not at all poſſeſs them.

Then I add, that *the good is ſuch as the impreſſions made upon the brain repreſent to the Soul as hers*; that I may not confound this Joy whereof I now ſpeak, and which is a Paſſion; with Joy purely *intellectual*, which enters into the *Rational* Soul by an action proper to her alone, and which we may call a pleaſant commotion raiſed by herſelf in herſelf, wherein conſiſteth the poſſeſſion of good, that her intellect repreſents to her as her own. Tho realy ſo long as the Rational Soul continues conjoyned with the Senſitive, it can hardly be but that this intellectual joy will have the other that is a paſſion, for its companion. For, ſo ſoon as our Intellect obſerves that we poſſeſs any good, though that good be ſo far different from all that pertains to the body,

that

that it is wholy unimaginable; yet presently the *Imagination* makes some impression in the brain, from whence followeth a motion of the Sensitive Soul, and of the Spirits, that exciteth the passion of Joy.

Art. 36. The various *Degrees* of *Joy* and their *names.*

Of this so gratefull affection there are divers *sorts*, or (to speak more strictly) *degrees*. For, as various circumstances may intervene, and cause the Soul to be more or less affected with her fruition of the good she possesseth: so may we distinguish various differences of the passion itself. To be more particular; as the good she possesseth, is great or small; unexpected, or long desired; durable, or transitory; and as reason moderateth the appetite, or suffers it to be unbridled: so it comes to pass, that the Effusion of the Soul, and consequently the pleasure is greater or less, permanent or momentary, immoderate or temperate, &c. And hence the kinds of more *remiss* Joy are call'd *Complacency*, *Jucundity*, *Gladness*, *Exhilaration*: and those of more *intens*, *Rejoycing*, *Exsultation*, *Triumph*, *Boasting*, *Transport* or *Ecstasy*, *Laughter*, &c.

Art 37. The various *Degrees* of *Grief*, and their *names.*

By the same reason, as the Evil that causeth the opposite passion of *Grief*, is in the present great or little, suddain or fore-

foreſeen, long or ſhort, and the like: ſo are there excited various kinds or degrees of *Trouble* or *Grief*; and accordingly the paſſion is diſtinguiſhed into *Diſcontent*, *Sollicitude*, *Vexation*, *Sadneſs*, *Sorrow*, *Affliction*, *Miſery*, *Lamentation*, *Weeping* and *Howling*. All which belong to *Grief*, which is an ingrateful *Languor of* the Senſitive Soul, wherein alone conſiſteth the incommodity that hapneth to her from Evil or defect, which the impreſſions made upon the brain, repreſent to her as her own. For, beſides this, there is alſo an *Intellectual Sorrow* proper to the *Rational* Soul, which is not to be placed in the number of the paſſions, tho for the moſt part it hath for its adjunct the paſſion of Sorrow; by reaſon of the moſt ſtrict conjunction betwixt the two Souls in this life.

Art. 35. Envy and Pitty.

As the Good or Evil preſent, being repreſented as belonging particularly to ourſelves, produceth Joy or Grief in us: ſo when Good or Evil is propoſed to us, as belonging to *others*; we ſo far concern ourſelves therein, as to judge them *worthy*, or *unworthy* of the ſame. If we judge them *unworthy* of the *good* that is hapned to them; that raiſeth *Envy* in us: if we think them not to deſerve the *Evil* that is befallen them, then we are affected

fected with *Pity* or *Commiſeration*, which is a ſpecies of *Sorrow*; and the contrary to it is *Hardneſs of Heart*, proceeding either from ſlowneſs of imagination (for men of dull capacities are generally leſs apt to pity the calamities of others) or from ſtrong opinion of our own *exemption* from the like ſufferings, or from that inhuman temper of mind which the *Grecians* call *Miſanthropia*, *Hatred* of all or moſt men; or finally from *deſpair* after long adverſity, whereby the mind being grown as it were *callous* or brawny (as *Seneca* expreſſeth it) is apt to conceive, that no evil can come to it, greater than what it hath been accuſtomed to undergo.

Art. 39. *Generous* men moſt inclined to *Commiſeration*; and why.

On the *contrary*, they are more than others propens to *Commiſeration*, who think themſelves very weak, and obnoxious to adverſe fortune: becauſe repreſenting to themſelves anothers misfortune, as poſſible to happen to themſelves alſo (for the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man) they are eaſily moved to *pity*, but more out of *love* of *themſelves* than of others. And yet it hath been ever obſerved, that men of the moſt *generous* and Heroick ſpirits, ſuch who having by brave reſolutions, and habitual magnanimity, elevated their ſouls above the power of fortune, and ſo

could fear no evil that she could bring upon them; have nevertheless been prone to *Commiseration*, when they beheld the infirmity of others, and heard their complaints; because it is a part of true *Generosity*, to *wish well to every one*. But the *Grief* of this *Heroick Commiseration* is not (as the other) *bitter*, but like that which Tragical cases represented in a Theatre, produce, it is placed more in the *Sense*, than in the Soul it self, which at the same time injoyeth the satisfaction of thinking that she doth her duty in sympathizing with the afflicted. And the *difference* betwixt the Commiseration of the *vulgar*, and that of *Generous* minds, doth chiefly consist in this; that the vulgar pittieth the misery of those who complain, as thinking the evil they suffer, to be very grievous and intollerable: but the principal object of generous pity, is the *imbecillity* and *impatience* of those who complain; because men of great Souls think, that no accident can fall upon a man, which is not really a less evil than the *Pusillanimity* of those who cannot endure it with constancy; which *Seneca* intimateth (*de tranquillitate animi*, cap. 15.) where he saith, *neminem flebo flentem; nam suis lacrymis efficit, ne ullis dignus sit*: and though they hate the vices of men, they

they do hate not their persons, but only pity them.

Manifest it is therefore, that in *some*, *Commiseration* is nothing but imagination of future Calamity to our selves, proceeding from the sense of another mans calamity; as it is defined by Mr *Hobbs*: in *others*, a species of *Grief*, mixt with *Love* or *Benevolence* toward those whom we observe to suffer under some evil, which we think they have not deserved; as it is defined by *Monsieur des Cartes*.

Art. 40. *Commiseration*, a species of *Grief* mixed with *Benevolence*.

Manifest it is likewise, that the contrary passion, *Envy*, is a sort of *Grief* mixt with *Hate*, proceeding from our sense of prosperity in another, whom we judge unworthy thereof. A passion never excusable, but where the *Hatred* it contain's, is against the unjust distribution of the good that is envied, not the person that possesseth it, or that distributed it. But in this corrupt age, there are very few so just and generous, as to be free from all Hate towards their competitors, who have prevented them in the acquisition of a good which is not communicable to many at once, and which they had desired to appropriate to themselves; though they who have acquired it, be equally or more worthy thereof.

Art. 41. *Envy*, a sort of *Grief* mixed with *Hate*.

Art. 42. *Acquiescence* of mind, a kind of *Joy*.

When we reflect our thoughts upon *good* done by *our selves*, there results to us that internal *Satisfaction* or *Acquiescence* of mind, which is a species of *Joy*; calme indeed, and serious, but incomparably sweet and pleasant; because the *Cause* of it dependeth upon nothing but *our selves*. But then that cause ought to be *just*, that is, the good upon which we reflect our cogitations, ought to be of great moment: otherwise the Satisfaction we fansy to our selves, is false, and ridiculous, serving only to beget pride and absurd arrogancy. Which may be specially observed in those who esteem themselves truely religious, and pretend to great perfection of Sanctity, when in reality they are *Superstitious* and *Hypocrites*: that is, who because they frequent the temple, recite many praiers, wear short hair, observe fasting-daies, give alms, and perform other the like external duties of Religion; therefore think themselves to be arrived at the highest degree of purity, and to be so far in the favor of Almighty God, that they can do nothing that may displease him, and that whatever their passion suggesteth to them, is of holy zeal; though it not seldome suggesteth the most detestable crimes that can enter into the heart of Man, as the betraying of Cities

ties, assassination of Princes, extermination of Nations, only because they follow not their fanatique opinions. And this *Delusion* seems to be the Daughter of internal *Acquiescence* grounded upon an *unjust cause*. Again, to excite this most comfortable passion, it is requisite that the good act upon which we reflect, be *newly* done by us: because that constant satisfaction or self-acquiescence which alwaies is a concomitant and certain reward of Virtue, is not a passion, but a pacific *Habit* in the *Rational* Soul; and is therefore call'd *Tranquility and Quiet of Conscience*.

Art. 43. *Repentance*, a species of *Grief*, but allayd with somthing of *Joy*.

On the contrary, from our remembrance of an *Evil* act by us committed, ariseth *Repentance*, which is a branch of *Grief*, alwaies most *bitter*, because the *cause* of it is only from *ourselves*: but then this Grief is allayed by expectation of amendment, or returning into the right way to good; which is referrible to *Joy*. Nor doth the bitterness of this passion hinder it from being of excellent *use* in our life, when the action whereof we repent, is realy Evil, and we certainly know it to be so: because in such cases it strongly inciteth us to doe *better* in the future. But it is not *universaly* profitable. For it is no rarity for men of weak

and timorous minds to be touchd with Repentance of actions they have done, tho they do not certainly know those actions to be realy evil, but only believe them to be so, because they fear lest they be so, and if they had done the contrary, they would have been equally disquieted with repentance. Which is an imperfection in them well worthy Commiseration: and they ought to repent of such their Repentance.

Art. 44. Favour.

When we observe, or recall to mind good performed by an *other*, tho not to ourselves; we are thereby moved to *Favour* the doer: because we are by nature inclined to like and love those who doe actions that we think good, althouh from thence nothing of good redounds to us in particular. *Favour* therefore is a species of *Love*, accompanied with *desire* of seeing good to happen to the person whom we favour; and somtimes with *Commiseration*, because the adversity that falls upon those whom we think to be good, makes us the more to reflect upon their *merits*.

Art. 45. Gratitude.

But if the good done by another upon which we reflect our cogitations, hath been done to *Us*; then to favor is adjoined *Gratitude*: which likewise is a kind of

of *Love*, excited in us by some action of another, whereby we believe, that either he hath really benefited, or at least intended to benefit us in particulars; and accompanied with *desire* to shew ourselves thankful to him therefore. And therefore this passion of *Gratitude* as it excells simple *Favour* in this, that it is grounded upon an action which concerns *Us*: so hath it far greater *force* upon the mind, especialy in men of noble and generous natures. The Contrary hereunto is *Ingratitude*, which notwithstanding is no *Passion* (for Nature, as if she abhorr'd it, hath ordained in us no motion of the Spirits whereby it might be excited) but a meer *Vice*, proper to men who are either foolishly *proud*, and therefore think all benefits due to them; or sottishly *stupid*, so as to make no reflexion upon good turns done them; or of *weak* and *abject* minds, who having been obliged by the bounty and charity of their Benefactors, instead of being gratefull, prosecute them with hatred; and this because either wanting the will to requite, or despairing of ability to make equal returns, and falsely imagining that all are like themselves, venal and mercenary, and that none doth good offices but in hope of remuneration; they think that their

their Benefactors have *deceived* them; and so deprave the benefit itself into an injury. *Hatred* then being an adjunct to *Ingratitude*; it follows that *Love* must attend on *Gratitude*, which is therefore alwaies honest, and one of the principal bonds of human Society.

Art. 46. Indignation. On the contrary, when we consider Evil committed by an other, tho not against us; we are moved to *Indignation*: which is a species of *Hatred* or *Aversion* raised in us against those who do any thing that we judge to be evil or unjust, whatsoever it be; sometimes commixed with *Envy*, sometimes with *Commiseration*, sometimes with *Derision*; as having its object very much diversified. For, we conceive *Indignation* against those who doe good or evil to such who are *unworthy* thereof; but we *Envy* those who *receive* that good, and *pity* those who *suffer* that evil. And yet in truth, to obtain good whereof one is unworthy, is in some degree to doe evil: and to do Evil, is in some sort to suffer evil. Whence it comes, that sometimes we conjoyn *Pity*, sometimes *Derision* to our *Indignation*, according as we stand *well* or *ill* affected toward them whom we observe to commit Errors. And therefore the *Laughter* of *Democritus*, who derided

the

the folly, and the *Tears* of *Heraclitus*, who bewail'd the miſery of mankind, might both proceed from the ſame cauſe, *Indignation*.

Art. 47. Anger.

But when Evil is done to *ourſelves*, the paſſion thereby kindled in us, is *Anger*: which likewiſe is a ſpecies of *Hatred* or *Averſation*, but different from *Indignation* in this, that it is founded upon an action done by another with intention to hurt *us* in particular; and in this, that when it hath proceeded to a determination of hurting him who did it, it paſſeth into *Revenge*; whereas at firſt accenſion, the Paſſion is no more but *Excandeſcence* or ſuddain *Heat of blood*. The *Deſire* of Revenge that for the moſt part accompanieth *Anger*, whether it aim at the *death*, or only at the *ſubjection* of our Enemy; is indeed directly oppoſed to *Gratitude* (for this is deſire of returning good for good, and that, deſire of requiting evil with evil) as *Indignation* is to *Favour*: but incomparably more *vehement* than either of thoſe three affections; becauſe the deſire of repelling harm, and revenging our ſelves, is a part of natural inſtinct neceſſary to ſelf-preſervation, and ſo of all deſires the ſtrongeſt and moſt urgent. And being conſociated with *Love* of *ourſelves*, it affords to

Anger

Anger all that impetuous agitation of the Spirits and blood, that *Animoſity* and *Boldneſs* or Courage can excite: and its aſſiſtant, *Hatred*, promoting the accenſion of the Choleric or more Sulphureous parts of the blood as it paſſeth through the heart, raiſeth in the whole maſs thereof a more pricking and fervent heat, than that which is obſerved in the moſt ardent *Love*, or moſt profuſe *Joy*.

Art. 48. Two ſorts of *Anger*; one, *Harmleſs* the other *Revengeful*.

Now as men inflamed with this violent paſſion, or (as *Seneca* calls it) *ſhort fury* of *Anger*, differ in point of temperament; and as this or that of the uſual concomitants of it, is more powerful than the reſt: ſo muſt the *Effects* thereof upon the body be likewiſe *various*. And from this variety men have taken notice chiefly of *two* ſorts of Anger. *One*, that is quickly kindled, violent at firſt, and diſcovers it ſelf viſibly by outward ſigns: but performs little, and may be eaſily compoſed. And to this, they are moſt obnoxious, who are *good-natur'd*, i.e. who are inclined to *goodneſs* and *love*. For, it ariſeth not from profound Hatred, but from a ſudden *Averſion* ſurpriſing them: becauſe being propens to conceive that all things ought to proceed in that manner which they judge to be the beſt; whenever they ſee others to act otherwiſe, firſt they admire,

mire, and then are *offended*; and ſo what would be to others matter only of *Indignation*, to them proves cauſe of *Anger*. But this commotion is ſoon calmed, becauſe the force of the ſudain *Averſion* that raiſed it, continues not long: and ſo ſoon as they perceive that the thing for which they were offended, ought not to have commoved them to paſſion; they ſuppreſs their diſpleaſure, and repent of it. The *Other*, that wherein *Hatred* and *Grief* are predominant, and which though at firſt it hardly betray it ſelf by external ſigns, unleſs by the ſuddain paleneſs of the countenance, and trembling; is notwithſtanding more impetuous within, ſecretly gnaws the very heart, and produceth dangerous effects. And to this pernicious ſort of *Anger* they are moſt ſubject, who have *proud*, *cowardly* and *weak* Souls. For, ſo much the greater doe injuries appear, by how much the better opinion pride makes Men to have of themſelves; yea and by how much greater value is put upon the things which the injuries take away: and theſe things are alwaies ſo much the more valued, by how much the more weak and abject the Soul is; becauſe they depend upon others, but the *Generous* put little value upon any thing that is not dependent upon themſelves.

When

Art. 49. *Glory* and *Shame.*

When we conſider what opinion other Men have of Us, the Good which we believe to be in us, diſpoſeth us to *Glory*, which ſeems to be compoſed of *Self-eſtimation*, and *Joy*; for to ſee ourſelves well eſteemed by others, gives us cauſe to have a good eſteem for ourſelves: and on the contrary, the *Evil* we are conſcious of, forceth us to *Shame*, which is a ſort of *Modeſty* or *Humility*, and *ſelf-diffidence*; for (as we have formerly obſerved) who thinks himſelf above Contempt, will hardly be humbled to ſhame. Theſe two Paſſions, *Glory* and *Shame*, tho directly oppoſite each to other, doe yet agree in their End, which is *to incite us to Virtue*; the firſt by *hope*, the other by *fear*: and that we may make a right uſe of them both, we are to have our judgment well inſtructed what actions are truely worthy *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe*; leſt otherwiſe we be aſhamed of virtuous actions, or affect glory from vices; as it happeneth to too great a part of mankind.

Thus have we at length recounted all the Paſſions of this our *fifth* diviſion, and deduced them ſucceſſively from their ſeveral cauſes or occaſions, in that order wherein their moſt remarkable diverſity ſeemd to us moſt eaſily diſtinguiſhable.

But

But now becauſe ſome of theſe paſſions are ſimple, others *Compoſed*; and that to our more clear underſtanding of the nature of both ſorts, it is neceſſary to enquire more profoundly into the *Motions* of the Senſitive Soul and ſpirits that conſtitute their Eſſential Differences: it remains that we yeeld obedience to that neceſſity, ſo far forth at leaſt, as to explain the Motions proper to that couplet of more ſimple affections, *Joy* and *Grief*; the two points in which all human actions end; and to that moſt violent one, *Anger*.

Art. 50. The *Motions* of the Soul and ſpirits in *Joy*.

In *Joy* therefore, which is a delightful commotion of the Senſitive Soul as it were triumphing in her fruition of good or pleaſure; I conceive that the Animal ſpirits being in great abundance, but with a placid and equal motion, ſent by the nerves to the heart, cauſe the orifices thereof to be opened and dilated more than at other times; and ſo the blood to be imported and exported more copiouſly and freely: and that by this means, from the blood are brought into the brain a plentious ſupply of new ſpirits, which extracted out of the pureſt and moſt refined parts of the blood, are moſt fit to confirm the idea formed of the preſent good in the imagination, and ſo to continue the Soul in her pleaſant Emotion.

Hence

Hence probably it is, that in this moſt agreeable paſſion, both the *pulſe* is alwaies made equal and more frequent, tho not ſo intenſe and ſtrong as in *Love*; and a certain *grateſull heat* is felt, not only through the Lungs and all the breaſt, but through all outward parts of the body; from the diffuſion of the blood in full ſtreams into them, which is diſcernible even by the florid *purple colour* wherewith they are ſuddainly tinged, and by the *inflation* or plumpneſs of all the muſcles of the *face*, which is thereby rendered more *ſerene*, ſweet and cheerful. Eaſy therefore it is to infer, that as this paſſion is moſt congruous to the nature of the Corporeal Soul, ſo are the corporeal motions that accompany and characterize it, moſt profitable to *health*; provided they be *moderate*. For, this Commotion and Effuſion may be ſo vehement and ſuddain, that the Soul may become weak, and unable to rule the body, or to actuate the organs of ſpeech, yea ſwooning, and death itſelf ſomtimes follow profuſe and inſolent Joy. So *Lacon Chilo*, an eminent Philoſopher, ſuddainly expired in exceſſive joy, beholding his Sonne a Victor in the Olympic games. So *Sophocles* the Tragedian alſo, and *Dionyſius* the Tyrant died of a ſurfet of ſuddain Joy.

The

The *reaſon* whereof ſeems to conſiſt, not in a vehement effuſion and diſſipation of the vital ſpirits, and a deſtitution of the Heart conſequent thereunto; as *Fernelius* would have it; becauſe the faſter the blood is effuſed through the arteries from the heart, the ſwifter muſt it return to the heart through the veines, ſo that the heart cannot be totaly exhauſted and left deſtitute of blood: but rather in a ſurcharge and *ſuffocation* of the heart by too redundant an afflux of blood. For, upon extraordinary dilatation of the floudgates of the heart by immoderate joy, the current of blood both out of the *Vena cava*, and from the *arteria venoſa*, may pour itſelf with ſo much violence, and in ſo great a quantity, into the ventricles thereof, that the heart, unable to diſcharge itſelf ſoon enough of that oppreſſing deluge, by retruding its *valves*, may be ſuffocated, its motions ſtopped, and the Vital Flame in a moment extinguiſhed. For certain it is, that in the ſtate of health, the blood is not admitted into the heart beyond a *certain proportion*: nor can that proportion be much exceeded, whatever the cauſe be that maketh an *apertio portarum* there, without manifeſt danger of life.

Among

Art 51. Laughter.

Among the *Signs* of this delightful paſſion, ſome have given the upper hand to that diſtortion of the countenance, accompanied with a loud, but inarticulate voice, which we call *Laughter*: but this being neither proper to, nor inſeparable from *Joy*, cannot therefore belong to it *eſſentialy*. That it is frequently a concomitant of *Mirth* or *Hilarity*, is not to be diſputed: but *Mirth* is the loweſt degree of Joy, a light and ſuperficial emotion of the Senſitive Soul and Spirits, a kind of ſhort tickling of the Imagination, uſualy expreſſed by Laughter: whereas *Joy* is ſerious, profound and grave, according to that memorable Sentence of *Seneca* (*epiſt.* 23.) *res ſevera eſt verum gaudium*. *Laughter* then (as I ſaid) is not *proper* to all Joy; becauſe common to ſome other affections: for ſome are obſerved to laugh out of *Indignation*, others out of *Contempt* and *diſdain*, neither of which belong to any kind of Joy. Nor is it *inſeparable* from Joy; becauſe in truth Joy cannot produce Laughter, unleſs when it is very *moderate*, and hath ſomthing of *Admiration* or *Hate* mixt with it. For, we have it from the oracle of Experience, that in great and profound Joy, the cauſe of it, whatſoever it be, doth never force us to break forth

forth into laughter: nay more, that we are moſt eaſily provoked to laugh, when we are *ſad*. Whereof the *reaſon* ſeems to be, either becauſe in ſolid Joy, the Senſitive Soul is ſo deeply commoved, ſo intirely taken up with the delight of fruition, that ſhe cannot attend to ſhake the Midriff, Lungs and Muſcles of the breaſt, nimbly and ſtrongly enough to create laughter: or becauſe at that time the Lungs are ſo diſtended with blood, that they cannot, by repeted concuſſions, or alternate contractions and relaxations, be further inflated with air, whereof no little quantity is required to produce that loud ſound emitted in Laughter. That we may underſtand this matter more fully, let us examine the *cauſe* or *occaſion*, and the *Motions* of Laughter.

Art. 52. The *occaſions* of Laughter.

As for the *Firſt*, viz. the *Occaſion* or Motive; whatſoever it be, there muſt concur therein theſe three *Conditions* following. (1.) it muſt be *new* and *ſurpriſing*; becauſe whatſoever is ridiculous at firſt, ceaſeth to be ſo when grown ſtale. (2.) it muſt be ſuch a novelty as may ſuggeſt to us a conception of ſome *eminency* or advantage in our ſelves above another whom the occaſion chiefly concerns: for, why are we naturally prone to laugh at either a *jeſt* (which is nothing but a witty or elegant diſcovery and

repreſentation of ſome abſurdity or indecency of another, abſtracted from his perſon) or at the miſchances and infirmities of others; unleſs from hence, that thereby our own *abilities* are the more ſet off and illuſtrated, and recommended to us by way of compariſon? (3.) It muſt not touch our own, or our friends *honour*; for, in that point we are too tender to tolerate, much leſs to laugh at a jeſt broken upon our ſelves, or friends, of whoſe diſhonour we participate. Theſe requiſites in a ridiculous cauſe conſidered, we may adventure to conclude, that *Laughter is an effect of ſudden, but light* Joy *ariſing from the unexpected diſcovery of ſome* infirmity *in another not our* friend, *and from* imagination *of our own* eminency, and exemption *from the like.* Here then (you ſee) is ſomething of *Admiration* from the *Novelty*, ſomething of *Averſion* from the *Infirmity*, & ſomething of *Joy* or *triumph* from our opinion of ſome *eminency* in our ſelves.

Art 53. Laughter out of *Indignation.*

And as for that *Laughter* which is ſometimes joyned with *Indignation*; it is moſt commonly *fictitious* or artificial, and then it depends intirely upon our *will*, as a voluntary action: but when 'tis *true* or *Natural*, it ſeems likewiſe to ariſe from *Joy* conceived from hence, that we ſee our ſelves to be above offence by that evil which is the cauſe or ſubject of our indignation;

nation; and that we feel our ſelves ſurpriſed by the unexpected novelty of the ſame. So that to the production of this Laughter alſo is required a concurs of *Joy*, *Averſion* and *Admiration*; but all moderate.

If this be ſo, what then ſhall we think of that odd example of Laughter in *Ludovicus vives*; who writes of himſelf (*lib.* 3. *de Anima*, *cap. de Riſu*) that uſually when he began to eat after long faſting, he could not forbear to break forth into a fit of loud laughter? This doubtleſs was not *voluntary*; becauſe he ſtrove to ſuppreſs it: nor could it be *Convulſive*, ſuch as Phyſicians call *Riſus Sardonius*; becauſe he was in perfect health, ſenſible of no pain therein, nor incommodity thereupon. It muſt therefore be *Natural*, though not *Paſſionate*; proceeding from ſome cauſe very obſcure, and *idioſyncritical*, that is peculiar to his conſtitution: perhaps this, that in this Learned man, either the *Lungs* were more apt to be diſtended with blood, or the *Midriff* more eaſily put into the motions that produce laughter, than commonly they are in moſt other men. The *Firſt*, becauſe in general, whatſoever cauſeth the Lungs to be ſuddenly puffed up and diſtended with blood, cauſeth alſo the external action of Laughter; unleſs where ſorrow changeth that action into groaning and weeping:

Art. 54. A rare example of *involuntary* Laughter.

the *other*, becauſe all Laughter is made chiefly by quick and ſhort vibrations of the *Midriff*. But this rare *Phenomenon* we ſhall perhaps be better able to ſolve, when we have conſidered how the action of Laughter is performed in all other men.

Art. 55. A conjecture concerning the *cauſe* thereof.

Concerning this Problem therefore, it is obſervable that in *Man*, there ſeems to be a greater conſent or ſympathy, or rather *commerce* of motions betwixt the *Midriff* and the *Heart*, yea and the *Imagination* alſo; than in Brutes of what order or tribe ſoever: and that the *Reaſon* given hereof by the moſt accurate of our Modern Anatomiſts, is this; that the principal Nerve of the *Midriff* is rooted in the ſame Nerve of the Spine (named *Nervus vertebralis*) from whence there comes a conſpicuous branch into the grand *plexus* of the *Intercoſtal* nerve; and that commonly two, ſometimes three other branches more are derived from that ſame notable *plexus*, into the very trunk of the Nerve of the *Diaphragm* (as you may ſee moſt elegantly repreſented by *Dr. Willis* in the *9th Table* of his moſt elaborate Book *de Anatomia Cerebri*) which are not found in Beaſts. For, from this plenty and ſingular contexture of nerves, it may be conjectured, not only why the *Diaphragm* doth ſo readily conform its motions to thoſe of the *Præcordia*, and of the

Animal

Animal Spirits excited in paſſions of the Mind, and cooperate with them; but alſo why *Riſibility* is an affection *proper* only to *Man*. For (as the ſame moſt curious *Dr. Willis* reaſoneth, in his chapter of the functions and uſes of the *Intercoſtal* pair of nerves) when the Imagination is affected with ſome pleaſant and new conceipt, inſtantly there is cauſed a brisk and placid motion of the heart, as if it ſprung up with joy to be alleviated or eaſed of its burden. Wherefore that the blood may be the more ſpeedily diſcharged out of the right Ventricle of the heart into the Lungs, and out of the left into the *Aorta* or grand Artery; the *Diaphragm*, being by abundance of Animal ſpirits immitted through ſo many nerves proceeding from the aforeſaid *Plexus*, briskly agitated is by nimble contraction drawn upwards; and ſo making many vibrations, doth at once raiſe up the *Lungs*, and force them to expell the blood out of their veſſels into the *arteria venoſa*, and to explode the aire out of their pipes into the windpipe; and this by frequent contractions of their lax and ſpongy ſubſtance, anſwerable in time and quickneſs to the vibrations of the *Midriff*. And then becauſe the ſame *Intercoſtal* nerve, which communicateth with the nerve of the *Diaphragm* below, is conjoyned above alſo with the nerves

of the jaws and muſcles of the face; thence it is, that the motions of Laughter being once begun in the breſt, the *face* alſo is diſtorted into geſtures or grimaſces patheticaly correſpondent thereunto. And this is the moſt probable account I am able at preſent to give of the *occaſions* and *motions* of *paſſionate Laughter* in general: nor can I at preſent think of any more plauſible conjecture concerning the reaſon of the admirable laughter of *Ludovicus Vives*, than this; that in him the nerves inſervient to the motion of the Midriff, might be after ſuch a peculiar manner contrived and framed, as eaſily to cauſe quick and ſhort reciprocations thereof, upon the pleaſant affection of his Imagination by the grateful reliſh of his meat, after long abſtinence, which doth alwaies highten the pleaſure of refection: But we have inſiſted too long upon the *motions* of *Joy*.

Art. 56. The *Motions* and *Effects* of *Sorrow*.

In the *contrary* whereof, viz. *Grief* or *Sorrow* (which we have above deſcribed to be an ingrateful *languor* of the Soul, from a conception of evil preſent, moving her to *contract* herſelf, that ſhe may avoid it) the *Animal Spirits* are indeed recalled inward, but ſlowly and without violence: ſo that the *blood* being by degrees deſtitute of a ſufficient influx of them, is traſmitted through the heart with

with too slow a motion. Whence the *pulse* is rendered *little*, *slow*, *rare*, and *weak*; and there is felt about the heart a certain oppressive *strictness*, as if the orifices of it were drawn together, with a manifest *chilness* congealing the blood, and communicating itself to the rest of the body. From which dejecting symptoms it is easy to collect, that this dolefull affection, especialy if it be vehement and of long continuance, cannot but infer many, and grievous incommodities to the whole body. For, besides this that it darkneth the *spirits*, and so dulls the *wit*, obscures the *judgment*, blunts the *memory*, and in a word beclouds the *Lucid* part of the Soul: it doth moreover incrassate the blood by refrigeration, and by that reason immoderately constringe the heart, cause the lamp of life to burn weakly and dimly, induce want of sleep by drying the brain, corrupt the *nutritive juice*, and convert it into that Devil of a humor, Melancholy. No wonder then if in men overcome with this so dismal passion, the countenance appears pale, wan and liveless; the limbs grow heavy and indisposed to motion, the flesh decays and consumes through want of nourishment, and the whole body be precipated into imbecillity, *Cachexy* or an evil habit, languishing

ſhing and other cold and chronic diſeaſes. All which the wiſeſt of Men, King *Salomon*, hath ſumm'd up in few words in 17 *Chap.* of his *Proverbs*, where he advertiſeth, that *a ſorrowful ſpirit drieth up the very bones.* And yet notwithſtanding, it is very rarely found, that from *Grief* either long and obſtinate, or violent and ſuddainly invading, any man hath fallen into a *ſwoon*, or been *ſuddenly* extinguiſhed. Which I am apt to refer to this; that in the ventricles of the heart, tho but very ſlowly commoved, there can hardly be ſo ſmale a quantity of blood, but it may ſuffice to keep alive the vital flame burning therein, when the orifices of them are almoſt cloſed, as commonly they are by immoderate grief.

Art. 57. *Sighs* and *Tears.*

Somtimes this bitter paſſion is *ſignified* by a certain uncomely diſtortion of the face, ſomwhat different from that of Laughter, and acompanied with *Tears*; ſomtimes only by *Sighs*: by *Sighs*, when the Grief is *extreme*: by *Tears*, when it is but *moderate.* For as Laughter never proceeds from great and profound Joy, ſo neither doe Tears flow from profound ſorrow; according to that of the Tragedian, *leves curæ loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent.* Nor is weeping the *pathognomonic* or infallible ſign of Grief, For, all tears are not *voluntary*; every light hurt or pain of

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the Eyes cauſing them to diſtill againſt our will: nor all voluntary ones the effect of *Grief*. Some weep for ſudden *joy* joyned with *Love*, eſpecialy *old* men: ſome when their *Revenge* is ſuddainly fruſtrated by the repentance and ſubmiſſion of the offender; and ſuch are the tears of *Reconciliation*. Some again weep out of *Anger*, when they meet with a repulſe or check of their deſires, which cauſing them with regret to reflect upon their own weakneſs and inſufficiency to compaſs their wills, affects them with diſpleaſure, and diſſolves them into tears, as if they fell out with themſelves upon a ſudden ſenſe of their own defect: and this kind of weeping is moſt familiar to *Children* and *Women* when they are croſſed in their wills and expectation; as alſo to *Revengefull* Men, upon their beholding of thoſe whom they commiſſerate, and their want of power to help them. Notwithſtanding the *Occaſions* of weeping be thus various, yet ſince *Tears* are frequently both an effect and teſtimony of *Sorrow*, the nature and motions whereof we have now attempted to explain: it can be no impertinent *Digreſſion*, to inquire further into their *original* or ſours, and the *manner* how they are made to flow, when we are willing to

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ſignify our preſent ſorrow by ſhedding them.

Art. 58. Whence *Tears* flow.

As for the *Fountain* therefore whence all our *Tears* flow, and the *Matter* whereof they conſiſt; the ſucceſfull induſtry of Modern Anatomiſts hath diſcovered, that in the *Glandules* placed at each corner of the Eyes, there is either from the *blood* brought thither by the arteries (as the vulgar doctrine is) or (as I, upon good reaſons elſwhere delivered, conceive) from the *Nutritive juice* brought by nerves, ſeparated, and kept in ſtore a certain thin, clear and watery humor, partly *ſaline*, partly *ſubacid* in taſt; the *uſe* whereof is aſwell to keep the globes of the eyes moiſt and ſlippery, for their more eaſy motion; as to ſerve for *Tears* when we have occaſion to ſhed them. And to this ſome have added, that becauſe there are certain branches of nerves (like the tendrels of a vine) incircling the veſſells leading to and from thoſe *Glandules*, and by their tenſion ſomtimes conſtringing them: therefore it is probable, that when the ſerous humor is too abundant in the blood brought into the brain, the ſame is by the arteries (whoſe pulſe is quickned ſomwhat by the preſſure of theſe nerves) brought more copiouſly than at other times, into thoſe

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Glandules, and after its ſeparation, there detained from returning by the veins, that are likewiſe ſtreightned by conſtriction of the ſame nerves. Whether this ingenious conjecture be true or not; certain it is, that the Matter of Tears is the ſame with the liquor of the *Lymphæ-ducts*, and that they flow from the aforeſaid *Glandules*, which are therefore named *Lacrymales*.

Art. 59. How they are *expreſſed*

And as for the manner of their *Expreſſion* from thence in ſome paſſions of the Mind; the moſt rational account I have hitherto met with concerning it, is this. When any occaſion of *weeping* occurrs, and affects the Senſitive Soul; inſtantly the *Ventricles* of the heart, with all the *Præcordia*, are by the blood in abundance brought into them, more than uſualy crowded and diſtended, and the *Lungs* alſo ſtuffed and inflated, ſo that they cannot perform the action of reſpiration but by *ſobbs* intermixed; and the *Midriff*, to give room to ſuch diſtenſion of the heart and Lungs, is preſſed downward, with a more intenſe contraction alternately ſucceeding; which great depreſſion and brisk contraction being repeted, is the efficient cauſe of *Sobbing*. and at the ſame time the air being with difficulty admitted into the lungs, by reaſon

ſon they and the Midriff are ſo exceedingly diſtended, and with no leſs difficulty exploded again by the windpipe: thence comes that whining ſound of *crying* and *howling*. To this affection of the *vitals*, the parts of the *face* alſo, being diſtorted into a ſad and mournfull aſpect, exactly correſpond: becauſe the nerves which contract the *Præcordia*, have a communion of continuity, and cooperate with thoſe which are inſerted into the muſcles of the face, and which compoſe it into the poſtures of weeping and laughter in paſſion. Nor doth the diſorder ceaſe here, but extend itſelf to the upper region alſo, to the *brain*, where the Spirits being put into confuſion, and the arteries ſurcharged with too great an afflux of blood from the oppreſſed heart; the palace of the Soul itſelf is brought into danger of a purple deluge. For prevention whereof, the nerves incircling and binding the trunks of the arteries in many places, ſtrongly conſtringe them; ſo that the commotion of the blood is much repreſſed, the liquor thereof (in the beginning of the paſſion highly rarefied) ſuddainly condenſed, and the ſerous part of it being put into a flux, is tranſmitted into the above mentioned Glandules of the Eyes, there pla-

placed and deſtined by nature to receive it. And then becauſe theſe *Glandules* are in like manner conſtringed, and as it were ſqueez'd by certain nerves that are of the ſame original and community with the *Pathetic* nerves of the *face* and *heart*: the *ſerous* liquor is expreſſed out of them through their *excretory channels* leading to the corners of the Eyes (moſt accurately deſcribed, with their uſes, by that diligent Anatomiſt *Nichol. Steno*, in a ſingular treatiſe) and forced to diſtill in a ſhower of *tears*; the ſtrong Contraction of the *membranes* inveſting the whole *brain*, concurring to that *expreſſion*.

Art. 60. The reaſon of weeping for *Joy*.

The ſame may be ſaid likewiſe of the *ſhedding tears* for *Joy*. For in ſuddain and great *Joy* conjoyned with *Admiration*, the Senſitive Soul very much expanding herſelf, and diffuſing the Animal Spirits; the blood is ſent from the heart in great abundance to the brain, ſo as to diſtend the veſſels that contain it: which being ſoon after ſtrongly contracted again by the ſame Soul withdrawing herſelf inward, (as if ſhe feared a diſſolution by ſo ample an Effuſion) the blood is in a ſort put into a flux or melted, and the ſerous part of it ſeparated in the Glandules of the Eyes, and thence by conſtriction of the nerves ſqueezed forth in *tears*.

This

Art. 61. Why *Infants* and *Old* men are more prone than others to shed tears.

This being ſuppoſed, it will not be difficult for us thence to infer, that *Infants* and *Old* Men are indeed more prone to weep than thoſe of middle age: but for divers reaſons. *Old* Men for the moſt part weep out of *Love* and *Joy* together; becauſe both theſe affections cauſing a great Effuſion of the Senſitive Soul, and conſequently a large apertion of the orifices or ſluices of the heart; muſt therefore (eſpecialy where they are conjoyned) cauſe alſo a tranſmiſſion of the blood from thence to the brain in great abundance: and the blood being generaly more thin and diluted with *ſerum* in *old* men, muſt yield more matter for their tears. But *Infants* commonly weep out of mere *Sorrow* and vexation, ſuch as is not accompanied with the leaſt of Love: becauſe the *contraction* of the Soul and nerves cauſed by ſorrow, expreſſeth out of the blood (which is alwaies abundant in children) brought by the arteries to the brain, a ſufficient quantity of *ſerum* to repleniſh the *Glandulæ Lachrymales*, and ſupply the ſourſe of their tears.

Art. 62. The reaſon of *Sighing* and *Sobbing*.

There remains yet that other *Sign* of *Sorrow*, which doth uſually accompany it when it is profound and *extreme*; and that is *Sighing*; the cauſe whereof is very much

much different from that of weeping, though both proceed from Grief. For, the ſame occaſion that moves us to ſhed tears, when our Lungs are ſtuffed and diſtended with blood; provokes us alſo to fetch deep *ſighs*, when they are almoſt *empty*, and when ſome ſudden imagination of *Hope* or comfort opens the ſluice of the *Arteria Venoſa* in the lungs, which ſorrow had lately contracted. For, then that little blood that remained in the lungs, in a moment paſſing down through that pipe into the left ventricle of the heart; the ambient aire inſtantly ruſheth by the mouth into the lungs, to repleniſh that place the blood had left free: and this *great and quick repletion of the lungs with aire*, is what we call *Sighing*.

You have now heard what Conjectures ſeem to me moſt conſentaneous to reaſon and Anatomical obſervations, concerning the Corporeal Motions excited in thoſe two eminent paſſions, Joy and Sorrow, with their uſual Adjuncts, Laughter and weeping: be pleas'd to hear alſo a few words touching the more violent motions proper to *Anger*, which I have promiſed next to conſider.

Art. 63. The *Motions* and *Symptoms* of *Anger*.

That the *Effects* of this moſt vehement Commotion of the Senſitive Soul are *various*, not only as the *occaſion* or injury is conceived

conceived to be greater or leſs; but alſo according to the various *temperaments* of perſons, and to the diverſity of other *Paſſions* conjoyned therewith: is obvious to common obſervation, and we have already hinted. And from this variety it is, that men have diſtinguiſhed Anger into *Harmleſs* and *Dangerous*, or ſimple heat of blood, and thirſt after Revenge: aſſigning moreover to each ſort its proper *Signs* or Characters obſervable in the outward parts of the body, and eſpecially in the *face*. For ſome when they are angry, look *pale*, or *tremble*; others grow *red*, or *weep*: and the vulgar judgeth the paſſion of the *firſt* ſort to be much more *dangerous*, than that of the *other*. Whereof the *reaſon* may be this; that when we either will not, or cannot ſhew our reſentments, and revenge otherwiſe than by our change of countenance, and by words; we then put forth all our heat, and exert all our force at the very beginning of the commotion; ſo that the blood being in this ſudden effort copiouſly effuſed from the heart into the face. and there detained a while by conſtriction of the veines by thoſe branches of the *Fifth* pair of nerves that are inſerted into the muſcles of that part; we are forced to appear in the ſcarlet livery of *ſhame*, that is,

to

to *bluſh* out of *indignation* and *regret* or grief at the unworthy affront. And ſometimes the firſt emotion of *deſire* to vindicate our ſelves, together with *commiſeration* of our own want of power to revenge more effectually, cauſeth us alſo to *ſhed tears*.

But they who on the contrary, reſerve themſelves for, and ſtrongly reſolve upon *revenge* in time to come, grow deeply *ſad* and *penſive* at the preſent; as conceiving themſelves thereunto obliged by the nature of the injury done to them, and caſting about in their thoughts how to accompliſh their revenge: and all this while the *Senſitive Soul* perſiſting in her *Contraction* and revocation of the Spirits inwards, there is no extraordinary, nay but little diffuſion of the blood outwards. And ſometimes they alſo *fear* the evils that may enſue from the revenge they intend; which ſtrikes them into *paleneſs*, *ſhivering* and *trembling*: the Senſitive Soul being then diſtracted betwixt the contrary motions of *deſire* of revenge, and of *fear* of the ill conſequents thereof; like a Sea beaten by two contrary winds. Yet after this firſt conflict is over, when they come to *execute* their revenge, then fear giving place to rage, they ſoon grow the more *inflamed* and daring, by how much

the *colder* they were during their deliberation: as in *Fevers* that invade with cold and ſhivering, the following heats are alwayes moſt ardent and unquenchable. You ſee then how the *Motions*, and conſequently the *Efforts* and *Effects* of this violent paſſion may be *diverſified* even by diverſity of other *affections* conjoyned therewith. For in the *Harmleſs* and *Bluſhing* or *Weeping* anger, there is alwayes a mixture of *ſhame* and *ſelf-pity*; which by allaying the deſire of revenge, helpeth much to check and moderate the commotion of the blood; and therefore ſuch anger ſeldom laſteth long, and is more eaſily compoſed: when on the other ſide, in the *Pale* and *Trembling*, but *Dangerous* anger, there is firſt deep *Indignation*, then *Fear*, and at laſt *Furious* perſuit of *revenge*; by which the blood being moſt violently agitated, and the ſulphureous parts of it all kindled into a flame, is not to be calmed and reduced to temper, unleſs by the pleaſure of revenge, or by triumph in the ſubmiſſion of the Enemy, or by the cold damp of repentance. For prevention of which moſt bitter paſſion, by moderating our Anger; I think my ſelf in Charity obliged to conclude this argument with an excellent *Moral* remark of *Monſieur des Cartes.*

Although

Art. 64. *Excess* of Anger, to be avoided; and that chiefly by the help of true *Generosity*.

Although the passion of *Anger* be in itself *usefull*, in that it inspires us with vigour and courage necessary to repell injuries: yet the *Excesses* of no other passion are with greater care and caution to be shunned. Because by perturbing our judgment, they often induce us into those errors, whereof we ought afterward dearly to repent: yea sometimes they hinder us from repelling injuries so safely and honourably, as otherwise we might, if we were less commoved. But as nothing doth more increase the flame of *Anger*, than *Pride*: so (I am perswaded) nothing can more abate and restrain the Excesses of it, than true *Generosity*. Because while *Generosity* makes us to have but little value for all things that may be taken from us; and on the other side, to prize above all temporal things, our *Liberty* and *Empire* over *ourselves*, which is lost when we are capable to be hurt by an other: it makes us with *Contempt* alone, or at most with *Indignation* to revenge those injuries, with which weaker minds are wont to be offended. ¶

Being now at length arrived at the end of this my divertising Exercise, wherein I proposed to my self to inquire into the *Occasions*, *Causes*, *Differences*,

Motions and *Effects* of the moſt powerfull and remarkable of all the *Paſſions*, by which the Mind of Man is apt to be perturbed; ſo far as my weak underſtanding aſſiſted by reading and meditation would permit: before I lay aſide my pen, I find it requiſite to advertiſe you briefly of *two* things, *one* whereof may conduce to your more eaſy comprehenſion of what I have hitherto delivered concerning the more *general Differences* of the Paſſions; the other may ſerve to my exemption from the cenſure of the *Illiterate*.

Art. 65. That of all the Paſſions hitherto conſidered, only *ſix* are *Simple*; the reſt *Mixed*.

The *Firſt* is, that of all the Paſſions recounted and deſcribed in this impolite diſcourſe, there are only *ſix* that ſeem to be *Simple* and *Principal*, namely *Admiration*, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Deſire*, *Joy* and *Grief*; which are therefore ſaid to be *Simple*, becauſe they conſiſt of only one ſingle act or commotion of the Senſitive Soul diſturbed with the apprehenſion of things whether real or imaginary. For, as to all the *reſt*; either they are but various *ſpecies* of thoſe Simple ones, or they reſult from divers *mixtures* and combinations of them; being therefore named *Mixt* Paſſions, becauſe they conſiſt of more than one act or Motion. If therefore I have chiefly conſidered the Nature, *motions*, and principal Effects of the *ſix*

Sim-

simple or *Primitive* paſſions; contenting myſelf only with a brief *Genealogy* of the *Compound* or *Derivative*, as ſufficient to direct your cogitations to the various *Mixed* commotions whence they reſult: it was only leſt I might abuſe your patience by undecent repetitions, or oppreſs your mind with too great multiplicity of particulars, which is none of the leaſt impediments of Science.

Art. 65. Reaſons againſt publication of this diſcourſe.

The *Other* is, that notwithſtanding the *Excellency*, and ſingular *Utility* of the Argument whereof I have treated in this Diſcourſe; yet ſeeing my deſign in compoſing it, hath been partly to render my preſent ſolitude leſs tedious to my ſelf, and chiefly to give you ſome teſtimony that I convert not my leiſure into idleneſs: You ought not to fruſtrate my confidence of your ſecrecy, or to expoſe my defects, by communicating theſe papers to *Others*. Not to *Philoſophers*, leaſt they find nothing *new* in them but my *Lapſes*. Not to the *Unlearned*, becauſe they are incompetent judges of *truth* or *error*, eſpecialy in ſuch Philoſophical Enquiries; more addicted to barbarous contempt of Knowledge in others, than to confeſs ignorance in themſelves. To *Theſe* therefore (you may be moſt aſſured) I am not ambitious you ſhould recommend this

Treatiſe, wherein is contained nothing that can either pleaſe, or reform them. I know it is no leſs difficult to teach them the art of regulating their exorbitant Paſſions, than it is to bring them to prefer the ſevere dictates of *reaſon*, to the flattering ſuggeſtions of *Senſe*; or to convince them, that realy nothing is *pleaſant*, but what is alſo *honeſt*; nothing very *deſireable*, but the right uſe of their *freedom of will*; nothing *formidable*, but the *evil* they *themſelves* commit. I know, that in the Vulgar, *Religion* is *fear*; *conſtancy*, bruitiſh *obſtinacy*; *zeal*, *pride*; *friendſhip*, *intereſt*; and *virtue* itſelf but *diſſimulation*. I know alſo, that the multitude is not led by *merit*, but carried headlong by *prejudice*, to praiſe or diſpraiſe: and that they are more propens to *malignity* and *detraction*, than to *charity* and *candor*. The *Vulgar* then, and all that herd with them, I exclude from my ſtudies; leſt by perverſely interpreting them (as they do all things) they ſhould interrupt my *tranquility*, which I value infinitely above their *favour*, and wherein I endeavour to find a *happineſs*, which neither their hatred, nor the iniquity of Fortune ſhall take from me.

That I may find this the ſooner, I

now

now and then entertain myſelf with ſerious reflections upon my own *defects*, as the only impediments that have hitherto hindered me from attaining unto it: and among the reſt, I hold my mind longeſt fixed on this following *Meditation*: which I therefore freely impart to you who are my *Friend*, both becauſe I think it may be of equal uſe to you alſo, by helping you to moderate your *Affections* to the tranſitory things of this ſhadow of life; and becauſe the precedent diſcourſe will perhaps be ſomwhat the leſs imperfect, after it hath received ſo pertinent a

CONCLUSION.

Art. 1. That all the *Good* and *Evil* of this life depends upon the *Passions:*

THat all the Good and Evil of this life depends upon the various *Passions* incident to the Mind of Man; I need no other document than my own dearly bought Experience: which hath too often convinced me, that while I out of weakneſs ſuffered my ſelf to be ſeduced and tranſported by the ardor and exceſſes of my *Affections*, I have fallen into Errors, that have more dejected my ſpirit, than a long ſucceſſion of infortunes could ever doe; and from whence I could not expect better fruit, than that of ſhame, ſorrow and repentance.

Art 2. Which yet were inſtituted by Nature as *incitements* to the Soul.

Notwithſtanding this, I ought not to be ſo unjuſt, ſo ingrateful to *Nature*, as to transfer the blame of ſuch Errors upon *her*; as if ſhe had been leſs careful than ſhe might have been, to ſecure Man from infelicity: only becauſe ſhe thought fit to make him obnoxious to ſo great a multitude of inward *Perturbations*. No, I ought rather to remember, that among all of them, there is no one but hath its

Uſe,

Uſe, and that a good one too: provided we rightly imploy the forces *Nature* hath given us, to keep it within the bounds of Moderation. And it may ſuffice to Natures vindication, that reaſon obligeth me to acknowledge, that her deſign in inſtituting our Paſſions, was in the *general* this; *that they might diſpoſe and incite the* Soul *to affect and deſire thoſe things, which Nature by ſecret dictates teacheth to be good and profitable to her; and to perſiſt in that deſire: as the ſame commotion of the ſpirits that is requiſite to produce them, doth diſpoſe the parts of the* Body *alſo to thoſe motions that ſerve to the execution of her will.* And hence doubtleſs it is, that they who are naturaly moſt apt to be moved by paſſions, have this advantage above others of duller and groſſer conſtitutions, that they may (if they will) taſt more of the pleaſures belonging to the Senſitive Soul: but then again they are likewiſe thereby more expoſed to drink of the gall and wormwood of pain and remorſe, when they know not how to regulate their paſſions, and when adverſe Fortune invades them. I am confirmed then, that becauſe man is conſtituted propens to Paſſions, he is not therefore the *leſs perfect*, but rather *the more capable of pleaſure* from the right uſe of the

the good things of this life: and by consequence, that Nature by making him ζῶον παθετικὸν, hath therein signalized both her *wisedom* and *indulgence*.

Art. 3. That we are prone to *Errors*, not from want of an *omniscious* understanding:

But *had he not been* more perfect, *if it had pleased his* Creator *to endow him moreover with such Excellency above all other Animals*, *as might have* secured *him from committing* Errors *through the violent instigation of his* Passions, *whenever they should incite him to desire and persue things not* realy, *but onely apparently* good for *him*? Certainly *no*. For it is not only impious, but highly absurd, to imagine that *God* can be Author of our *Errors*, because he hath not given to us an Understanding *Omniscious*: for it is of the formal reason of a created intellect, that it be *finite*; and of a finite intellect, that it extend *not* itself to *all* things. But that Man should have a *Will* unconfined or extensible to all things, this indeed is convenient to his nature: and it is a transcendent *perfection* in him, that he can and doth act by his own will, that is *freely*; and so is, by a peculiar prerogative, Author of his own actions, and may deserve praise and reward for them. For no Man praiseth a Watch, or any other Self-moving engine made by art, for performing the motions thereby designed;

ſigned; becauſe thoſe motions neceſſarily reſult from the figure and conſtruction of its *parts*: but the *Artiſt* himſelf deſerves praiſe, becauſe he framed the engine not by neceſſity or compulſion, but *freely*. So we by the ſame reaſon deſerve the more by welldoing, that is by embracing truth, becauſe we do it *voluntary* or by election; than we ſhould, if we could not but do it. When therefore we fall into Errors, occaſioned by our Paſſions; the defect lieth in our own act, or in the uſe of our *liberty*, not in our nature: for that is the ſame when we make an erroneous judgement of things repreſented to us, as it is when we make a right judgment. And although Almighty God might, if He had thought good, have given ſo great perſpicacity to our Underſtanding, as that we could never have been deceived: yet by what right can we require that privilege from him? True it is (I confeſs) that among us *Men*, if any hath power to hinder this or that evil, and yet doth not hinder it; we accuſe him as cauſe of it: and juſtly too, becauſe the power that Men have one over others, was inſtituted, and committed to them to that end, that they ſhould uſe it to the reſtraining of others from evil. But there is not the ſame reaſon why we ſhould think

think *God* to be Author of our Errors, only becauſe it was in His power to have prevented them, by making us ſuperior to deception: for the power that *God* hath of right over all Men, is moſt *ſoveraign*, moſt *abſolute*, moſt *free*. And therefore we are obliged to aſcribe to His Divine Majeſty, all poſſible praiſe and thanks for the good gifts He hath out of his infinite benignity been pleaſed to beſtow upon us his Creatures: but we have no pretext of right to complain, becauſe He hath not conferred upon us all things that we conceive he might.

Art. 4. But from our *ill uſe* of that underſtanding we have, in the conduct of our *deſires* ſuggeſted by paſſions.

Beſides, although the *Intellect* of Man be not omniſcious; yet is it not ſo narrow, ſo limited, as not to extend to the conduct of his Unlimited *Will*, in the Election of Good, and avoidance of Evil; and conſequently to his exemption from *Error* by the violence of his Paſſions. For, *firſt*, by virtue of his Underſtanding, Man is capable of *Wiſedom*, which is alone able to teach him how to ſubdue and govern all his Affections, and how to diſpenſe them with ſuch dexterity, as not only to make all the Evils they produce, eaſily tollerable, but even to reap internal ſatisfaction and joy from all. And *ſecondly*, it is evident from the very nature of our Paſſions, that they cannot car-

carry us on to any actions whatſoever, but only by the *Deſire* they excite in us: and therefore if we can but *direct* that deſire to *right* objects, that is to things *realy Good*; we may by that alone prevent our being deceived, that is our being carried to evil actions by violence of our Paſſions: but that *Right Reaſon* is of itſelf able ſo to direct our deſire ariſing from paſſions, is manifeſt from the known Utility of *Moral Philoſophy*, which preſcribeth certain rules to that end. I will *conclude* then, that I commit Errors in paſſion, not becauſe I am naturaly prone to Paſſions, nor becauſe I want an omniſcious Underſtanding: but only becauſe I make not a *right* uſe of that finite indeed, yet ſufficient *Underſtanding* God hath given me, in the conduct of that Cupidity my paſſions excite in me.

Art. 5. That all *Errors* to which the *deſires* excited by our Paſſions, expoſe us, ariſe from hence, that we doe not ſufficiently *diſtinguiſh* things that depend intirely upon *ourſelves*, from thoſe that depend upon *others*.

That I may therefore be henceforth better able to make uſe of my Underſtanding as I ought, in ſuch occaſions; it highly concerneth me to enquire in the next place, into the origin of that *Error*, to which the *Cupidity* accompanying our Paſſions, doth moſt frequently expoſe us: for, that being once known, will be the more eaſily avoidable. This *Error* then doth ariſe (if I miſtake not) from hence; *that we do not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh thoſe things that de-*

depend intirely upon ourſelves, *from thoſe that depend upon* others, as to their events: it being a general rule, that *Deſire is alwaies good, when grounded upon certain Knowledge*; and on the contrary alwaies *evil*, when founded upon ſome *error*. Now as to things that depend upon *ourſelves* alone, that is upon our Free-will; to know them to be good, is ſufficient to aſſure us we cannot deſire them too fervently: becauſe to doe good things that depend upon ourſelves, is to *purſue Virtue*, which cannot be too fervently deſired, nor can the *event* of our deſire of ſuch things poſſibly be unhappy, becauſe from the conſcience that by deſiring them we have rightly uſed the freedom of our will, we receive all the ſatisfaction we expected. But alaſs! the Error that is too commonly committed in ſuch caſes, lieth not in the over fervent, but in the *overcold* deſire. And the beſt *remedy* againſt this *defect*, is to free the mind as much as is poſſible, from all other deſires leſs profitable; and then to endeavour clearly to underſtand, and with due attention to examine the goodneſs of the thing that is repreſented as worthy to be deſired.

Art. 6. And that they may be *prevented* by two *General Remedies*, viz. *Generoſity*.

As for the things that are altogether *independent* upon *Us*; however good they may be, yet we are never to deſire them vehemently: not only becauſe tis poſſible they may never arrive, and ſo vex and torment the mind ſo much the more bitterly, by how much the more eagerly they have been deſired; but chiefly becauſe by preoccupating our thoughts, they withdraw our ſtudy from other things whereof the acquiſition depends upon ourſelves. And againſt theſe *vain* deſires there are *two* general *Remedies*; whereof the firſt is true *Generoſity*; the other, a firm belief of, and tranquill dependence upon *Providence Divine*. For, that noble and heroic habit of the mind, which is called *Generoſity*, and which ſeems to comprehend all other Virtues; though it animateth Men to great and honorable enterpriſes, doth yet at the ſame time reſtrain them from attempting things which they conceive themſelves incapable to effect; inſpiring *courage*, not temerity. Then by teaching, that nothing is either more worthy of, or more delightful to a ſpirit elevated by the love of Virtue, above the vulgar, than to doe good to others; and in order thereunto, to prefer beneficence to ſelf-intereſt: it makes us perfectly charitable, benign, affable, and

and ready to oblige every one by good offices, when it is in our power so to do. Again, being inseparable from virtuous *Humility*, it makes us both to measure our own Merits by the impartial rule of right reason, and to know that we can have no just right to praise or reward, but from the genuin and laudable use of the freedom of our Will. And from these and other the like excellent effects of this divine Virtue, it is that the *Generous* attain to an absolute dominion over their exorbitant passions and desires. They conquer *Jealousie* and *Envy*, by considering, that nothing whereof the acquisition depends not wholy upon themselves, is realy valuable enough to justify their earnest desire of it. They exempt themselves from *Hatred* towards any, by esteeming all as worthy of love as themselves. They admit no *Fear*, by being duely conscious of their own innocency, and secure in the confidence of their own Virtue. They banish *Grief*, by remembring that while they conserve their *will* to doe *good*, they can be deprived of nothing that is properly theirs. And *Anger* they exclude, because little esteeming whatsoever depends upon others, they never yeeld so much to their Adversaries, as to acknowledge themselves within the

reach

reach of their injuries. It is not then without reaſon, that I fix upon *Generoſity*, as one of the univerſal remedies againſt our inordinate Cupidities. And

Art. 7. And frequent reflections upon *Providence Divine.*

As for the other, namely frequent reflection upon *Providence Divine*; this doubtleſs muſt likewiſe be of ſoveraign efficacy to preſerve us from all diſtempers of mind. For, it eſtabliſheth us in a certain perſwaſion, that it is abſolutely impoſſible that any thing ſhould come to paſs otherwiſe than this *Providence* hath from all eternity determined: and conſequently, that *Fortune* is but a *Chimera*, hatch'd in the brain out of an Error of human underſtanding, and nouriſhed by popular *ſuperſtition*. For, we cannot *deſire* any thing, unleſs we firſt think the ſame to be ſome way or other *poſſible*: nor can we think thoſe things to be poſſible, that depend not upon us, unleſs ſo far as we imagine them to depend upon *Fortune*, and that the like have hapned in times paſt. But this opinion proceeds only from hence, that we *know not* all the Cauſes that concurr to ſingle Effects. For, when a thing that we have apprehended to depend upon Fortune, and ſo to be poſſible, ſucceeds not: that is a certain ſign, that ſome one of the Cauſes neceſſary to make it ſucceed or come to paſs,

hath been *wanting*; and consequently, that the same was absolutely impossible; as also that the like event, that is such a one to the production whereof the like necessary Cause was wanting, hath never come to pass. So that had we not been *ignorant* of that *deficient* Cause, we never had thought that event to be *possible*, nor by consequence ever *desired* it.

Art. 8. Which utterly excludeth *Fortune*, but leaveth us at *liberty* to direct our desires.

We are therefore utterly to renounce that vulgar absurdity, that there is in the World a certain Power called *Fortune*, that makes things to happen or not to hapen as she pleaseth: and in the room thereof to establish this great verity, that all things are directed by *Divine Providence*, whose decree is so infallible and immutable, that excepting those things which the same decree hath left to depend upon our *Will*, we ought to think, that in respect of *Us*, nothing doth or can come to pass, that is not necessary, and in some measure fatal: so that we cannot without *error* desire any thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth. But forasmuch as our desires for the most part extend to things that depend neither wholy upon us, nor wholy upon others: therefore we ought in them to distinguish exactly what dependeth *intirely* upon *ourselves*,

ſelves, that ſo we may extend our deſires to *that* alone. And as for the reſt; though we ought to look upon the ſucceſs as fatal and immutable, leſt we place our deſire thereupon: yet ought we alſo ſeriouſly to weigh and conſider the *reaſons* that ſuggeſt more or leſs *hope*, that they may ſerve to direct our actions accordingly. For *reaſon* requires we ſhould follow the more probable and ſafe way to our end: and when we have done ſo; whatever the *Event* be, we ought contentedly to acquieſce in this, that we have done what our *Underſtanding* judged to be *beſt*. And truely when we have learned thus to diſtinguiſh *Providence Divine* from *Fortune*, we ſhall eaſily acquire a habit of directing our deſires in ſuch a manner, that becauſe the accompliſhment of them depends upon ourſelves only, they may alwaies afford us full ſatisfaction.

Art. 9. How we may expedite our ſelves from the difficulties that ſeem to make the decree of *Divine Providence* irreconcileable to the *liberty* of our *will*.

But *doe we not here intangle ourſelves in great difficulties, by endevoring thus to reconcile this* eternal Preordination of God, *to the* Liberty *of our* Will? we doe, I confeſs; but conceive withall, that we may diſentangle ourſelves again, by remembring, that *our Underſtanding* is *finite*, but the *power* of *God* by which He hath from eternity not only foreknown all

things that are or can poſſibly be, but alſo willed and preordained them ſo to be, is *infinite*: and then that it is enough for us, clearly and diſtinctly to know that this infinite Power is eſſentialy in God; but too much for us ſo to *comprehend* the ſame, as to ſee in what manner it leaveth the actions of Men undermined and *free*. For of the *Liberty* or indifferency that is in us, we are all ſo conſcious within ourſelves, that there is nothing we can comprehend more evidently, more perfectly. And it were abſurd, becauſe we cannot comprehend one thing which we know to be of its own nature *incomprehenſible* to us; therefore to doubt of another which we do intimately comprehend, and by daily experience find to be in ourſelves.

Art. 10. How it comes that we are often *deceived by* our *will*, though we are never deceived *with* our will.

Again, ſince we thus know moſt certainly, that all our *Errors* depend upon our *Will*; *is it not wonderfully ſtrange that we are ever* deceived, *when no Man is* willing *to be deceived?* 'Tis ſo indeed; but nevertheleſs the Problem ſeems capable of ſolution by conſidering, that it is *one* thing to be willing to be deceived, and *another* to be willing to give *aſſent* to thoſe things wherein it hapens that error is found. And though there be no Man, who is expreſly willing to be deceived: yet

yet there is scarcely any, who is not often willing to assent to those things wherein error is, unknown to him, contained: Yea it often falls out; that the very desire of attaining to truth, causeth those who do not rightly know by what way it is to be attained, to give judgment of things they do not clearly perceive, and so to err. So that the *summe* of all this perplex and intricate matter is this, that *Error ariseth from our assent to things whose truth or falsity, good or evil, we have not clearly and distinctly discerned.* For, since *God* cannot without impious absurdity be imagined to be Author of deceipt, the faculty He hath given us of perceiving and discerning, cannot naturaly tend to *falsity*: as neither can our faculty of assenting, that is our will, when it extends itself only to those things that are clearly perceived. Whence it follows, that to *direct our desires aright*, our main business must be to imploy our *Understanding* or faculty of discerning, strictly and attentively to examine and consider the *goodness* of the objects, before we determin our *Will* upon them: wherein doth chiefly consist the use of all *Moral* Wisedom, and whereupon great part of our temporal *Felicity* dependeth.

Art. 11. A *third* general *Remedy* againſt Error occaſioned by inordinate Paſſions, viz. *Premeditation* and *Deliberation*.

But do not I here propoſe a leſſon very hard to human frailty to learn? Is it not extremely difficult thus accurrately and calmly to examine things, when the imagination is vehemently commoved by the object of ſome more violent paſſion, and the judgment ſtrongly ſurpriſed? I acknowledge it to be *difficult* indeed: but this difficulty hath its proper *Remedy*, namely *Premeditation* and *Deliberation*. I find in myſelf (and ſo do all Men, I believe) that the motions raiſed in my blood by the objects of my affections, doe ſo promptly follow upon the firſt impreſſions made by them in my brain, and from the mechanical diſpoſition of the organs of my body, though my Soul contribute nothing toward their advancement, but continues indifferent; that all the wiſedom I can call to my aſſiſtance, is not ſufficient to reſiſt and arreſt them. And others there are, I know, who being naturaly propens to the commotions of Joy, or of Commiſeration, or Terror, or Anger; have not the power to refrain themſelves from ſwooning, or tears, or trembling, or heat of blood, whenever their Phanſy is vehemently aſſaulted by objects apt to excite thoſe Paſſions. Nay, as if all Mankind were equaly ſubject to the ſame defect, it is held for

a Maxim, that *the firſt motions of our paſſions are not in our power.* And yet notwithſtanding, this ſo univerſal defect is not incurable by *Premeditation* and *care.* When therefore we firſt feel any ſuch ſtrong commotion of our blood, we ought to be premoniſhed and to remember, that all things that offer themſelves to the imagination, reſpect only the deception of the Reaſonable Soul, and to perſwade her that the reaſons which ſerve to recommend the object of her paſſion, are far more firm and conſiderable than in reality they are: and on the contrary, that thoſe which ſerve to diſcommend it, are much weaker and leſs conſiderable than in truth they are. And when Paſſion comes at length to perſwade us to do thoſe things whoſe execution admits of any the leaſt pauſe or delay: we muſt remember to abſtain from giving judgment concerning them, much leſs aſſent to them, and to avert our cogitations to other things, untill time and quiet have wholy compoſed the commotion in our blood. Finaly, when heat of paſſion inciteth us to actions that allow little or no time for counſel or deliberation; in this caſe we are to convert our will chiefly upon following thoſe *reaſons* that are *contrary* to what that paſ-

ſion ſuggeſteth, although they appear leſs valid. So when an Enemy invades us unexpectedly, that ſuddain occaſion permits us not to take time for deliberation whether of the three is beſt, to *reſiſt*, to *ſubmit*, or to *fly*. Here therefore, when we feel ourſelves ſurpriſed with *fear*; we ſhould endeavor to avert our thoughts from the conſideration of the danger, and fix them upon the reaſons for which there is greater ſecurity and honor in reſiſtence than in flight: and on the contrary, when we perceive ourſelves to be by *anger* and deſire of *revenge* provoked to ruſh turiouſly upon him who aſſaults us; we muſt remember to think, that it is great imprudence to precipitate ones ſelf into manifeſt danger, when ſafety may be obtained without infamy: and where we are *inferior* to the Aggreſſor in point of ſtrength, there we are likewiſe to conſider, that it is better to retreat honorably, or to conſent to terms of ſubmiſſion, than like a wild beaſt to expoſe ourſelves to certain death. This therefore I ought to preſcribe to my ſelf, as a *Third Pancreſton* or *Univerſal Antidote* againſt the incommodities impendent from Paſſions; viz. to give myſelf time for deliberation, where the occaſion will allow it: and

where it will not, there to convert my thought chiefly upon the reaſons that contradict the ſuggeſtions of my paſſion: and alwaies to remember that the reaſons that offer themſelves to recommend the object of my paſſion, are not realy ſo valid and conſiderable, as my imagination repreſents them to be. Nor doth this counſel ſeem difficult to be put in practiſe, eſpecialy by conſiderate Men and ſuch who are wont to make ſerious reflections upon their actions.

Art. 12. A *fourth* univerſal Remedy, viz. the conſtant exerciſe of *Vertue*.

But what need I thus perplex my thoughts in ſearching for Medicins to mitigate the violence of Paſſions, when there is one ſingular Remedy infallibly ſufficient to ſecure us from all the Evils they can poſſibly occaſion, and that is the *conſtant exerciſe of Vertue?* For, ſeeing that the internal commotions of the *Reaſonable* Soul touch us more neerly, and by conſequence are much more prevalent over us, than the affections of the *Senſitive*, which though different from, are yet many times conjoyned with them: moſt certain it is, that all the tumults raiſed in the *Senſitive*, have no power to perturb the tranquillity of her Superior, the *Rational*, provided ſhe have reaſon to be in peace and content within herſelf; but ſerve rather

to

to augment her Joy, by giving her occaſions to know and delight in her own perfection, as often as ſhe finds herſelf much above any the leaſt diſcompoſure or diſturbance from them. And that ſhe may be thus *content* within herſelf, ſhe need do no more but intirely addict herſelf to the *love* and *perſuit* of *Virtue*. For, whoever hath ſo lived, that his conſcience cannot accuſe him of ever neglecting to do thoſe things which he judged to be beſt (which is exactly to follow the conduct of Virtue) this Man doth from thence receive that *intellectual joy* and ſatisfaction, which is of ſuch ſoveraign power to make him happy, that the moſt violent commotions of his affections can never be of force enough to perturb the tranquillity of his Soul; and which being the *Summum Bonum* of human life, is not to be attained (as *Seneca* from his oracle *Epicurus* moſt judiciouſly obſerves, *Epiſt.* 23.) *niſi ex bona conſcientia, ex honeſtis conſiliis, ex rectis actionibus, ex contemptu fortuitorum, ex placido vitæ ac continuo tenore unam prementis viam.* Nor is there indeed any other internal ſatisfaction or joy belonging to the Rational Soul, but what ſhe thus formeth to herſelf out of herſelf; and what can therefore be no more interrupted

terrupted, than ſhe can be deſtroyed: the aſſurance whereof made the ſame *Seneca* ſay (*Epiſt.* 27.) *Sola virtus præſtat gaudium perpetuum, ſecurum: etiam ſi quid obſtat, nubium modo intervenit, quæ infra feruntur, nec unquam diem vincunt.*

Art. 13. The ſtudy of *Epicurus*'s *Morals* recommended

And theſe, *my dear friend*, are ſome of thoſe Philoſophical conſiderations upon which I ſometimes reflect (as I lately told you) as Univerſal and Efficacious Remedies againſt vain deſires ſuggeſted by our Paſſions, and the various Evils to which they uſualy expoſe us. Which now you have with ſo great patience heard; 'tis fit I ſhould gratefully reſign you to a more profitable converſation with your own thoughts, which I know to be for the moſt part imployed in the ſtudy of things noble and worthy your excellent wit. But firſt, leſt you ſhould think I do it ſomwhat abruptly, and by omitting to preſcribe alſo *Special Preſervatives* proper to the exceſſes of each *particular* Affection, end this diſcourſe before I have finiſhed it: ſuffer me in a word to advertiſe you, that I make this omiſſion, not from incogitancy, nor out of wearineſs, but only for your greater benefit. For, being of opinion, that the *Ethicks* of *Epicurus* are (after Holy writ) the beſt *Diſpenſatory* I have hitherto read,

of

of Natural *Medicines* for all diſtempers incident to the mind of Man: I conceive, I may do you better ſervice by recommending that Book to your ſerious peruſal, than by writing leſs accurately of the ſame moſt weighty argument. This therefore I now do; not doubting but that in the *Morals* of that grave and profound Philoſopher, you will find as good *Precepts* for the moderating your Paſſions, as *Human wiſedom* can give.

FINIS.

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